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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the symbiotic relationship between
rhetoric and homiletics.

The proposed interface between the

two disciplines is metaphor.

Contemporary research on

metaphor in philosophy, rhetoric, sociology, and theology is
employed to produce a rhetorical/metaphorical homiletics.
A deconstruction of classical homiletics traces the
basic preaching model to a Cartesian philosophical starting
point.

The nature of the Christian scriptures as

metaphorical and of Christian liturgy as symbolic is alien
to the rational, objective homiletics.

An examination of

Christian worship as a rhetorical event includes the
elements of the theory of rhetoric developed by Michel
Foucault: discursive practices, rules, roles, knowledge, and
power.
Through a new reading of classical sources, implicitly
or explicitly impacting the homiletic tradition, a
different, more positive role is suggested for rhetoric.
Instead of viewing rhetoric as a tool of evil, the preacher
is encouraged to accept the rhetorical nature of all
preaching.

On this reading homiletics is defined as a type

of rhetoric and the preacher becomes a rhetor.

Rhetoric is

defined as contingency and probability in opposition to
traditional Christian dogmas of certainty.

v

In an extension of the rhetorical theories of Ernesto
Grassi and Richard H. Brown, a rhetoric of folly is
developed.

By juxtaposing the views of Grassi and St. Paul

concerning folly, a common goal of Christians and
secularists is discovered.

Both, while despairing of the

rational paradigm, suggest folly as a way of survival.

The

characteristics of a rhetoric of folly are: identification,
semantic speech, empathic communication, dialectical irony,
and metaphor.
Metaphor, as a creative power, is presented as the
major component in a rhetoric of folly.

Rather than view

metaphor as an element of style, this study resituates
metaphor as an element of rhetorical invention.

Metaphor is

capable of redescribing reality, producing a new world, and
creating credibility, community, and concepts by which
Christians and secularists structure reality.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Christian preaching faces a perpetual crisis.1
According to Cardinal Newman2

and Matthew Arnold3

preaching can be seen as an attempted synthesis of two rival
moral and intellectual traditions: the secular or "Hellenic"
tradition, and the sacred or "Hebraic" tradition.
Throughout the history of preaching the convergence of these
two traditions has been almost impossible to accomplish.
Tertullian prescribed the polarities in his blunt question:
"What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?"4

Arnold

complains that there ought to be a happy balance between the
two, "though it never is."5
Perhaps the most significant response to the crisis of
the rival cultures embedded in Christian preaching was that
of St. Augustine.

Floyd Anderson argues that Augustine

produced a synthesis of sacred doctrine and pagan knowledge,
representing "probably the most successful synthesis of
Hebraism and Hellenism in Western history. 116

Augustine

joins eloquence to religion and provides in De doctrina
Christiana two texts for the present study.

The first text

would eliminate existing differences between the sacred and
the secular:

"Every good and worthy Christian should

understand that wherever they may find truth,

it emanates

from their Lord."7 In the second text, Augustine urges
preachers to

"...

despoil pagan thought of the gold of

wisdom and the silver of eloquence, as by God's command the
Hebrews despoiled the Egyptians."8
Unfortunately, the Augustinian synthesis has not
survived into the twentieth century.

The most notable

reconstruction of Augustine's rhetorical homiletics was that
of Fenelon.

Subsequent homiletic theorists have attempted

to combine disparate elements of Hebraism and Hellenism
without achieving the "happy balance" that Matthew Arnold
thought desirable.
A partial result for contemporary preachers,

saddled

with the oral culture of the Hebrew prophets as well as the
literate culture of Athens, is a crisis of rationality. I am
using the term "rationality" in the sense that the
autonomous consciousness of the thinker could account for
any reality by the strict application of the methods of
science and logic.

The classical critiques of rationality

have been expressed in the works of the "masters of
suspicion," Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx.

They called into

serious question the naive rationalist claims of the Age of
Enlightenment.

Homiletic methodology, content in its own

illusion of rationality, has failed to challenge or
assimilate the charges made by the hermeneutics of
suspicion.

The most frequent and most damaging charge by
Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud has been expressed in a variety
of ways: in Marxist terms, by the bourgeois intellectual's
refusal to struggle against oppressive economic conditions;
in Freudian terms, by the disclosure of subterranean forces
of the unconscious motivating our supposed rationality; in
the charges of Nietzsche that our primary task is not the
development of a sincere rationalism, but the becoming of
individuals.
A contemporary critique of the crisis of rationality by
Richard J. Bernstein centers in what he calls "Cartesian
anxiety."

Cartesian anxiety is the assumption that only two

options are available for those who inquire into matters of
knowledge and action: either some ultimate ground for
knowledge and action exists, some objective foundation, or
we are beset by relativistic skepticism which ends in
befuddled plurality.

This opposition, argues Bernstein,

includes the crisis of "rationality versus irrationality. 1,9
Homiletic methodology has remained oblivious to the dilemma
by choosing either a dogmatic rationalism or a charismatic
irrationality.
An example of the impact of the Cartesian anxiety upon
preaching can be seen in the way the literate world in which
preachers perform has diluted the impact of oral
communication.

As W. Lance Haynes argues,

"Focusing on

rhetoric solely through literate frameworks has long since
led us to treat oral rhetoric as if it were written and
performed--as if the rhetorical processes at work in oral
composition and interaction differ little, if at all, from
those of written thought and indeed, to then attempt the
promulgation of an orally-performed version of literate
rhetoric. 1,10

Classic homiletic theory, with its insistence

on the use of propositional statements to be developed and
defended, has produced a literate framework.
The rhetoric of oral literacy dominates theological
study, at least that of the homiletics department, in the
modern seminary.

The preoccupation of homileticians with

constructing sermons from a stock homiletic design
(introduction, text, propositional topic, categorical
points, and conclusion) suggests a dependency upon the
technical restraints of literacy.
While homiletical methods are Hellenistic in nature,
this very dependence upon literacy raises an additional
problem.

Haynes, drawing on the models of Walter Ong,

suggests that we are experiencing the advent of the age of
video literacy; he argues,

"Video is impregnating modern

civilization with rhetorical processes that cannot be
optimally studied, taught, or used by traditional literate
means."11

Applied to homiletics this suggests that aspects
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of oral culture are reintroduced to traditional literate
homiletic methodology.
After all, classical rhetoric is the content of the
Hellenism imbibed by preaching.

The propositional sermon,

so characteristic of homiletic design, involves the
painstaking construction of proofs intended for sequential
critical digestion.

The whole process is that of classical

rhetoric, and homiletics shows little inclination to change
its ancient foundations.

Sermon textbooks often employ

edifice metaphors, for example, to indicate that sermons are
built or constructed in a logical fashion.12

The process

appears like gothic architecture, leading the audience
through cognitive labor to construct cathedrals of
definitional precision, decorated with pathos and ethos, and
cemented with the mortar of linear logic.

As Leland Griffin

has shown, such metaphors are nineteenth century relics.13
In a survey of 120 preaching textbooks I discovered a
preponderance of classical Greek and Latin rhetorical
theory.

For example, the foundational homiletical text of

the twentieth century is On the Preparation and Delivery of
Sermons. by John A. Broadus.

A synopsis of Broadus' work

demonstrates an adaptation of the Aristotelian theory of
rhetoric and the Ciceronian canons of rhetoric--invention,
disposition, delivery, style, and memory--to the particular
needs of Christian preaching.

Broadus includes a section on

argument which borrows extensively from Richard Whately, but
cites no rhetorical theorists after him.
Since 1970 there have been some attempts to move beyond
the old preaching method, but even the new models have
ignored potential contributions by rhetorical theorists.
Some homileticians have adapted superficial elements of
communication theory to preaching.14

Others suggest a

story-telling model without including narrative theory in
their methods.15
Two contemporary homileticians are possible exceptions
to this critique: Fred Craddock, who starts from an
existentialist position and argues for an inductive model of
preaching,16 and David Buttrick, who presents what he calls
a "patchwork phenomenological" approach.17

Craddock and

Buttrick attempt to move preaching away from dependence on
classical rhetoric.

Their works are a step in the right

direction, but still fall short of a synthesis of
contemporary rhetoric and homiletics.
In general while rhetorical theory has moved beyond its
classical roots and the study of knowledge and reality has
revealed the shortcomings of a Cartesian dualism, preaching
has continued to live in an isolated intellectual tower.
is as if the art of preaching has become a still-frame
picture from the eighteenth century.

Even as other

disciplines have experienced reconstruction, now homiletic

It

theory is called to a similar task.

I began by noting the

dichotomy that prevails in homiletics.

Perhaps a synthesis

can be formed, a synthesis of wisdom and eloquence, a
synthesis of orality and literacy, a synthesis of rhetoric
and homiletics.
In this study I attempt a reconstruction of the
Augustinian synthesis.

My purpose is to begin developing a

rhetorical homiletics: a union of form and content, wisdom
and eloquence,

sacred and secular.

The major emphasis will

be on contemporary rhetorical theory because rhetoric and
homiletics are part of the same basic discipline.

The need

for a rhetorically-based homiletics arises in part from such
historical and interpretative considerations already
expressed, but at least one other rationale supports my
attempt.
This rationale comes from what I consider common goals
of preachers and rhetoricians; for example, solving human
problems, preventing nuclear war, averting ecological
disaster, or any one of dozens of other issues of public
interest.

The vital issues confronting our existence are of

such magnitude that all potential alliances and syntheses
for effecting a global community of peace and well-being
demand consideration.

As Haynes asserts,

"Recognizing the

extent to which humane behavior, once learned, need not be
preceded by conscious deliberation paves the way toward

creation of a truly humane world society."18

From such a

rhetorical base may rise "not a global village--after all,
the prospect of village life thrills us not--but a global
community."19

I am suggesting that the secular rhetorician

and Christian preacher have in common a fundamental attitude
which affirms the ultimate significance and final worth of
our lives, here and now, in nature and in history.

As David

Tracy makes explicit, this common faith of "secularist and
modern Christian is perhaps the most important insight
needed. . . . " 20
Central to my argument is the contention that
traditional homiletical methods have been influenced by
science and reason.

It is no accident that a rational,

objective homiletic arose at the same time as scientific
method inspired by Descarte's A Discourse on Method.
Rational homiletics parodies scientific procedure in which
an object is isolated for study and a general deduction is
followed by descriptive statements.

Such a strictly

rational method of preaching clashes with the metaphorical
nature of religious thought and language.

In other words, a

rational method, based on a hermeneutics of God-given
certain truth cannot cope with biblical language which is
often figural, poetic, or narrative in form.

As Hans Frei

has demonstrated, the idea that texts contain themes,
propositions, or principles was a response to skeptical

rationalism's charge that the Bible was a collection of
irrational, embarrassing myths.21
To be clear, my objective is not to reject all
traditional homiletical theory, much of which has been of
practical import to preachers.

I seek instead a

deconstruction of homiletical methods and the potential for
a new model. The theoretical content of my model will be
that of contemporary rhetorical theory.

As Cherwitz and

Hikins point out, "homiletics is a subspecies of
rhetoric. "22
Adopting rhetoric as a pivotal starting point and major
content contributor to a theory of homiletics will not
authorize rhetoric with the power to replace historical
concerns of preachers, such as the inspiration of'the Bible,
revelation from God, and questions of authority.23

These

issues are better pursued in theological studies.

I intend

to apply contemporary rhetorical theory to homiletics with
the goal of producing theoretical as well as pragmatic
implications for preaching.
There are numerous perspectives in contemporary
rhetorical theory which could contribute to homiletics: the
epistemic, the argumentative, the fantasy-theme, the speechact, the performative, and the narrative.

Any of these

perspectives are possible starting points for a rhetorical
homiletics.

Given the need to refute the rational paradigm
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of homiletics, and given the rhetorical, symbolic nature of
religious thought and language, however, I offer an
epistemic and metaphorical perspective.

This perspective

was chosen because it projects rhetoric as a way of
knowing,24 presupposes that reality is "socially
constructed,"25

and offers metaphor as the "boundary-

violater," by which the unknown can become known and thus
expand what counts as knowledge.
Rhetoric as epistemic departs from the traditional
point of view of homiletics--that truth is certain,
knowable, and communicable.

Applied to homiletics, the

epistemic nature of rhetoric offers potential for
challenging the rational, objective method of preaching.
Rhetoric as epistemic also elevates the art of preaching
from its traditional managerial role of passing the truth
from one person to another, and allows preaching to recreate
reality through metaphor.
The Statement of the Problem
The increase in scholarly interest in metaphor has led
to an immense explosion of meanings for the term metaphor.
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine critically
the concept of metaphor as it is used in rhetoric and
philosophy, and apply these theories to a homiletical model.
Since a comprehensive survey of all of twentieth century
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rhetoric, philosophy, and homiletics is impossible within
the parameters of my study, I will concentrate on studies of
metaphor in rhetoric and philosophy that consider the
epistemic value of metaphor.
In this study I attempt to resituate metaphor from its
status as a mere ornament of style to an essential role in
the creation of knowledge.

A survey of representative

homiletics texts shows that metaphor has been primarily
treated as a part of style.

E. Eugene Hall and James L.

Heflin surveyed many of the treatments of preaching and
concluded,

"Attention to figures of speech in treatments of

preaching are less than extensive.1126

The problem is to

see the preacher, not as a user of pretty words, but as a
maker of new worlds through metaphor.

The preacher comes to

the arena of public debate to present his/her metaphorical
worlds, not as the only reality, but as one way of defining
the community, within the bounds of his/her religious
commitments and interpretations.
Questions, therefore, need to be asked and answers
attempted in a systematic way.

Among the central questions

related to the problem of metaphor in homiletics are:
1) What is the nature of the basic relationship between
rhetoric and homiletics?

2) What is the theory of metaphor

utilized in traditional homiletics?

3) What characteristics

of rhetoric and philosophy will be most helpful in
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maintaining the assertion,
preaching"?

"Metaphor has epistemic value for

4) What insights from theories of metaphor can

be applied to a homiletical model?

5) Can metaphor function

as the thought of the sermon rather than the decoration of
the sermon?

While these questions suggest the parameters of

the research problem,

further explication of certain related

problems is needed.
The Subproblems
The first subproblem is to examine the complex inter
relationship of rhetoric with homiletics.

Any preaching

model proposing a dependence upon rhetorical theories will
of necessity have to deal with the natural antipathy of
Christian scholars to rhetoric.

There has been little

effort to bridge systematically the concern of homiletics
and rhetoric or to explore fully and directly the way
metaphor makes possible at least one interface between
homiletics and rhetoric.
The second subproblem is to examine the concept of
metaphor in representative rhetorical and philosophical
studies of the twentieth century.

The third subproblem is

to examine the concept of metaphor in representative
homiletics texts of the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.

While theologians have incorporated much

rhetorical theory of metaphor into their discussions of
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faith, little scholarly work has been done on metaphor in
the area of homiletics.

The fourth subproblem is to produce

a rhetorical model for homiletics that has epistemological
and practical value.

The model includes contributions of

rhetorical scholars in research other than that of metaphor.
The Delimitations
The concept of metaphor, especially in its rhetorical
nature, controls the investigation.

No attempt is made to

include every treatment of metaphor, because metaphor
pervades discussion not only in the humanities but the
sciences as well.

Therefore, representative treatments of

metaphor are selected; specifically the works of Ernesto
Grassi, Paul Ricoeur, Max Black, Wayne Booth, Mark Johnson,
and Richard H. Brown.
Further, no attempt is made to deal with every major
homiletician of the twentieth century.

In this study I

evaluate the basic paradigms of homiletics.

Certain works

have been recognized by scholars in the history of preaching
as the most influential homiletic textbooks.
the work of John A. Broadus, Andrew Blackwood,

Specifically,
James W. Cox,

and John Killinger will be studied as representatives of the
classical homiletics paradigm.
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The Definition of Terms
The term "epistemology" is used in the broad sense to
refer to how knowledge is acquired.

Questions about the

nature of epistemology depend on some stable notion of what
it is.

As I use the term it means a way of knowing, a way

that extends the boundaries of religious knowing. The
relationship between rhetoric and epistemology has been of
interest to rhetorical theorists at least since Robert L.
Scott's seminal article. Scott asserts,

"In human affairs,

then, rhetoric, perceived in the frame herein discussed,
a way of knowing; it is epistemic.1,27
argues,

is

Elaine Ognibene

"rhetoric can no longer be seen simply as a means of

persuasion.

It becomes instead the medium in which selves

grow.1128
From a religious perspective, Wayne Booth's book,
Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent. recognizes that
when belief is taken as dogma, there is no role for
rhetoric, except the manipulative use by the superior, and
argues for the creative role of assent.29

For rhetoric to

be a rhetoric of assent, it must be viewed as epistemic.
Given this definition of epistemic, preachers are asked to
abandon certainty for ambiguity.

Giving rhetoric a place of

honor in the isolated kingdom of preaching can open
homiletics to a demystification of its perceived task and
help the preacher's advocacy of Christianity become more
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morally responsible.

Then he might be able to have a

positive role in fostering community and a viable civic
life.
"Metaphor" refers to two active thoughts that remain in
permanent tension with one another.

As Paul Ricoeur

insists, metaphor belongs to the semantics not the syntax of
language.30

Rather than being defined as a figure of

speech, a decorative use of language, metaphor is original
language, prior to rational language; metaphor creates
thought, redescribes reality, and remains always open-ended,
indirect, ambiguous, and revolutionary.

The distinctive

features of metaphor can be summarized in the following way:
a metaphor is an assertion or judgment of similarity and
difference between two thoughts in permanent tension with
one another, which redescribes reality in an open-ended way,
but has structural as well as epistemic and effective power.
"Rhetoric" gets poor reviews from the homileticians.
Among those unfamiliar with the history of preaching there
exist a number of misconceptions about rhetoric.

In

homiletic textbooks one finds warnings against the dangers
of rhetoric and rhetoric defined as style or oratory.31
The lack of a careful definition of rhetoric by
homileticians is further evidence that preaching has failed
to assimilate the resources of contemporary rhetoric.

A

typical definition of rhetoric from a popular homiletical
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work will indicate the seriousness of the definitional
problem:

"Rhetoric taught him to use his abilities . . . by

instructing him in the art of extemporization, appropriate
expression, and moving appeal."32
Witness, in contrast, the following definitions of
rhetoric offered by serious scholars across the centuries.
Aristotle's definition still stands as paradigmatic for
rhetorical theorists:

"Rhetoric is the faculty of finding in

any given situation the available means of persuasion. 1,33
Francis Bacon gave a psychological perspective in defining
rhetoric as the "application of reason to the imagination
for the better moving of the will."34

For Kenneth Burke

rhetoric is "the use of language as a symbolic means of
inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to
symbols."35

I. A. Richards, in an idealistic fervor

assigns rhetoric to ". . . the study of misunderstanding and
its remedies."36
definition:

Cherwitz and Hikins offer the following

"Rhetoric is the art of describing reality

through language."37

All of these authors, and others who

could be cited, agree that rhetoric is a serious
philosophical subject that has evolved from a managerial
role in the transmission of knowledge to a creative role in
the generation of knowledge.

In other words, there is an

emergent consensus that rhetoric is epistemic.

In this study I am adopting and extending the
definition of Gerard A. Hauser that rhetoric is "the
management of symbols in order to coordinate social action."
According to Hauser,

"Rhetoric exists in the realm of the

contingent not the certain."38

Because I am interested in

how the study of rhetoric and of homiletics can be mutually
informing, I have concentrated on the kind of language by
which the preacher describes the world as it exists and
redescribes a new world invaded by the presence of the
kingdom of God.
"Homiletics" may be defined as the science of preparing
and delivering a discourse based on scripture.

In this

study I work toward a homiletics which adapts contemporary
rhetoric to the particular ends and demands of preaching. By
homiletics I mean an ongoing conversation within which
religious beliefs are advanced and supported, but which
never attain the status of certainty.

Contemporary

rhetorical theory can clarify the communicative dimensions
of homiletic discourse and establish new philosophical
starting points for homiletics.

Contemporary rhetorical

theory can also demonstrate distinctive features of metaphor
little explored by today's homiletical theorists.
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The Significance of the Study
The concept of metaphor has emerged within the past
four decades as a key category in rhetoric and philosophy,
as well as other disciplines.

One contribution of these

studies is a developing consensus that metaphor can create a
changed world-view or perspective.

Metaphor can open

avenues for multiple meanings of texts as well as
alternative solutions to public problems.

Such creative

possibilities are significant for any preaching attempting
to contribute to our survival.

As Booth argues " . . .

the

quality of any culture is in large part the quality of the
metaphorists that it creates and sustains."39

Preaching

which narrowly shuts out public debate by Christians
deserves the criticism it often receives.
Among those unfamiliar with the history of homiletics
there exists a host of criticisms about the subject and the
phenomena associated with it.

Not since Charles Dickens was

giving preachers such a hard time in Pickwick Papers have
Christian ministers appeared in sorrier plight.

Is it

because (as the Wakefield Master put it, c.1425)

"Are we all

hand-tamed by these gentry?"
hard time of it.
considered crazy.

Preachers have often had a

Jesus was called a devil, a drunkard, and
Epicurean and Stoic philosophers in

Athens called St. Paul a "cock sparrow."

Augustine

complained of his clergy as "a couple of unpretentious sheep
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do g s ."

Charlemagne sent for Alcuin to give ignorant

preachers something worth hearing to say.

Chaucer has a

line on "shitey shepherds and their shitey sheep."

Jonathan

Swift flailed out at the Scottish divines for delivering
"oracular belches to . . . panting disciples."

Yet, that

Charles Dickens version of Methodist preachers: unctuous,
mewling, greedy; across two centuries it stings.
A second significance for this study lies in the
observation of David Tracy that " . . .

all major religions

are grounded in certain root metaphors."40

These root

metaphors are frameworks for creating new meaning.

The

preacher's search for a hermeneutic of metaphor is "a
groping, a tatonment: or one who is seeking to find one's
way, to establish a sense of direction."41

In common with

artists and scientists, preachers can use root metaphors to
make experience significant.
A third significance for this study is the expansion of
rhetorical theories of knowing and metaphor to another
discipline--homiletics.

Traditional homiletics has promoted

a religious positivism which views the lexicon of Christian
truth as certain and literal.

In this fictive kingdom, the

preaching of the Bible is factual and literal.

While the

presence of metaphor is not denied, biblical figures of
speech are sacrificed on the altar of explanation and
literal paraphrase.

Under the reign of literalism,

there is
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little wonder that metaphor has been banished from the
kingdom.

I believe that the truncated art of homiletics can

be restored to a place of honor in our society.

"All

serious study is, no doubt, life-justifying,"42 but there
is potential for significance in a study that searches for
the survival of the human race in the spoken arts of
rhetoric and homiletics.
The Review of Related Literature
Two major bibliographical works, Warren A. Shibles'
Metaphor: An Annotated Bibliography and History and volume
17 of the Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of
Linguistic Science, provide the basic introductory resources
for the study of metaphor.

These two sources list over

9,500 entries. By necessity then only major writers in major
periods who have exerted either a direct or indirect
influence upon homiletical theory will be considered. The
major portion of the review focuses on periodical literature
relating to metaphor and to dissertations relevant to the
epistemic nature of metaphor.
Due to the dependence of homiletics upon classical
rhetoric, the theory of metaphor as developed by Plato,
Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian will be considered.

These

foundational studies inform most theories of metaphor.
Although Plato never formulated a theory of metaphor, his
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negative assessment of rhetoric holds just as true for
metaphor.

Plato's attitude concerning metaphor has often

been mirrored by homileticians.

By this assertion I am not

claiming a direct line from Plato to Christian writers, but
I am saying that preachers have often produced a similar
negative evaluation of rhetoric and metaphor.

(This thesis

will be developed in the discussion of the complex interface
between rhetoric and homiletics.)

The writing of Plato most

pertinent to this study is Gorqias.

In Gorqias, Plato

denounces rhetoric as "The generic name I should give it is
pandering; it has many subdivisions, one of which is
cookery, an occupation which masquerades as an art but in my
opinion is not more than a knack acquired by routine."43
Aristotle's views, developed in the Rhetoric and in the
Poetics, provide the foundation for almost all succeeding
theories of metaphor.
the classical paradigm:

His definition of metaphor remains as
"Metaphor consists in giving the

thing a name that belongs to something else; the
transference being either from genus to species, or from
species to grounds, or from species to species, or on
grounds of analogy."44

Basing metaphor in both rhetoric

and philosophy was Aristotle's positive rebuttal to Plato's
earlier negative evaluation of metaphor.

Aristotle's

treatment of metaphor can be summarized as follows:

1) as

something which happens to the noun, metaphor is attached to
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the word rather than to discourse in general; 2) As
something that displaces meaning away from or toward another
meaning, metaphor always borrows from another field of
meanings; 3) Metaphor has some sense different from ordinary
language; 4) Metaphor plays across several typologies.
While Aristotle did emphasize the creative aspect of
metaphor, the basic result of his theory was to place
metaphor under the rubric of style.
Cicero, in the De Oratore. also perceived
an ornament of language.

metaphor as

Cicero's view of metaphor is

important in homiletics because of his close connection to
the later work of Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana.

"A

metaphor is a short form of simile, contracted into one
word."45

Thus metaphor is seen as playing a cosmetic role

"with respect to ordinary language . . .

in order to produce

a pleasing effect."46
Quintilian's significance lies in his summation of
rhetorical theories of metaphor that came before him, a kind
of restatement of classicism.

A trope consists of "the

artistic alteration of a word or phrase from its proper
meaning to another," and "the commonest and by far the most
beautiful of tropes" is the metaphor.

Metaphor is for

Quintilian the "supreme ornament of style."47
George Campbell, in The Philosophy of Rhetoric,
introduces a rhetorical framework vastly different from the

classical system.

In place of the five canons, Campbell

reduces the goals of speaking to four: enlighten the
understanding, please the imagination, move the passions,
or influence the will.48

The significance of Campbell for

this study can be traced to current homiletics textbooks
which still utilize Campbell's framework.

In addition, his

treatment of metaphor as an occurrence in the mind, as an
act of the imagination, is relevant to the proposed model
developed in this study.

The major tasks of metaphor,

according to Campbell, are fixing attention and interest,
moving the passions, and inducing belief.

The role of

metaphor in inducing belief has particular relevance for the
preacher.

Campbell argues that "lively ideas have a

stronger influence than faint ideas to induce
belief.

. . .1149

Also, Campbell insists that metaphor is

basically argument by analogy.50
Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres
were first published in 1783.

Blair, a popular Scottish

preacher, develops a rather complete conception of metaphor
as linguistic expression.

His remarks on metaphor betray a

negative concept of metaphor as ornaments; they are
"artificial embellishments of rhetoric" or "laboured
refinements of art" or "pompous."51

Thus Blair insists

that metaphor is to be used to embellish and to decorate
speech.

His work carries this now obsolete concept of
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metaphor to its culmination.
sort of picture."52

Blair defines metaphor as "a

This definition is used in

prescriptive preaching texts which encourage inspiring
preachers to paint pictures with words.
Pierre Fontanier treated metaphor as a mere ornament to
plain thought and only one of many figures of speech.
important task of the interpreter is paraphrase.

The

Metaphor

is a mere accident in naming and rhetoric is the art of
pleasing not persuading.

Metaphor is understood as the

substitution of one noun for another.

This approach to

metaphor, dominant from Plato through part of the twentieth
century, has been expressed and taught in homiletical text
books through the present time.

For Fontanier rhetoric is

reduced to the study of figures of style, which he defines
as "the more or less remarkable traits and forms, the
phrases with a more or less happy turn, by which the
expression of ideas, thoughts, and feelings remove the
discourse more or less far away from what would have been
its simple common expression."53
I. A. Richards, in The Philosophy of Rhetoric,
represents a major shift in the direction of metaphor
theory.

His definition of metaphor, his nomenclature for

the elements involved in metaphor, and his theory of meaning
constitute his major contributions to the study of metaphor.
For example, his definition of metaphor has been
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paradigmatic for most ensuing studies of metaphor:

"When we

use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things
active together and supported by a single word, or phrase,
whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction. 1,54

For

Richards metaphor is basic to our thought process.
In The Philosophy of Rhetoric Richards makes several
claims that in one form or another remain basic to the study
of metaphor.

Metaphor is not a trope dealing only with

words, nor is it a matter of style alone.
omnipresent principle of thought.

Instead, it is an

"Thought is metaphoric,

and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language
derive therefrom."55

Metaphor permeates all discourse.

Because homileticians have missed or ignored these claims,
they have taken metaphor as a stylistic ornament dealing
with the matter of choosing visual words to enforce logical
points in the sermon.

Richards discounts this traditional

or received view of metaphor and suggests that metaphor
involves metaphysical and epistemological issues.
Homiletics has much to gain from the insights of
Richards.

The idea that thought is essentially metaphoric

fits well with the concept that Judaic-Christian scriptures
and religious languages are basically metaphoric.

If, as

Richards argues, metaphors are cognitively irreducible and
indispensable, then homiletics can dispense with the futile
attempt to merely repeat Christian traditions and attempt to
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expand them with new metaphoric formulations.

Also, any

adequate account of meaning and truth must give a central
place to metaphor.
One of the attempts to explore the epistemological
character of metaphor is the work of Susanne Langer.

Her

Philosophy in a New Key extends Kant's critique of reason,
explores the power of metaphor, and explicates epistemology
as all that is left to the philosophical heritage.

Langer

perceives metaphor as the principle by which new words are
born.

"One might say that metaphor is the law of life.

It

is the force that makes it essentially relational,
intellectual,
reality,

forever showing up new, abstractable forms in

forever laying down a deposit of old, abstracted

concepts in an increasing treasure of general words."56 In
a profession,

such as preaching, which suffers from a loss

of confidence in language as well as from the crippling
weight of a whole pantheon of dead "god" metaphors,

Langer's

insistence on broadening the philosophy of meaning to
include metaphor as new meaning offers potential.
Philip Wheelwright,

in The Burning Foundation,

discusses the relationship between metaphor and reality and
the function of metaphor in religion.

He proposed a double

language theory--literal and metaphorical.

As language that

is "alive," "fluid," "vital," "open," and "resonant,"
metaphor has for Wheelwright an ontological character.57
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While Wheelwright's language theory may perpetuate the
dichotomy of rhetoric and homiletics (since rhetoric is
traditionally seen as poetic and homiletics as persuasive
discourse), his description of metaphoric language acts to
counteract the positivism and literalness in linguistic
analysis as well as in homiletics.
A philosophical approach to the theory of metaphor is
used by Max Black in his Models and Metaphors: Studies in
Language and Philosophy.

Black summarizes theories of

metaphor, dividing them into substitution views, comparison
views, and interaction views.
relevant theory in this study.

The interaction view is the
Black relied on I. A.

Richard's theory in which two different expressions act
together to result in another meaning.

Although Black fails

to explain the significance of metaphor for philosophy, he
does argue for the nonparaphrasable quality of interactive
metaphors.

"Up to a point, we may succeed in stating a

number of the relevant relations between the two elements of
a metaphor . . . But the set of literal statements so
obtained will not have the same power . . . The loss in such
cases is a loss in cognitive content . . . The literal
translation . . . fails to give the insight that the
metaphor did."58

Metaphor is a filter, according to Black,

which links a system of associated meanings to a principal
subject, its focus.
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Perhaps the most comprehensive theory of metaphor is
that of Paul Ricoeur.

In his Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur

insists that metaphor contains the power to redescribe
reality.

The work progresses from a rhetorical to a

semantical, to a hermeneutical study.

He rejects common

understandings of metaphor as word, as phrase, as sentence
and argues for metaphor as discourse.59
Ricoeur,

Metaphor, notes

is a momentous creation of language.

The

metaphoric process involves more than mere expression.
Indeed, it is "knowledge-in-process."

The hearer/reader of

metaphor is invited to discover more implications of
metaphors.

This discovery requires, according to Ricoeur,

the ability to express or redescribe reality.

Ricoeur

argues that the metaphoric function of language impels human
discourse not only toward new meanings, but toward an
appropriate philosophical language to understand them.
According to Ricoeur, the function of metaphor is to present
"in an open fashion, by means of a conflict between identity
and difference, the process that, in a covert manner
generates semantic grids by fusion into identity."60
Another prominent theorist associated with the metaphor
debate is Ernesto Grassi.

In his Rhetoric as Philosophy

Grassi sees metaphor as prior to scientific thought.

In

fact, he insists that metaphor is the basis of human
thought.

His concept of ingenium (ingenuity) suggests that
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metaphor has the capacity to create and transform reality.
In short, metaphor--the power of the word--is epistemic.
The primal, original power of words suggests that rhetoric
is the evolutionary movement from chaos to cosmos,

from

darkness to light, from destructive tendencies to
constructive ones.

Metaphor is more than a figure of speech

because it embodies the basic process by which humans think,
know, and process the events of their world.

Grassi argues

that "philosophy itself becomes possible only on the basis
of metaphors, on the basis of the ingenuity which supplies
the foundation of every rational, derivative process."61
Kenneth Burke brings a sociological perspective to the
study of metaphor.

Burke defines metaphor in functional

terms:
Metaphor is a device for seeing something in terms of
something else.
It brings out the thisness of a that,
or the thatness of a this . . . metaphor tells us
something about one character as considered from the
point of view of another character.
And to consider A
from the point of view of B is, of course, to use B as
a perspective upon A.62
In Permanence and Change Burke asserts,

"It is precisely

through metaphor that our perspectives, or analogical
extensions, are made . . .
a world without purpose."63

a world without metaphor would be
Burke develops from his

definition an institutionalized view of metaphor.
system of thought is dominated by its metaphor or
perspective.

In order to gain a perspective on our

An entire
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perspectives we must be able to imaginatively transcend the
parameters of our perspective.

This would enable one to

view the subject from as many diverse metaphoric
perspectives as his/her own power of invention would permit.
For his part, Burke claims priority for one metaphor--poetic
metaphor--as the ruling perspective:

"Man is an actor."64

There are five ingredients of "man is an actor": Act, Scene,
Agent, Agency, and Purpose.

Through the Pentad Burke is

telling us how to interpret the poetic metaphor.

Thus we

have a new system of invention, and in this case, perhaps a
fresh prescription for the thought processes of the
discipline of homiletics.
At least two dissertations deserve consideration here.
Michael M. Osborn's 1963 dissertation attempts to trace the
historical development of the theory of metaphor from
Aristotle to the twentieth century.

His theory rejects the

notion that metaphor's tradition is a matter of pure wordchange.

Instead Osborn argues that "the shift of emphasis

from metaphor as an occurrence in language to metaphor as an
occurrence in thought is not an abrupt change.

. . ."65

Metaphor, according to Osborn, may be defined as:
both communicative stimulus and response to stimulus.
As stimulus, metaphor is the identifying of an idea or
object through a sign which generally denotes an
entirely different idea or object.
As a response,
metaphor is an interaction of interpretants which
spring from the stimulus sign's usual denotation and
from its special denotation in this context.
This
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interaction of interpretants provides the basis for the
meaning of the particular stimulus-response cycle which
is metaphor.66
Osborn concludes his work with suggestions for future
research in metaphor that served as the catalyst for this
dissertation.
Representative of studies in the cognitive nature of
metaphor is Eva Feder Kittay's dissertation,

"The Cognitive

Force of Metaphor: A Theory of Metaphoric Meaning."
Building on the work of Richards, Black, Burke, Goodman, and
others, Kittay suggests that the cognitive force of metaphor
be sought in its perspectival character.

Three propositions

make up this perspectival nature of metaphor: 1) There are
two identifiable components in every metaphor; 2) The
components interact so that one is the "lens" by which we
view the second; 3) There is a relation of tension between
the two components.

Kittay suggests that each component of

the metaphor is an element in a semantic field from which
terms in our language acquire their meaning.

"The meaning

of a metaphor involves the cross over from the semantic
field of one of the components to the semantic field of the
other.1,67
Rhetorical scholars have explored the theoretical
implications of metaphor in numerous articles.

For example,

Franklin Fearing suggests that metaphor, at a different
level, performs the same function as the "physiognomic
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perception" of primitive oral societies, in which the object
is endowed with dynamic-affective qualities.

To allege such

close parallels between metaphor and perception in oral
cultures, could have significant bearing on a rhetorical
model of homiletics based on elements of orality.68
An assumption guiding much rhetorical research on
metaphor is that the use of metaphor is a significant tool
for rhetorical criticism.

Kathleen Hall Jamieson, in "The

Metaphoric Cluster in the Rhetoric of Pope Paul VI and
Edmund G. Brown, Jr.," studies the recurring metaphors of
Pope Paul and Governor Brown.

Jamieson argues,

"By

isolating a rhetor's range of metaphors and comparing them
with other habitual rhetorical behaviors, critics can
minimize the likelihood that they are generalizing from
aberrant rhetorical cues."69
Wayne Booth claims even greater critical power for the
study of metaphor.

Booth argues for an ethical criticism

based on the quality of the characters and cultures built by
metaphor.70

Some of the consequences of taking Booth

seriously would include the study of metaphor as the solving
of a puzzle,

"taking literally Aristotle's statement that

metaphors are like enigmas or riddles;"71

and the study of

metaphor as "a quest for ways to improve my culture and
myself; that is, a search for a cure."72
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Herman G. Stelzner, operating on the assumption that an
age or an institution can be known by its metaphors,
examines the figurative language "used in contemporary
discussion of oral communication, emphasizing the organizing
power that has been demonstrated by mechanical, evolutionary
or biological, and military concepts."73

According to

Stelzner, mechanistic metaphors, inspired by Newton,
dominated nineteenth century speech pedagogy.

The works of

Darwin, however, provided the impetus for biological
metaphors as paradigms in the twentieth century.

Mechanical

metaphors still govern homiletical methodology as a part of
its rational, objective base.
In a related article,

"Rhetoric and the Science of

History: The Debate Between Evolutionism and Empiricism as a
Conflict of Metaphors," Richard H. Brown argues that "both
evolutionists and empiricists are engaged in poetic
construction--albeit with different root metaphors."

Brown

extols the value of metaphor as being indispensable to
science, as our fundamental way of noting similarity and
difference.

"All discourse is poetic," insists Brown,

that it uses metaphors and other tropes.

. . .1174

"in

Of

particular significance to my study are Brown's claims that
we make worlds through the use of metaphors, and that we
should engage in a rhetoric which fosters civic life.
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The role of metaphor in persuasion has been studied by,
among others, John W. Bowers and Michael M. Osborn.75
Utilizing empirical research, Bowers and Osborn pursued the
question,

"Are metaphorical conclusions more effective in

changing attitudes than literal conclusions?"76

The study

provided some initial empirical evidence that metaphorical
conclusions have greater effects on audience attitudes.
Michael Osborn's study of "light-dark" archetypal
metaphors has religious meanings important in preaching.
Osborn lists the major variations of the light-dark family
as light-dark, the sun, fire, and the cycle of the seasons.
One of Osborn's more interesting suggestions is that
"Archetypal images may be especially crucial not only when a
society is in upheaval, but also in its formative stages
before it has achieved a certain national identity."77
Philosophers have turned their attention to the topic
of metaphor increasingly during the last twenty years.78
Because of the explosion of studies of metaphor in
philosophy, only sample views can be mentioned here.
Binkley has argued that the truth value of a metaphor is
assessed the same as that for literal expressions.

His

point is that metaphor is not cognitively inferior to
literal statements.

He argues that metaphorical claims

function as argument "which has more or less determinate

35
criteria evaluation, which can be supported and weakened
with evidence and so on."79
A growing number of philosophers are irreducible
theorists.

Mark Johnson, for example, asserts that "a

consensus is beginning to emerge about the nature of the
cognitivity issue.

. . ."80

From the perspective of

Johnson, metaphor is "an omnipresent principle of
cognition;1,81 metaphor cannot be reduced to a literal
paraphrase; and metaphor alters our conceptual structures as
well as recreates our world.82
Strong support for the epistemic value of metaphor also
comes from literature on the essentiality of metaphor in
science.83

Metaphor can no longer be dismissed as a mere

ornament, a simple comparison, or a matter of word usage.
If metaphor is indispensable in rhetoric, philosophy,

and

science, homiletics comes to this party hat in hand.

From

the realization that metaphor is essential even in science
comes an assumption of the pervasiveness of metaphor in all
language.

As Lakoff and Johnson argue,

"no account of

meaning and truth can be adequate unless it recognizes and
deals with the way in which conventional metaphors structure
our conceptual system.84
In summary, then, metaphor is indispensable to our
thought, to our ways of coming-to-know, to the making of our
world, and potentially, to the evolving of global community.
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In science, in religion, in philosophy

metaphor provides

access to the unknown through describing the known.

The

literature related to metaphor suggests a consensus among
rhetoricians and philosophers that metaphor has cognitive
value, that it is not reducible to a literal paraphrase, and
that it produces new insights not possible in literal
language.
The Data, Their Treatment,
and Their Interpretation
The primary data for this study are the writings of
representative twentieth century rhetoricians, philosophers,
theologians, and homileticians.

The literary and critical

data are contained in the journal articles and monographs of
the major theorists listed above.

Secondary data will

include the material which helps to set the historical
background and interpretation of the interest in metaphor.
The unpublished dissertations dealing with metaphor are
another type of secondary data.
The Research Methodology
This research study stresses historical and rhetorical
criticism of major treatments in rhetoric, philosophy,
homiletics.

and

Osborn's 1963 paradigm of the functions and

significance of metaphor is not entirely adequate for
critical application to the proposed rhetorical model for
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homiletics.

Recent research in metaphor by rhetoricians,

philosophers, and homileticians needs to supplement Osborn's
theory; and a rhetorical model for homiletics centered in
metaphor needs to be created. In addition, most other
theories of metaphor fail to make any systematic application
of the rhetorical significance of metaphor in preaching.
The primary research methodology will be qualitative.

The

historical method will be utilized, along with a descriptive
survey of the data, and interpretation and application of
its significance.
The Treatment of the Data
Chapter one attempts a rationale for the study of
metaphor as the key in a reconstruction of the Augustinian
synthesis.

The aim of the initial phase of the research is

a historical perspective on metaphor.
Chapter two of this dissertation consists of a critique
of homiletical methodology.

Working from the notion of

Michel Foucault's concept of discursive formation,

I will

attempt to show how the traditional methodology of
preaching, and its liturgical context has precluded an
epistemic role for metaphor.
In chapter three, using a historical review of
attitudes toward rhetoric by homileticians,

I attempt to

show how rhetoric has been systematically divorced from

38
homiletics.

As revealed by a critique of historical

attitudes toward rhetoric, I demonstrate that the divorce is
one of ideology not praxis.

I then argue from work done by

Richard Weaver and Richard Kinneavy that rhetoric deserves a
new reading in application to homiletics.

On this basis,

I

propose a philosophy of homiletics and a rhetoric of
homiletics which utilizes metaphor as the creation of
knowledge.

An additional purpose in Chapter Three is to

demonstrate rhetorical criticism of preaching through an
alternative method.
Chapter four will review theories of metaphor as a
starting point for formulation of a tentative model for a
rhetorical homiletics, i.e., a rhetoric of folly.

The

originating power of metaphorical language, the process of
ingenuity, the irony of "folly," and the identification of
significant components of a rhetoric of folly will provide
the basic presuppositions of the rhetorical-theory-content
in the proposed model.

Crucial to the development of the

model will be an introductory conception of a philosophy of
homiletics.

The pragmatic application of preaching cannot

be other than a sophistic handbook without a philosophical,
axiological, and epistemological base.
Chapter five describes and defines the significance of
metaphor for preaching.

An extension of the theories of

I.A. Richards and Paul Ricoeur is utilized to develop the
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base of a metaphorical epistemology defined as the creation
of reality.
Chapter six discusses and evaluates the creative power
of metaphor in terms of authority, community, and concepts.
Chapter Six extends the discussion of metaphor's epistemic
value.
The Conclusion consists of summaries and evaluations of
the rhetorical research.
are included.

Suggestions for additional study
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ENDNOTES
1. The crisis of preaching has been expressed as
secularism vs. supernaturalism, liberalism vs. conservatism,
science vs. poetry, concept vs. symbol, rationality vs.
irrationality, and secular vs. sacred.
I have chosen to
emphasize rhetorical aspects of the crisis of preaching.
The depth of the crisis can be discerned by noting that
while theology has made four dominant responses to the
crisis of rationality; the liberal model, the neo-orthodox
model, the radical model, and the revisionist model, there
has remained only one basic homiletical model.
2. T. H. Newman, The Idea of a University (New York:
Longmans, 1947), 230-231.
3. Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1960), 129-144.
4. Tertullian, De praescriptione (PL II, Col. 20a-b), 7.
Gregory the Great expressed a similar view: "The same mouth
singeth not the praises of Jove and the praises of Christ."
R.L. Poole, Illustrations in the History of Medieval
Thought, (London, 1884), 8. The dichotomy has been
expressed in preaching as sacred vs. secular, eloquence vs.
wisdom, religion vs. science and spirit vs. flesh among
others.
See H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, for
four models of the Christian relation to culture.
5. Arnold,

130.

6. Floyd Anderson, "De doctrina Christiana 2.18.28: The
Convergence of Athens and Jerusalem," Rhetoric Society
Quarterly XV (1985):102.
For related studies see James J.
Murphy, "Saint Augustine and the Debate About a Christian
Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech 46 (December, 1960):
400-410; Murphy, "The Metarhetorics of Plato, Augustine, and
McLuhan: A Pointing Essay," Philosophy and Rhetoric 4
(1971):201-214; and John H. Patton, "Wisdom and Eloquence:
The Alliance of Exegesis and Rhetoric in Augustine," Central
States Speech Journal 28 (Summer, 1977):96-105; and Andrew
A. King, "St. Augustine's Doctrine of Participation as a
Metaphysic of Persuasion," Rhetoric Society Quarterly XV
(1985 ):112-115.
7. Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, translated by
D. W. Robertson, Jr. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
1958), 2.18.28.
All quotations from De doctrina Christiana
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will be taken from this translation.
Elevating a passage to
the level of "text" indicates a vigorous engagement with
Augustine's suggestions, and allows them to serve as thought
provokers and new reflection and practice.
8 . De doctrina Christiana.
9. Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and
Relativism: Science. Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania, 1983), 766-767.
10. W. Lance Haynes, "Of That Which We Cannot Write: Some
Notes on the Phenomenology of Media," Quarterly Journal of
Speech 74 (February, 1988):98-99.
I am using the term
"rationality" in the sense that the autonomous consciousness
of the thinker could account for any reality by the strict
application of the methods of science and logic.
The crisis
of preaching is considered as a subset of the larger crises
of theology manifested as the crises of cognitive claims and
the ethical and existential crises.
The classical critiques
of Enlightenment rationality were expressed in the works of
the "masters of suspicion," Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche.
They called into serious question the naive rationalist
claims of the Age of Enlightenment.
A modern critique of
rationality, by Hans-Georg Gadamer, argues that rationality
leads to both philosophical folly and human impoverishment.
For a succinct theological perspective on the crisis of
secularism, cf. Schubert M. Ogden, The Reality of God (New
York: Harper and Row, 1964), 6-20.
11. Haynes, 98.
12. Among numerous examples of the influence of archi
tectural and building metaphors upon homiletics see, Harold
T. Bryson and James C. Taylor, Building Sermons to Meet
People1s Needs (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1980); James Earl
Massey, Designing the Sermon (Nashville: Abingdon Press,
1980); and Dwight F. Stevenson, In the Biblical Preacher's
Workshop (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967).
13. Leland Griffin, "The Edifice Metaphor in Rhetorical
Theory," Speech Monographs 27 (November, 1960):279-291.
14. A number of homileticians utilize communication
theory in their methodology, among them are M.R. Chartier,
Preaching As Communication: An Interpersonal Perspective
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1981); G.R. Fitzgerald, A
Practical Guide to Preaching (New York: Paulist Press,
1980); J. Randall Nicholls, Building the Word (San
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Francisco: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1980); C. Pennington,
God Has a Communication Problem (New York: Hawthorne Books,
Inc., 1976); and George E. Sweazey, Preaching the Good News
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976).
15. In the 1980's homiletics experienced a growing
literature on preaching as story-telling.
Samples of this
work include: E. A. Steimle, M. J. Niedenthal, and C. L.
Rick, Preaching the Story (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1980); Eugene L. Lowry, The Homiletic Plot (Atlanta: John
Knox Press, 1980) and Doing Time in the Pulpit (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1985); and Henry H. Mitchell, The Recovery
of Preaching (San Francisco: Harper and Row, Publishers,
1977).
16. Fred B. Craddock, in As One Without Authority: Essays
on Inductive Preaching (Enid, Oklahoma: Phillips University
Press, 1971), is important for his rejection of the
rational-deductive methodologies of the pulpit.
See also
Overhearing the Gospel (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1978),
which starts from Kierkegaard and develops an "indirect"
communication of the gospel; and Preaching (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1985).
17. David Buttrick, Homiletic: Moves and Structures
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987).
18. Haynes, 98.
19. Haynes, 98.
20. David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New
Pluralism in Theology (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975),
8.
The goal of creating a better society through rhetoric
is not a new idea. Cicero, in De inventione, gave the
challenge to rhetoric: "Men ought none the less devote
themselves to the study of eloquence although some misuse it
in private and in public affairs; and they should study it
more ardently in order that evil men may not gain great
power to the detriment of good citizens and the common
disaster of the community." (Cicero, De inventione. 1.2.5.).
21. Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 51, 154.
22. Richard A. Cherwitz and James W. Hikins, Communi
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CHAPTER TWO
A DECONSTRUCTION OF CLASSICAL HOMILETICS:
A FOUCAULTIAN ANALYSIS
A symbiotic relationship exists between rhetoric and
homiletics despite the historical divorce of the two
disciplines, a divorce maintained mostly by homiletics.

In

Chapter One, I argued for an Augustinian synthesis of the
rhetoric/homiletics mix.
our attention.

An additional problem now requires

Not only has homiletics historically

perpetuated a divorce from rhetoric, but even more telling,
homiletics has ignored the potential contributions of
contemporary rhetoric.

Outside of bibliographic mention of

some modern rhetoricians, homiletics textbooks are void of
any rhetorical theory content beyond George Campbell and
Richard Whately.

For example, James W. Cox, in Preaching:

A Comprehensive Approach to the Design and Delivery of
Sermons. a 1985 preaching textbook, suggests the following
rhetoricians for study by students of preaching:

Kenneth

Burke, George Campbell, Cicero, Lane Cooper, Edward P. J.
Corbett, Quintilian,

I.A. Richards and Richard Whately.1

Cox does not, however, utilize any contemporary rhetorical
theory in this book.
From a homiletician's perspective, we seem to have come
to the end of rhetoric.

Classical homiletics,
50

lured by the
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philosophy of Descartes, has sold out to the gods of
epistemological certainty and foundationalism.

With

philosophy and metaphysics providing one leg, homiletics
added a romanticized theory of the inspiration of the Bible
as the second leg, and proceeded with the task of providing
the root principles of all knowledge, human and divine.

The

resulting metaphor is a three-legged stool with one leg
missing.

Combine the metaphor of the medieval preaching

tree and the architectural metaphor of correct homiletical
structure and one has arrogance of power suggesting that
Christian knowledge is the only true knowledge.

The

Christian preacher postures as the possessor of privileged
knowing, thus becoming not only a Sophist from a rhetorical
perspective, but a Gnostic as well, from a theological
perspective.2
Homiletics, however, is in a precarious position
because of the attack on philosophy and the attack on
religion by scholars of the lineage of end of philosophy
thinking.

From Nietzsche to Heidegger to Derrida there has

been a radical deconstruction of philosophy.

These voices

have been joined by those of Wittgenstein, John Dewey,
Richard Rorty, and Calvin 0. Schrag.3

The destiny of the

epistemological paradigm--the search for certainty and the
foundations of knowledge--has been outlined by Rorty in his
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.

According to Rorty,
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the epistemological project was ill-fated from the start,
designed to provide a "knowledge of knowledge."4

There

comes a time, says Rorty, when it is a mark of wisdom to set
aside this futile quest for incorrigible givens, elusive
mental structures, and to situate ourselves in the ongoing
"conversation of mankind."5
lucid sentences:

As put in one of Mannheim's

"That is why unambiguousness, too great

clarity is not an unqualified social value.
According to Calvin Schrag,

. . ."6

"Philosophy is dismantled as a

collection of necessary conditions for knowledge and
descends into the contingency of social practices and the
conversational voice of mankind."7
What does philosophy have to do with homiletics?
Homiletics, like other kinds of rhetorical practice, is
based on a certain philosophical starting point.

In the

case of traditional homiletics, the philosophical starting
point is Cartesian.

Since the basis of the end of

philosophical argument is a deconstruction of Descartes,
homiletics based on Descartes is subject to the same
criticisms as systematic philosophy.

Schrag suggests "that

when philosophy comes to its end, it becomes rhetoric."8
On the positive side, the end of philosophy results in
a posture of hermeneutical retrieval: ". . . having to do
with the reclamation of a hermeneutical space that provides
a new beginning."9

Schrag combines the hermeneutical space
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with praxis,

"the imbeddedness of interpretation in the

conversation and social practices of mankind,"10 to create
a new rhetoric.

Schrag then defines rhetoric as

. . the

interaction of self and other in dialogue and public
encounter."11

I argue, therefore, that rhetoric within

Schrag's hermeneutic space of communicative practice has the
potential to give a new starting point for homiletics, a
starting point not grounded in Cartesian certainty,
sophistic rhetoric, or gnostic heresy.12

I do not,

however, embrace the ontological claims of the so-called
rhetoric of inquiry.13

My specific interest here is in the

challenge to the Cartesian starting point, not a total
abandoning of a possible objective reality.
In short, I appeal for a remarriage of homiletics to
rhetoric, classical as well as contemporary.

I say

classical because rhetoric was the first love of homiletics.
Aristotle and Cicero were essential to homiletics long
before preaching went "whoring" after the illusive gods of
philosophy.

Concern for a return of homiletics to rhetoric

is part of my attempted Augustinian synthesis.
Farrell reminds us,

"Augustine loved rhetoric.

As Thomas
. . ,"14

The superficial rhetoric of homiletics cannot be
equated with the Aristotelian notion of "techne".
maintains,

Schrag

"Far from being a simple routine guided by
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means-end coefficient, rhetoric as the art of persuasion was
viewed as a collaborative and creative activity of
deliberation and discourse against the backcloth of the
common good of the polis."15

As Paul Ricoeur admonishes

all who reflect upon the nature of rhetoric,

"Rhetoric

cannot become an empty and formal technique."16
That homiletics has suffered from its divorce from
rhetoric, can perhaps best be demonstrated by a
deconstruction of the classical model of preaching.

Such a

critique is justified by the obsolescence of the old
rational homiletics.

In the last century every aspect of

homiletics--language, theology, and the liturgical context—
has changed radically, yet the same model of topics,
propositions, and points remains the central staple of the
preacher.

The rational Cartesian method of classical

preaching no longer seems to fit the symbolism of Christian
worship and scriptures.

A new homiletic model is needed.

The question is how do we proceed with a deconstruction
of homiletics?

The choice of a critical tool has been

influenced by the dominance in homiletical criticism of the
study of "great preachers."

The emphasis of scholars in the

discipline of preaching has been on the history of great
preachers.

This approach has led to an inordinate number of

personality studies focusing on biographical facts and
psychology.

Rod Hart in a critique of rhetorical
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scholarship (applicable to homiletics) insists,

"Such a

history becomes an intellectual version of People magazine
and we, its readers, become voyeurs or worse yet,
idolaters."17
The overall nature of preaching has been overlooked or
neglected by studies that concentrate on a few great
preachers.

Stereotypical conclusions have been drawn on

entire generations of preachers.

These generalizations,

based upon small samples, ignore many possibilities.
Perhaps, as Michel Foucault argues, we have missed a whole
universe of issues, situations, arguments, and discourses
constituting the rhetorical experience of preaching.18
Preaching lives at least as much by the popular
proclamation of ordinary people,

"anonymous," away-from-the-

spotlight preachers, leading ordinary religious lives, as by
the "big-church" hero-preachers of the famous pulpits.

From

the viewpoint of Foucault, we cannot ignore or dismiss the
importance of ordinary examples of preaching.
There is, perhaps, no option more important for an
understanding of preaching than reflection upon the ordinary
ways of preaching practiced by thousands of unknown
"reverends" in sweat-box country churches of thirty-two or
more flavors.

The paradigm for homiletic critique so far

has been the extraordinary preachers--the gifted, the well-
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educated, the big-time stars.

This approach will not

suffice for interpreting preaching.
Therefore, the rhetoric-content of Foucault's work
seems suited to a deconstruction of traditional homiletics.
Foucault is a discourse analyst, an interpreter of the power
of pervasive, anonymous discourses, especially of the
complex relations between power and truth in all discourses.
Consider,

for example, Michel Foucault's

analyses of

different discourses in our history: the discourses of
penology, medicine, law, sexuality, madness, and reason,
indeed the discourse on discourse itself in the modern
development of disciplines and specialization.19

What

these analyses show is that every discourse bears within
itself the anonymous and repressed actuality of highly
particular arrangements of power and knowledge.

Every

discourse, by operating under certain assumptions,
necessarily excludes other assumptions.

Above all, our

discourses exclude those others who might disrupt the
established hierarchies or challenge the prevailing hegemony
of p o wer.
Foucault's elaboration of what he terms an "episteme"
or "discursive formation" specifies units that are
applicable to the criticism of a given culture or
institution.

Those units are: discursive practices,

roles, power, and knowledge.

Since these units are

rules,
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characteristic of a social institution such as the church,
and since preaching exists primarily within the context of
the church, Foucault's theory opens the possibility for a
critique of traditional homiletics within a different
framework than is typical of preaching histories. Fou
cault's concepts of discourse as an event and rhetoric as
epistemic also offer an opening for a rhetorical model for
preaching that gives a major role to metaphor.
The Theoretical Units of Foucault
The relevance of Foucault to problems in rhetoric has
been demonstrated by a number of scholars.

Foss and Gill

use Foucault's notion of the discursive formation as a basic
tool for construction of a middle-level theory of an
epistemic rhetoric.20

Their model is adapted for use in my

critique of the classical homiletical model.
Martha Cooper suggests that Foucault's archaeological
theory of discourse conforms to the outlines of an
interpretive rhetorical criticism.21

In a subsequent work

Cooper expands upon Foucault's theories of the eventfulness
of discourse and the incorporeal nature of discourse.22
Gaonkar contends that Foucault's work is applicable to
contemporary studies of argument.23

Foss, Foss, and Trapp

devote a full chapter to Foucault in their Contemporary
Perspectives on Rhetoric.24

My point here is that since homiletics is a type of
rhetoric, Foucault's theory of discourse has the same
relevance for homiletics as it does for rhetorical practice
in general.

The church, in which preaching usually takes

place, is a social institution, is a part of culture, and in
some cases it has been difficult to distinguish church from
culture.

(The culture of the South and the Protestant

churches of the South come to mind.)

The church as

discussed throughout this chapter is the church/churches of
the South, in particular the Southern Baptists and the
United Methodists.25
Toward that end, I propose to focus upon the church and
churchly discursive formations.

My approach rests upon the

conviction that the liturgical event, as a whole, with all
its constitutive elements, is an event.
says something.

It both does and

As such the worship event of a Christian

church with its verbal elements of praying, singing, reading
Scriptures, and preaching, along with its powerful nonverbal
rituals, practices, and symbols, constitutes a discursive
formation.

When the backdrop of southern culture, so much a

part of the church in the South, is added, there is a
mixture of symbols; i.e., the cross of Christ

is draped in

magnolia blossoms and the dying Christ asks for grits and
gin rather than water.
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The Episteme (Discursive Formation)
An episteme is "the total set of relations that unite,
at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise
to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly
formalized systems."26

It is the code of a culture that

governs "its language, its schemas of perception,

its

exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its
practices,"27 and it imposes on all branches of knowledge
"the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a
certain structure of thought that the men of a particular
period cannot escape."28.

An episteme is the sum total of

the discourse of a particular period.

Applied to

homiletics, a discursive formation may be defined as the
characteristic system, i.e., the church and all its related
educational institutions, that defines the conditions for
the possibility of knowledge.

The episteme is the world

view of a given Christian church.

"It is a kind of period

style for the organization of knowledge that functions
automatically in the church."29
In The Archaeology of Knowledge. Foucault substitutes
the term "discursive formation" for "episteme."
terms can be used interchangeably.
however,

The two

Discursive formation,

further emphasizes the central role of discourse in

the creation of knowledge.

For Foucault,

"all that about

which it is possible to speak within any given discursive
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formation is called savior or knowledge."30

He describes

his project as the "pure description of discursive
events."31
The discovery of discursive formations, according to
Foucault, is called archaeological analysis.

The goal of

such analysis is to examine human experiences and/or
institutions and cultures as particular domains of
knowledge, exercises of power, and acting out of rules and
roles.

The basic material of archaeological analysis is the

statement.

The archaeological examination of statements

explores the nature of discursive transformation:

"Rather

than refer to the living force of change . . . archaeology
seeks to establish the transformations that constitute
'change'."32

So Foucault seeks to identify and isolate

discursive formations based upon statements, rules, roles,
and strategic functions.

"For Foucault, then, knowledge and

these discursive practices are inseparable.

Everything

about which we can speak in a discursive formation is
knowledge; knowledge is generated by discursive
practice. "33
For example, conservative leaders of the Southern
Baptist Convention have been able to control the
denomination through the creation of "knowledge of the
inerrancy" of the Bible.

That such an outmoded relic of

Fundamentalist theology could count as knowledge in the

nation’s largest Protestant body is evidence of a particular
discursive formation or closed institution in which only
certain statements can be accepted as knowledge.

A

framework for acceptable knowledge has been constituted
among Southern Baptists: pietistic Puritanism, revivalistic
emotionalism, and narrow sectarianism.

These are by no

means the only tentpoles of Baptist faith and ecclesiology,
but they now dominate the Southern Baptist Convention.
Preaching that falls outside the prescribed rules and
definitions of the present discursive formation is rejected
as knowledge and labeled as heretical.

Morris H. Chapman,

SBC President, says he will not give up inerrancy
requirements.

"My commitment is to pursue the perpetuation

of allegiance to the perfect word from the perfect God.

My

heart's desire is to encompass all who do believe in
perpetuating allegiance to the perfect word."34
The application of Foucault's concept of the discursive
formation to the history of preaching reveals tendencies of
previous discursive formations to exert continuing influence
on preaching in the twentieth century.

Since only one

episteme can be present at any one time, carry-over from one
period to the next can take place only at superficial,
imitative levels.

Considering the voices of a given

episteme as the authentic voices of that era suggests that
the imitators of these voices are mere echoes.35

When the
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authentic, originating voices of a given discursive
formation have departed, the Christian church still contends
with the echoes.

The imitators of a preceding episteme copy

the methods, the structures, and the style of their
predecessors.
Every Churchly discursive formation produces numerous
echoes for every authentic voice.

The result is an

artificial imitation deserving the epitaph of sophistry in
the best tradition of Plato.

A brief survey of the

discursive formations characteristic of Christian preaching
since the Reformation illustrates the problem with echoes of
previous epistemes.
The episteme of the sixteenth century, according to
Foucault, was based on the idea of resemblance or
similitude.

For the Reformation Church, however, the

episteme was the Word.

The word of preaching constituted

the foundation and origin of the church.

Reformation

preachers placed the Word over the images and symbols of the
medieval church.

Luther went so far as to insist that

"there is a sacrament of the word."36

Proclamation assumed

the mantle of superiority as icons and rituals were
disregarded.

The oral nature of preaching and the

exposition of the Scripture were more important then any
other aspect of church life.

Yngve Brilioth, evaluating
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Luther, underscores the significance of the change wrought
by the Reformation:
To present the word in this way is a terrifying
responsibility since this word according to Luther is
quietly reverenced by the whole creation.
No person,
before or since, has so exalted the word, not only the
written word, but the living word on the lips of the
preacher.37
While the Reformers produced an almost magical
conception of the word, the Seventeenth century witnessed
echoes of an older episteme, that of the Medieval Age.

"The

resemblance between the Dominican 'art of preaching' and
much of the methodology of the seventeenth century is in
many respects striking.38

The deceptive echoes of the

reformed tradition crystallized the form of the Word into a
new legalism.

A scribal emphasis upon words replaced the

dynamic emphasis on the power of the word.
was Protestant formalism.

The end result

The word became less living unity

and more of an inexhaustible storehouse of proof texts.

The

exegetical technique became an exaggerated, virtuoso's
juggling of passages.

The expository context and the

scrupulously organized sermon became a straitjacket in which
the preacher slowly strangled on the meaning of every Greek
word in forty-eight verses of scripture.
In the episteme of the nineteenth century,
became an object to be known.

language

This episteme was concerned

with "the analysis of meaning and signification. 1,39

In

the church, however, preaching reached a zenith of power.
The sweet prince of the pulpit became the favorite metaphor
to describe the masters of religious discourse.40

These

preachers turned the sermon into a literary production.
power of the church, however, was but an illusion.
the calm before the storm.

The

It was

The attempted duplication of the

nineteenth century preachers traps the church in a
methodology no longer adequate.

In the interpretative

framework of Richard Harvey Brown, community and
communication by the church is no longer possible in the
current age of Modernity.41
In the current age of Modernity, human beings, in
gaining supremacy over language, have replaced it as the
organizing principle of knowledge.
results in disastrous consequences.
humans as the origin of life.
of God.
ended.

For the church this
God is replaced by

Truth is no longer inspired

Language has no particular power.

Prophecy is

Humans are in control but also out of control.

The

Church has responded with the method of the nineteenth
century discursive formation.

The once proud and mighty

church seems blithely unaware that when the rules and roles
and knowledge change the source of power also changes.
point is that the classical homiletics speaks from an
authoritative role, one the church and her preachers no
longer enjoy.

My

65
Foucault's theory serves as a critical tool for
analyzing and understanding the system in which religious
discourse is produced and functions.

That system is the

church and its related institutions.

From a Foucaultian

perspective of the church we can better understand the
discursive production of preaching and the kinds of
knowledge it has produced.
Discursive Practices
By discursive practices Foucault means discourse that
follows particular rules and is understood to be true in a
given culture.

Written and spoken discourse as well as non-

discursive acts make up discursive practices.

He includes

as discursive practices in his own writings such phenomena
as architectural forms, use of space, institutional
practices, and social relations.

In Discipline and Punish,

for example, Foucault discusses the use of the architectural
figure of the panopticon to induce particular effects on
inmates.42

Rhetoric as symbolicity seems to me the

equivalent of Foucault's discursive practices.

The

multiplicity of symbols and forms which constitute the
church certainly appears to qualify the church as a
discursive formation.
Within the church, discursive practices include
architectural forms, use of space, ritual and symbolic
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practices, music, the reception of visitors, the image of
the preacher, and the persuasive appeals built into the
fabric of the worship event.

All of these practices follow

recognizable rules and count as knowledge in the public
known as church.
The design elements of the church that make up
discursive practices include the architecture of the church,
both externally and internally.
actual shape of the buildings.

One such element is the
Even a novice church

observer soon learns to distinguish a charismatic fellowship
with its pre-fab steel structure, brick facade, and glowing
neon sign from the First United Methodist Church, Anywhere,
U.S.A.

From huge white columns, to high steeples, to

stained-glass windows, to bronze crosses, the architecture
of the church speaks of sacred ground, solemnity, grandness,
and power.

Often perched on a hill in the center of town,

the church appears as the ruling entity.
Methodist Church of Shreveport,

The First United

for example,

sits on a hill

at the head of Texas Avenue, presiding over a downtown area
of dilapidated, closed businesses.

Perhaps here is a

metaphor of the church's problem: a king without subjects.
Inside the church, the pulpit constitutes a major
mechanism of discourse.

In Herman Melville's Moby Dick,

there is a description of the pulpit that is a metaphor tor
the reverence of the church.

The pulpit was shaped like the
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prow of a ship.

Of this Melville says,

"What could be more

full of meaning?--for the pulpit is ever this earth's
foremost part; all the rest comes in its rear; the pulpit
leads the world . . . Yes, the world's a ship on its passage
out, and not a voyage complete; and the pulpit is its
prow.1,43

This is the image of the pulpit designed for the

homiletic method of the nineteenth century.

As much as I

want to affirm this image, the age of Modernity scoffs at
such arrogance.

A more fitting image would

be Norman

Rockwell's painting of the preacher putting up a sign that
reads,

"Lift up thine eyes." while a crowd of people walk

by, heads down, ignoring the message of the church.44
The arrangement of the pews is another design element
used in the church.

A church designed as a lecture hall

constitutes different discursive practices from a church inthe-round.

The former is for educational purposes where the

preacher is the authorized, recognized professor.
is to pass along information.

The goal

The worshipers bring their

Bibles and notepads to take notes on first century New
Testament "trivia."

A flat-minded literalism pervades the

verse by verse exposition of the text.45

The worship event

becomes almost exclusively a process of conveying
information.

The very arrangement of the pews thus supports

an image of worshipers trapped in the straitjacket of
literal language.
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On the other hand, the church-in-the-round projects the
image of the stage where the preacher is the actor--the paid
professional.

The goal is to entertain a passive audience.

The worshipers' involvement is at the critical level as they
judge how the choir sounded and symbolically hold up cards
numbered 1-10 to express their evaluation of the sermon.
Music is another important part of the church's
worship.

A choir,

at times with professional soloists,

performs at Sunday worship.
worship event.

Music begins and completes the

The musical style identifies the discursive

nature of a given church.

The high church anthem built

around an arrangement of Bach creates a far different
impression than a jazzed up version of "On Jordan's Stormy
Banks I Stand."
Various discursive practices can be seen in the images
created by the professional staff of a church.

The

ministers often wear robes and use symbolic paraments which
match the altar and pulpit paraments.
matching robes.
images.

The choir wears

Again, different churches project different

A Southern Baptist seminary course in pastoral

work, for example,

stresses the importance of a particular

physical image for preachers.

Ministers are encouraged to

wear conservative suits and ties, well-shined shoes, short
hair, and no facial hair.

The mercurial shifts of faces and

fashions, along with controversial styles, are to be avoided
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as they give evidence of conformity to a secular culture.
The preacher, members of the staff, and other worship
participants conduct themselves in a particular manner that
suggests a certain solemn, dignified, humble person.
Another dominant feature of some contemporary Christian
worship is the synthetic and thus inauthentic nature of many
elements in the worship setting.

Some churches have been

influenced by the artificial environment and entertainment
motif of the television evangelists. After watching the
televised worship services of Jimmy Swaggart, Oral Roberts,
Robert Schuller, and Jerry Falwell, I devised a composite of
the synthetic image being projected: Red-White-and Blue
spangled sets mixing the old-time religion with patriotism;
clean, freshly scrubbed young men and women singing
religiously erotic music, an endless parade of religious
celebrities, and the stylishly tailored star preachers with
dental caps and artfully styled coiffures.46

Their

production of Jesus is that of a plastic Jesus, with no
sense of reality.

He is an antiseptic Jesus huckstered like

cars and deodorant soaps.

Robert Schuller,

for example,

replaces the doctrine of sin with the mild concept of "low
self-esteem."

The message is upbeat.

Possibility for

happiness, good fortune, and riches is offered along with
the 800 numbers for phoning in donations.

The whole

production is a carefully planned event which omits any
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natural, spontaneous acts of worship which might otherwise
occur.
Finally, the role worshipers are assigned in church
constitutes a discursive practice.

The congregation sits

passively through the service, responding as programmed by
years of ritual to speed through the Apostles Creed as if in
pursuit of a spot in the Guiness Book of World Records;
nothing is required of them.

While the minister encourages

participation, the actual involvement is limited to
repetition of known prayers and singing of familiar hymns.
Even the "Amen" is scheduled.

One violates the programmed

roles of worship only at the risk of personal embarrassment.
As Carlyle Marney explains,

"At Highland Park Methodist in

Dallas, a little girl in a choir once when I was preaching
forgot herself and said,

'Amen'.

It was so devastating I

don't think she came back all week."47
Rules
Rules, according to Foucault, are principles that
govern a discursive formation.

Mostly unconscious and

difficult to articulate, rules determine the possibilities
for the content and form of discourse:

"the production of

discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized, and
redistributed according to a certain number of proce-
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dures."48

Foucault suggests three categories of rules that

govern various aspects of the discursive formation.
One category of rules controls what can and cannot be
talked about in the discursive formation.

One example would

be the lack of a concept of the injustice of slavery in the
first century church.

The New Testament includes

admonitions for slaves to obey their masters,49 and St.
Pa u l 's Epistle to Philemon urges a slave owner to take back
his slave.50

Opposition to slavery was not known as a

concept in the first century church.

In a different way,

opposition to slavery would not have been an object of
discourse in Southern pulpits of the nineteenth century
because the congregation would not have permitted such a
concept.
A second category of rules determines who is allowed to
speak in a discursive formation.

The rules of the United

Methodist Church, for example, are quite specific about who
is and who is not allowed to speak.

"An elder is an

ordained minister who has met the requirements of paragraph
424 and therefore has full authority for the ministry of
Word, Sacrament, and Order.

. . ."51

Only speakers

accepted as qualified may engage in the practice of
preaching in the church.

Again, these rules may be

carefully spelled out by a church hierarchy, or on the other
extreme, may be left to the discretion of individual
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churches.

Preachers in the United Methodist Church,

for

example, must meet numerous conditions in order to serve as
an elder of the church in full connection.52

The Board of

Ordained Ministry is responsible to enforce these
conditions.
There are also rules, usually unwritten, concerning the
gestures, behaviors,

language, delivery that are deemed

appropriate for the preacher.

Religious discourse in the

Pentecostal church, for example, must be accompanied by an
enthusiastic, emotional, loud delivery, if it is to be
viewed as holy and thus legitimate for that role.

In other

churches, the sermon must be accompanied by the wearing of
robes if it is to be considered legitimate for the role of
the clergy person.
A third group of rules concerns the form that concepts
and theories must assume to be accepted as knowledge in the
discourse.

"Such rules govern the arrangement of

statements, style, and terminology used in discourse."53
In the churchly discursive formation,

for example, the use

of obscene words would not be recognized as appropriate.
Rules, therefore, deal with what is accepted as appropriate
in the discursive formation.

Even though these rules may

appear vague, the rules determine what is appropriate to the
very nature of an occasion, of a relationship, of an event,
of the truth.

Members of the discursive formation recognize
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the appropriateness of discourse when it is present, and are
so aware of its absence that they may stomp out of the room
to protest the insult.

There is such a thing as appro

priateness in Christian discourse, a method of communicating
accepted as congenial to the nature of the churchly
discursive formation.
Those who wish to speak in the church, for example,
must produce certain types of statements and use certain
forms before they will be heard.

The infamous "holy whine"

of frontier revivalists has persisted to the present in some
Protestant churches, and can be attributed to the unwritten
rule that a preacher must sound like a preacher.

Southern

Baptists are expected to give allegiance on four points
according to Chapman:

"Adam and Eve were real people.

historical narratives of the Bible are accurate.
of the Bible were supernatural events.

The

Miracles

The authors stated

by all the books were the authors of the books."54
The worship of the church involves specific rituals
that require those participating to engage in certain
behaviors and convey a particular image.

At a basic level,

this point can be demonstrated by the look of confusion on
the face of an evangelical Protestant attempting to worship
in a high-church Episcopalian chapel.

The behaviors appear

odd, the language foreign, and the rituals complex.
Richard Brown asserts,

"...

As

each group's world appears an
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impenetrable mystery to members of other groups, even to
people of good will who are seeking to help or to form
alliances.1,55
The place from which church discourse must originate
makes up other conditions imposed on speakers.

The pulpit

is designated as the appropriate place from which to speak.
In the United Methodist Church, the lay reader's pulpit is
for reading the Scripture and making announcements, not for
proclaiming the sermon.

For preachers to speak while

walking up and down the aisle of the sanctuary,

for example,

would not be appropriate in mainstream Christian churches.
The congregation would think such a performer mad and would
not accord him/her the status given to the preacher in the
pulpit.
Often churches engage in vigorous debate over which
terms will be recognized as valid and which will be invalid.
Certain terms often become catch words for defining an
entire denomination;

"inerrancy" for the Baptists,

"pluralism" for the United Methodists.

Baptists have a

code-word for inerrancy--"Bible-believing preaching"--that
suggests other churches do not really believe or preach the
Bible.
Rules also govern the process of the generation of
knowledge in that they allow only certain individuals to be
involved in the formulation of concepts, theories, and
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general church resolutions.

Theological discourses,

for

example, generally are not discourses to which everyone has
access and in which everyone can generate new knowledge.
Only a duly elected representative of a United Methodist
Conference,

for example, may propose changes in the general

church's policy on abortion.

And these proposed changes can

only be considered legitimate when the General Conference is
in session.

Rules are, without question, a major factor in

the structure of the churchly discursive formation.
Rules concerning religious discourse have a historic
succession within the church.

The preaching legacy has been

passed from generation to generation.

The rules are

prescribed in great detail concerning the art of preaching.
As a result, a rational homiletic design evolved:

an

introduction was followed by the text, which was reduced to
a propositional topic, developed in a series of points
(three being the favorite number), and concluded with a
summary.

Most homiletic texts contain these well-defined

and oft-repeated rules.56

These rules produced the

homiletic model based on certainty, propositions, and
authority.
nature

The homiletic model contradicts the symbolic

of the churchly discursive formation, as this

Foucaultian analysis attempts to demonstrate.57

In these

texts we see the emergence of a pattern that has contributed
to the continued relative unimportance of metaphor:
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rhetoric is a manual of style and metaphor becomes a
stylistic device.

The congregation, without being trained

in homiletics, clearly understands the rules.

These rules

are carefully monitored and unconsciously followed.
Roles
The role of the preacher as rhetor and minister has
changed in each succeeding episteme.

The preacher has been

perceived as everything from a royal herald to a prince of
the pulpit.

As already noted, such authority roles no

longer accrue to the preacher, the person once known as the
"parson. 1,58
Particular roles have been created for the preacher.
These roles are constrained by the discursive practices and
their rules.

In the church, the discursive practices create

a consistent role for preachers - one that is authoritative,
moralistic, and dogmatic. Richard Brown argues that "Any
person who claims a right to alter societal processes on
behalf of others [this applies to preachers] thereby
presupposes some talent or knowledge superior to that of the
person he presumes to help."59

This very assumption,

however, seems to turn clients into objects upon which the
expert exercises his technique.

Such an approach is

arbitrary, dogmatic, and smacks of an autocratic system of
control.
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The role that is established for the preacher by
traditional homiletics can be a basic means of imposing and
maintaining relationships of domination.

The nineteenth

century model of preaching clings to the theological
rationality of the Middle Ages which served

cognitive and

political requirements of a transnational clerisy that
monopolized literacy and revelation.60
Traditional roles for the preacher have been
stereotyped to an inordinate degree.

The preacher, however,

struggles with his/her role between two polarities: the
public and the private persona.

Rod Hart has attempted to

make this point when commenting on politicians, but the
point is relevant to preachers as well.

Hart argues that

politicians are best treated as public persons and not as
private individuals.
Rather than viewing the political leader as a small,
independent actor playing rather nakedly on a large
stage, we might conceive of an alternative metaphor.
Indeed, since political actors are so heavily costumed
and so expertly coached, natural, revealing,
spontaneous speech is all but extinguished in them.
From a phenomenological perspective, politicians are,
above all, public people.
In that sense, they are not
"persons" as the average voter is a person.
Unlike the
voter, they eat with elan and sleep strategically.
They feel pain bravely, and for all the voter knows,
they do not make love.
When angry they do not scream,
they grimace.
When happy they do not guffaw, they grin
carefully.
As citizens, we invite politicians into our lives at
only certain points during the day--often at 6:00 p.m.
and 11:00 p.m.--and actively think about them only
during certain months of the year--often, November.
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During the remainder of our waking hours, we
concentrate upon the "real people," the private people,
with whom we have daily commerce.
What is being
suggested, then, is that political figures are psychic
projections that citizens create out of a very partial,
perhaps undimensional, set of stimuli.
Public people
do not provide rounded-out psychological profiles of
themselves.
They occupy less space and time than do
private persons and they permit us to see less of their
emotional range than do our everyday associates. They
gesture grandly and they pontificate vehemently, but
because of their emotional and physical distance from
us they never really attain fully human status, never
ring completely true. . . .61
The role of the preacher is a public one.

His or her

congregation often has complex spiritualized expectations
that make no room for the preacher as a real person.

He or

she represents God and must be pleasant, sanitized, holy,
and humble.
In preaching, the minister projects this public
persona.

He or she is well organized and rational.

He

lives against the backdrop of a highly romanticized role,
and in many cases, may be unaware that the minister's status
in society may be as one without authority.

Preacher and

congregation may not note the incongruity between experience
and the well-organized sermon.
sermon method includes:

Life lacks the very things

order, coherence, clarity.

"The

clearly wrought sermon seems to imply that truth is
rational, consistent, and reducible to a limited number of
points."62

The result is an aura of unreality that makes
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worship seem artificial and the preacher's role a holy
masquerade.63
In one respect, Foucault's conception of roles diverges
from the utilization of roles in the church.

To Foucault,

the individual rhetors in a discursive formation are
unimportant.64

Instead, he sees rhetors simply as playing

roles and filling vacant spaces in a discursive formation.
Foucault's emphasis is on roles that receive power and
position from discursive practices rather than individual
qualities of individual rhetors.

Foucault, then, is not

interested in the individual gifts that enable a specific
preacher to pastor a large congregation.

In the church,

however, the cult of the individual superstar assumes
primacy.

Churches are often built on the charisma of the

preacher.

The individual becomes more significant than the

collective community of believers.

Foucault's emphasis on

the collective activity of a discursive formation needs a
hearing in the modern church where individualism has
superseded the corporateness of the church.
Knowledge and Power
Finally, the knowledge/truth of the church that is
produced by discursive practices, rules, and roles can be
identified.

The highest truth in the church resides in God,

Scripture, tradition, and the church's interpreters.

When
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truth is defined in such a way and the discursive practices
create these elements of the definition, there is little
room to question the knowledge of the discourse that is the
church.
The discursive formation of the church possesses a
power that controls the conduct of its members during
worship.

The printed order of worship discourages the

congregation from thinking.

All that is required is to

follow the printed instructions:
silent.

stand, sit, pray, sing, be

The worship leaders follow predictable patterns

Sunday after Sunday, and thus worshipers are controlled in
unconscious ways.

The power of the church is one of calling

people back to the way life ought to be, even though that is
not the way real life is.

The power embodied in the system

dictates acceptance of a rather simple view of life where
Jesus has all the answers.
The church, then, is a powerful discursive system that
has succeeded in creating a body of discourse that is
accepted as truth by believers.

It has also made people

repress aspects of themselves and led them to not question
what they normally would.

It projects an image of a

spiritual world far removed from the material world.

The

churchly discursive formation projects an arbitrary,
dogmatic, and autocratic system of control reified in the
traditional homiletic method.
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This analysis of the church by means of the theory of
Foucault presents a composite of the discursive formation
responsible for the nineteenth century homiletic method.
The constant pressure to simplify, clarify and conceptualize
has led to a radical denigration of the complexity of the
search for truth.

The restraints of the churchly episteme

have saddled homiletic method with a number of
methodological liabilities.
1.

Failure to accept the basic rhetorical nature of
preaching;

2.

Failure to recognize the loss of authority since
the church is no longer supported by infallible
scriptural interpretation or the cultural ethos;

3.

Failure to change a discursive style and language
which divorces the preacher from the figurative and
symbolic language of the Bible and from the
everyday language of real persons;

4.

Presupposing that the rational-scientific paradigm
is ideally suited to preaching;

5.

Exhibiting a reductionist approach to textual
interpretations;

6.

Failure to address the advent of a new discursive
formation thus precipitating a crisis in
methodology and language;

7.

Failure to break loose from a three centuries old
rationalist bind, with its attendant insistence
upon Cartesian certainty, the original meaning
illusion, and the literal truth paradigm.

I have attempted to question much of what preachers
have often taken for granted in our study of homiletics.
Also,

I have examined the larger framework in which
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homiletical processes occur.

There seems to be a direct

relationship between the discursive formation of the church
and the negative effects of it on the homiletical practices
that occur within it.
According to Foucault's concept of discourse as event,
preaching is seen as epistemic since it is a type of
rhetoric--a malleable rhetoric influenced by the cultural,
social milieu of which it is a part.

Preaching creates

rhetorically a version or versions of truth rather than
disseminating pre-conceived absolute knowledge.

This view

of preaching as rhetorical practice opens the way for
consideration for an epistemic role for metaphor; and
development of a rhetorical/metaphorical model of preaching.
Now I can say what I have only hinted at previously:
Rhetoric provides the foundation, the boundaries,

and the

methodology for the discipline of homiletics.
What is needed is the ability to imagine an alternative
method as well as the invention of an alternative model for
preaching.

As preachers we are concerned with preaching

Jesus here and now.

Preaching, as an event, means relating

the Gospel to a particular social mind in a particular place
and time.

I have attempted to demonstrate that the churchly

discursive formation, with its attendant nineteenth century
homiletic method, cannot communicate the gospel in late
twentieth century America.

Now our task is the discovery of
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a method and a language, contradistinctive of the rational
paradigm, with which to preach.
chapter,

Therefore, in the next

I suggest a more positive role for rhetoric in the

preaching event.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE RHETORIC/HOMILETICS RELATIONSHIP
In the last chapter I utilized the rhetorical theory of
Michel Foucault to deconstruct the classical homiletic
model.

At least part of my purpose was to demonstrate the

need of homiletics for a rhetorical base.

One of the

assumptions of this study is that a symbiotic relationship
exists between rhetoric and homiletics.

This implies that

there are qualities in virtue of which the two concepts are
related.

Yet in spite of what seems to be an obvious

relationship, the rhetoric/homiletics mixture has, from the
first, been at best an uneasy alliance, and at worst, an
open antagonism.

On the one hand, homileticians have

considered rhetoric as an unnecessary, pagan art, while at
the same time studying rhetoric and utilizing rhetoric in
homiletical handbooks.

Rhetoricians have, on the other

hand, devoted extensive studies to preaching; studies which
have contributed to a better understanding of the rhetorical
nature of preaching. To explain the rhetoric-homiletics
relationship I will examine the historical interaction of
the two disciplines.
theoretical.

To do so is practical as well as

For example, any homiletics proposing a

dependence upon rhetorical theory will have to attempt an
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amelioration of any differences and attitudes presently
separating rhetoric and homiletics.
As a prerequisite to formulating a rhetorical
homiletics, at least two issues must be resolved.

The first

issue concerns the historical relationship between rhetoric
and homiletics.

This issue will be addressed by a review of

the paradoxical treatment of rhetoric by Christian
preachers.

The second issue, conscious of the classical

roots of the antipathy of homiletics toward rhetoric,
concerns sources for a more positive view of rhetoric in
homiletics.

In arguing for what I consider to be the proper

relationship between rhetoric and homiletics,

I believe the

potential for rhetorical/homiletical synthesis will have the
necessary historical antecedents.
question posed in the introduction,

Therefore, the first
"What is the nature of

the relationship between rhetoric and homiletics?," is
probably the most essential question requiring attention.
Fictions and Misuse of Rhetoric in Homiletics
Among those familiar with the history of homiletics
there exists an extensive tradition of treating rhetoric as
a "devil" term.

As far back as St. Paul there exists among

preachers a basic mistrust of rhetoric.

"And my speech and

my message was not in the plausible words of [human] wisdom,
but in demonstration of the Spirit and power."1

In the
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Christian literature of the first five centuries numerous
theologians and preachers extended Paul's negative
assessment of rhetoric.

Cyprian, a teacher of rhetoric

prior to his conversion to Christianity, renounced all pagan
literature and rhetoric.
particular:
calumny.

Titian attacked rhetoric in

"You have invented rhetoric for injustice and

. . .1,2

From this initial negative assessment of rhetoric, at
least four fictions concerning rhetoric have gained
credibility in the discipline of homiletics.

These fictions

parallel misapprehensions of rhetoric common in Western
thought.

Rhetoric, like preaching, has always played to

poor reviews.
From Plato's insistence that rhetoric is not a true art
to conceptions of rhetoric as "artificial eloquence,
embellishment, ornament, and elaboration in language and
literary style," rhetoric has suffered from reductiveness,
fragmentation, and misapplication.

Preachers,

finding in

rhetoric a convenient scapegoat for packaging their antipagan culture attitudes, have attacked rhetoric perhaps even
more vehemently than other critics.
First, rhetoric, according to many homileticians, is a
pagan art which defiles the gospel of Jesus Christ.
Tertullian has a famous passage representative of this view:
"What concord is there between the Academy and the church?

What between heretics and Christians?"3

Those who like

Tertullian continue to treat rhetoric as a "devil" term are
not likely to grant rhetoric a significant place in modern
homiletics.

In colonial America, the Puritan preacher

Cotton Mather advised young ministers to avoid "squandering
away your time on the RHETORIC.

. . .1,4

The paradox is

that the charge against rhetoric is made by persons trained
in rhetoric.

In Tertullian's day, many Christian preachers

were teachers of rhetoric prior to their conversion.

In

Mather's Puritan America, the study of Petrus Ramus was
required of all ministers.
Second, rhetoric, it is argued, deals with style and
ornamental language whereas preaching deals with the simple
truth of Jesus Christ.

Cyprian speaks for this view as

early as the third century:

". . . i n speaking of the Lord

God, a pure simplicity of expression (vocis pura sinceritas
non eloquentiae) which is convincing depends upon the
substance of the argument rather than upon the forcefulness
of eloquence."5
In the ensuing history of preaching many critics have
sounded the trumpet for the "simple gospel."

Savonarola,

arguing against the popular rhetoric of Friar Mariano, says,
"These verbal elegances and ornaments will have to give way
to sound doctrine simply preached."6

The dramatic thrust

was given to the simple Gospel by what William Muehl calls
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the "vulgarized Reformation.1,7

Luther's and Calvin's

insistence on simplicity became perverted into a radical
denigration of the complexity of the truth, an elimination
of mystery from life, a loss of creative energies, and
later, a "literal-truth" paradigm of expository preaching by
conservative Christians.
Reinhold Niebuhr asserts that "the judgment of God is
always partly revealed in the effect of the structure of
reality upon the vitalities of history which defy that
structure."8

Applied to preaching, this means that the

imposition of the fiction of simplicity imposed upon
homiletics a reductionistic, arbitrary structure from which
it has yet to escape.

In the twentieth century, the most

anti-rhetorical of all preachers, Karl Barth, deprecates the
value of rhetoric and insists upon the virtues of
simplicity.
Nor are we required to display the truth of God in an
artistic form by the use of vain images or by
presenting Jesus Christ in outpourings of sentimental
eloquence.
When Paul told the Galatians that he had
portrayed before their eyes Jesus Christ crucified, he
was not referring to speeches in which he had used
every device of artistry to capture the imagination of
his hearers.
For him, to portray Christ was to show
him forth in plain truth without embellishments.9
The attempt to reduce Christianity and Christian
proclamation to a "simple Gospel" has exercised a
debilitating influence on homiletics.

Rooted in the

mistrust of Rhetoric by early Church Fathers and cultivated
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by the "Vulgarized Reformation," the "simple Gospel" fiction
has been a force in the "anti-intellectualism" of American
revivalism as well as the arbitrary theology of Funda
mentalism and the neo-Pentecostal movement.
Third, parallel with the association of rhetoric with
ornamentation and preaching with "simple truth" is the
assertion that rhetoric is appearance and not reality.

For

example, John Calvin insists that in preaching there should
be "nothing for appearance . . . everything . . . for
substantial reality."10

Fred Craddock, discussing the

current state of preaching, complains that "We are still
haunted by the ancient fear that . . . attention to artistic
form, compromises truth and morality.1111

Further,

Craddock argues that the fiction of appearance only in
rhetoric prescribes that attention to rhetorical matters
"shall be in inverse ratio to the importance of the subject
matter;" "that content and form are separate
considerations," i.e., content is essential and form is
accessory; and "that style is at best unnecessary embroidery
upon the truth and at worst subversion of it."12
Fourth, homiletics, it is implied, is a spiritual art
with different intentions, motives, and methods from
rhetoric.

In other words, homiletics is not rhetoric.

homiletics textbooks define preaching as different from
other kinds of public speaking.

Several scholars in the

Most
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discipline of homiletics have taken the position of Yngve
Brilioth that rhetoric is a secondary cultural motif.
our frame of reference," Brilioth asserts,

"In

"rhetoric has a

poor connotation."13
The homiletical textbook which has set the standard for
subsequent works is that of John A. Broadus, On the
Preparation and Delivery of Sermons.

Broadus, despite his

respect for the use of rhetorical theory, provides warnings
against rhetoric that remain an essential part of the
homiletical tradition:

"Attention must be called to the fact

that in the adoption of rhetorical methods all was not
gain."

Broadus delineates three dangers of rhetoric for the

preacher:

1) overemphasis on rules and forms (ironically

this is a criticism of most homiletics textbooks),
2) imitation, and 3) artificiality.14
contends,

"...

James Earl Massey

the sermon is quite unlike other speech

forms in terms of its motive, setting, spirit, and
substance.1,15
Other homiletic texts consider rhetoric in less than
positive ways.

For example, H. C. Brown, Jr. has a

truncated definition of rhetoric that is implied in many
homiletics:

"The accent has fallen loud and clear on the

view that rhetoric or form is the chief element in
preaching.

Preaching never has been, is not now, and never

will be a one-dimensional emphasis on rhetoric or form."16

97
At best rhetoric is perceived as only one of the many
influences on the development of the sermon.
The discussion of the relationship between rhetoric and
homiletics reveals confusion concerning the proper role of
rhetoric, the definition of rhetoric, and whether or not
rhetoric can be equated with homiletics.

From the vantage

point of the above perspectives, it is my contention that
the four fictions concerning the nature of rhetoric must be
systematically challenged.
Since we are the inheritors of the preaching legacy of
each preceding age, it seems imperative that the attempt to
establish a more positive role for rhetoric (and by
implication,

for metaphor) should be grounded in the

classical tradition which first produced the complex
relationship between rhetoric and homiletics.

James J.

Murphy has written at length of the Christian dilemma over
rhetoric in the fourth century.

"The basic issue was

whether the church should adopt in toto the contemporary
culture which Rome had taken over from Greece.
Rhetoric was involved . . . 1,17
subjugated to the Hellenic?

The fate of

Was the Hebraic to be

Murphy surveys the literature

of the early church and documents its ambiguous attitude
toward rhetoric.

He also contends that Augustine wrote the

De Doctrina Christiana, not only as a rejection of the
Second Sophistic, but also to "urge the union of both matter
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and form in Christian preaching.18

Augustine, according to

Murphy, was attacking the rhetorical heresy "that the man
possessed of truth will ipso facto be able to communicate
the truth to others."19

An intriguing comparison is made

by Murphy between Plato and the ecclesiastical writers of
the fourth century.

While acknowledging that Christian

writers did not look to Gorqias for a theory of
communication, Murphy does argue that they did adopt a
parallel attitude toward rhetoric, an attitude he dubs the
"Platonic rhetorical heresy."20
Murphy agrees with the scholarly consensus that Plato
was no friend of rhetoric.

In fact, Plato's attitude toward

rhetoric can be considered the historical breeding grounds
for the four fictions described earlier.

I believe,

however, that Plato produced a much higher concept of
rhetoric than that allowed by Murphy.

This theory of

rhetoric appears in the Phaedrus, and has been defended by
Richard Weaver and James W. Hikins.21
Overcoming the Platonic Rhetorical Heresy
Agreeing with Weaver, I assume that the Phaedrus
". . . i s consistently, and from beginning to end, about one
thing, which is the nature of rhetoric."22

Weaver argues

that the Socratic dialogue is an example of transcendence,
and that calls for the use of metaphor and the analogical
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mode.

In addition, he cautions readers against a literal

reading of the Phaedrus; a warning that he deduces from the
myth of Boreas and Oreithyia mentioned by Phaedrus.
Phaedrus: "I haven't noticed it. But
seriously, Socrates, do you believe this
legend?"
Socrates: " . . . though I find such
explanations very attractive, Phaedrus,
they are too ingenious and laboured, it
seems to me, and I don't altogether envy
the man who devotes himself to this sort
of work. . . ."23
Socrates dismisses the question of Phaedrus as
irrelevant.

According to Weaver,

"It is a limitation to

suppose that the truth of the story lies in its
historicity."24

For students of homiletics, the suggestion

that the search for the "literal truth" is irrelevant, will
be of significance later in this proposal.

For now, it is

enough to note Socrates is satisfied with the parable,

"and

we infer from numerous other passages that he believed some
things are best told by parable and some perhaps
discoverable only by parable.
forward by analogy. 1125

Real investigation goes

Thus early on, there is an

admission by Plato of the utility of rhetoric.
The dialogue proceeds with three speeches: the non
lover, the evil lover, and the noble lover.

The first

speech, in praise of the non-lover, is symbolic of neuter
discourse.

In homiletics, this would be the rational-
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deductive model that dominates most theories of preaching.
The language is literal and prosaic and maintains point-bypoint contact with objective reality.

Also, this is the

language of prudence which does not excite public opinion:
"It is a circumspect kind of [language], which is preferred
by all men who wish to do well in the world and avoid
tempestuous courses."26

Therefore, I think it safe to

assume that Plato condemns neuter discourse.
I have compared the detachment of such literal language
to the dominant homiletical model.

In practical terms, such

language from the pulpit reveals an ambivalence toward the
biblical criticism that has uncovered the literary nature of
the Bible--myths, fables, metaphors, stories, and
narratives.

Rather than formulating a homiletical model

analogous to the literature and its form, preachers tend to
perpetuate the old rational-deductive model in spite of the
revolutionary theory modifications that have taken place in
theological and biblical studies.

What results is a "self-

interested" rationalization by the preacher who claims his
congregation could not handle the truth about biblical
criticism.

Plato's condemnation of such literal-language

rhetoric is thus the

first piece of evidence in a

discounting of the so-called "Platonic rhetorical heresy."
The second major speech of the Phaedrus is delivered by
Socrates in praise of the evil lover.

The theme of the

speech centers on the point that the lover is an exploiter.
By analogy, Plato condemns base rhetoric in the speech by
Socrates.

The evil lover represents a speaker exercising a

mystic-dogmatic authority over the beloved.

Persons who

yield themselves to mystic-dogmatic authority enter into a
dependency mode that emasculates them.

Such authority is

obeyed without question, and in a sense, those in authority
play God with the lives of others.

Examples of this kind of

emotional manipulation occur in preaching, e.g., witness the
demagoguery of Jim Bakker, Jimmy Swaggart, and other
television preachers (although this type of rhetoric is not
unique to media preachers or the twentieth century).

Once

again it is important to focus on Plato's rejection of
rhetoric that never permits an honest examination of
alternatives.

As Weaver points out, the base rhetorician is

of profound danger today " . . .

with his vastly augmented

power of propagation," with provisions of "means of deluding
which no ancient rhetor . . . could have imagined.27
The third speech, in praise of love, represents the
noble speaker.

Its theme is types of divine madness.

A

crucial argument in the speech occurs in the opening lines:
"If it were true without qualification that madness is an
evil, that would be all very well, but in fact, madness,
provided it comes as the gift of heaven, is the channel by
which we receive the greatest blessings."28

(I will return
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to these remarks in discussing preaching and the concept of
"folly".)

As Weaver suggests,

"Mere sanity, which is of

human origin, is inferior to that madness which is inspired
by the gods and which is a condition for the highest kind of
achievement."29

Prophecy and poetry fall within the realm

of the inspiration of divine madness.
then, is possessed of creative love.

The noble speaker,
C. S. Lewis, in The

Four Loves, defines such agape as a gift-love, love which
gives without asking for anything in return.

Thus, the

third speech celebrates the poet and the rhetorician, each
of which "is trying to advance the borders of the
imaginative world."30

There are elements of rhetoric,

approved it seems by Plato, that are positive and essential
to my proposed model; among these elements are passion,
creativity, imagination, and transformation through
figurative language.
The problem of rhetoric, as far as Plato was concerned
in the Gorgias, was its inability to lead to truth.

Plato

maintains in the Phaedrus that truth needs rhetoric.

In a

personification of Rhetoric, Plato allows Rhetoric to speak:
"I do not insist on ignorance of truth as an essential
qualification for the would-be speaker; for what my advice
is worth I suggest that he should acquire that knowledge
before embarking on me.

I do emphatically assert, however,

that without my assistance the man who knows the truth will
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make no progress in the art of persuasion."31

And again:

"Come forward, noble creatures, and persuade Phaedrus, who
begets such lovely children, that unless he becomes an
adequate philosopher, he will never be an adequate speaker
either on any subject."32

Now, rhetoric, according to

Plato, consists of truth plus its imaginative presentation,
and this presentation makes use of metaphor.
contends,

As Weaver

"It is by bringing out these resemblances that the

good rhetorician leads those who listen in the direction of
what is good.

In effect, he performs a cure of souls, by

giving impulse, chiefly through figuration, toward an ideal
good."33

The culmination of Plato's conception of rhetoric

comes in the conclusion of the Phaedrus:
Our whole previous discussion has proved that speeches,
whether their aim is to instruct or to persuade, cannot
be scientifically constructed, in so far as their
nature allows of scientific treatment at all, unless
the following conditions are fulfilled.
In the first
place a man must know the truth about any subject that
he deals with, either in speech or writing; he must be
able to define it generically, and having defined it to
divide it into its various specific kinds until he
reaches the limit of divisibility.
Next, he must
analyze on the same principles the nature of soul, and
discover what type of speech is suitable for each type
of soul.
Finally, he must arrange and organize his
speech accordingly, addressing a simple speech to a
simple soul, but to those which are more complex
something of greater complexity which embraces the
whole range of tones.34
The picture, then, of the true rhetorician is that of a
noble lover of good, who works though philosophical and
analogical association. Sophistry is condemned while noble,
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philosophical rhetoric is praised.

Weaver applies a

positive conclusion to Plato's portrayal when he says,

"So

rhetoric at its truest seeks to perfect men by showing them
better versions of themselves.

. . ."35

I contend

homiletics will benefit from such a perspective of rhetoric.
Plato makes other contributions that, I believe, can be
interpreted as having positive rhetorical value for
homiletics. These contributions may be summarized as
follows:
First, he shows that the speaker should know the truth
of what he is going to say.

In other words, the rhetorician

must initially be a philosopher.

Applied to homiletics, the

preacher must first be a hermeneutician.

"All the great

arts need to be supplemented by philosophical chatter and
daring speculation about the nature of things."36

Second,

the rhetorician is like a physician--a "doctor of souls."37
Third, the function of rhetoric is "to influence the soul."
The central task, then, of the rhetorician is to match his
speech with a particular kind of soul.

For the preacher,

there is here a hint of twentieth century studies in moral
development.

Of more significance, however, is Plato's

insistence upon the rhetorician doing a life-time of
homework; in the sense of studying human beings.

Carlyle

Marney, noted Baptist preacher, explains homework as:
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that decades-long process of inquiry, hat in hand
. . . addressed to competent psychology, psychiatry,
sociology, history, drama, art, daily affairs,
interpreted by a growing Biblical memory, contemporary
experience, theological acumen.38
Fourth,

for Plato an oral rhetoric is to be preferred to the

art of writing.

Those who depend on writing will lose their

memory, forfeit wisdom for a source of quantitative informa
tion, and defeat the dynamic impact that only orality can
bring to discourse.
painting.

Writing, says Plato, is like a

Still-life is all you get as spontaneity and

open-endness are forfeited.

The value of oral communication

has been recognized both by public speaking instructors and
homiletics professors.

For example, Clyde Fant's Preaching

for Today, argues for an "oral manuscript."

Fant pleads for

what he defines as "incarnational preaching" which is
neither culturally accommodative nor an uninterpreted
biblicism.39

He seems to argue, in the end, for a free

form sermon that at its best may overcome the impersonal
written sermon manuscript, but at its worst may lack focus.
In any event, Plato's passionate defense of the spoken word
has relevance for preaching, especially in light of the
potency of oral language described in Walter O n g 's The
Presence of the Word.

Finally, the noble rhetorician,

argues Plato, will seek to know the will of God.

This gives

an ethical base to rhetoric that has always been part of the
preaching tradition.

The ethos of the preacher, his/her
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character and credibility, is an important subject for
homiletics.
Another perspective that suggests a positive role for
rhetoric is to project Plato's Socrates as a rhetorician.
Socrates' own kind of rhetoric involved a highly
sophisticated semiotic machinery in which rhetoric plays a
first-order role.

His attack of rhetoric is itself a

rhetorical strategy.

In short, Socrates is a rhetorician.

The analysis of Socrates' conversational patterns, however,
has come under such headings as Method, Irony, Maieutic,
Dialectic, or Dialogue.

What seems to be overlooked is the

obvious rhetorical nature of Socrates' methods.
One reason for the neglect of the rhetorical side of
Socrates is tied with the prevailing fiction of rhetoric as
mere embellishment.

In other words, having accepted what

appears as Socrates' rejection of all rhetoric, it has been
assumed that Socrates himself could not possibly employ
rhetorical techniques.

I believe that this carte blanche

acceptance of the Socratic status quo overlooks the
rhetorical devices of Socrates.

The protests of Socrates

serve as a weapon of concealing his art; and that art is the
art of rhetoric.
For example, Socrates frequently complains that he is
not a good speaker.

In Plato's Apology Socrates claims to

be unable to produce "speeches finely tricked out with words
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and phrases, carefully arranged" (17B9-C1).

By stressing

his harmlessness, Socrates defuses the possible defenses of
his listeners.
A second rhetorical strategy of Socrates is to appear
as a person involved in a casual conversation rather than as
a speech-maker.

The strategy allows Socrates to reach a

rhetorical goal despite what appears as a meandering conver
sation.

Socrates succeeds, it seems to me, in establishing

a credible ethos by insinuating that the listener has
nothing to fear, that Socrates has no manipulative, evil
goals, that he is benevolent, can be trusted, that he
desires only to help the listener achieve noble goals, and
that his is the voice of truth.

Socrates sets up his

listeners and moves them slowly toward his own rhetorical
goals.
The very existence of these goals marks Socrates as a
rhetorician.

"Socrates . . . was, in fact, aware of having

a certain mission to accomplish and felt himself engaged in
accomplishing it; and if he understood this mission as an
attempt to make other people aware of how badly they needed
to submit their behavior to radical change, it is likely
that he realized both how difficult it is to convince other
people that they behave in a radically improper w a y ."40
What we discover here is a new rhetoric.

Socrates

rejects the long-winded speeches of the Sophists for a

108
different approach: the indirect, the unassuming tone, the
shorter speech, simple remarks, questions, and analogies.
Socrates hammers away at the same message:

"no danger, no

suspicions, no need for being on guard."
The rhetoric of Socrates can be understood in terms of
rhetorical means toward noble ends.

Socrates attempts to

establish a rhetorical or communicative atmosphere.

He

tries to establish a sense of relevance of intimacy, of
confidence, of communication in depth.

To accomplish these

goals requires taking care to avoid what may be felt as
disturbing, to concentrate only upon certain sides of the
subject-matter, and to select what one has to say in order
to give a coherent picture of the state of affairs.
In "The Rhetoric of Socrates," Livio Rossetti lists
additional rhetorical devices employed by Socrates: 1)
getting a bystander to open a conversation rather than
opening it himself, or concealing himself under the mask of
a third person who is said to be much less compliant when
submitting a concept to careful analysis; 2 ) concentrating
upon a question of detail; 3) giving the impression of
abandoning a particular subject and of wishing to turn to
quite another kind of question; 4) saying something without
assuming the responsibility for having said it; 5) making
extensive use of examples and analogies; 6 ) offering two
obvious analogies before passing to a much more
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controversial one in order to elicit from the interlocutor
the same answer to the third; and 7) contriving a pseudoanalogical inferential formula.41

Rossetti gives no

example, but the rhetorical devices listed could be amply
illustrated from passages of the Phaedrus.
The foregoing analysis can be summarized as follows:
Socrates' rhetoric does exist, may be described in positive
terms, plays an important role in the dialectic interaction,
may be taken as the beginning of a new kind of rhetoric, and
is strongly marked by a rhetoric of anti-rhetoric.
Rhetoric and Christian Origins
A second source for formulating a more positive role
for rhetoric in homiletics is the Greek language.
Testament documents were written in KOINE Greek.

The New
Two

assumptions of biblical scholars have been that 1 ) the
concept of the Christian faith is unique, and 2) the origin
of Christian faith is neither in the Old Testament nor in
Greek thought.
agree.

With the first of these assumptions,

I

However, the second assumption has been called into

question from a variety of perspectives.

For example, James

L. Kinneavy has proposed an origin of the Christian concept
of faith in classical rhetoric.

His hypothesis is "that a

substantial part of the concept of faith found in the New
Testament can be found in the rhetorical concept of
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persuasion, which was a major meaning of the noun pistis
(faith or persuasion) and the verb pisteuein (to believe) in
the Greek language at the period the New Testament was
written. 1,42

Kinneavy supports his hypothesis with three

arguments:
1.

The semantic concept.
Persuasion and faith are
similar semantically, and this establishes the
potential of a mutual historical influence.

2.

The social, linguistic, and educational background
of the first century, A.D., when the New Testament
books were written.
Especially significant were
the Greek language and the awareness of Greek
rhetoric in Palestine.

3.

An analysis of the 491 occurrences of pistis and
its related cognates in their New Testament
contexts.

Kinneavy could have strengthened his case with a study
of pistis from the Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament.

For example, Rudolph Bultmann, in his analysis

of pistis, in Volume VI of Kittel, points out "In particular
a word (Enos , pripa, or Xoyoq) can be called pistos. also
the qlossa (tongue), so that in philosophy the Xoyog (Plato,
T i m . 49b), the tnoGeaig (Plato, Phaedrus, 207b), or the
ano66i|ig, (Plato, Phaedrus 245c) is m axog or niaxr], and
niaxtg can be combined with anoSGiKiKog( Aristotle's
Rhetoric, II, 1, p. 1377b, 23 ).43

Bultmann goes on to say,

"From a purely formal standpoint there is nothing very
distinctive in the usage of the New Testament and early
Christian writings as compared with Greek usage."44

Ill
A more detailed study of pistis reveals parallels
between rhetorical persuasion and Christian faith, n 10x05
means trusting, reliable, or certain.

By contrast, amaTog

means unfaithful, distrustful, and unreliable (see Plato
Phaedrus 245c--"untrustworthy speech").
confidence or trust.

riiaxig means

In so far as it contains an element of

uncertainty, trust can be contrasted with knowledge,
especially in Plato (See Resp. VI 511 d-e, where vor]aig
(insight), Siavoia (understanding), niaxig (belief), and
GiKaaicn (probability) are listed in their graded relation
to aXr|0Gia (truth).

Another meaning of luaxig can be

conviction or certainty as in "trust in what is real."

In

Resp. VI, 505e, Plato speaks of nioxig povipog (firm
belief).

Also ruaxig became a catchword for those religions

which engaged in propaganda.
Christianity alone.

"This did not apply to

All missionary preaching demanded faith

in the deity proclaimed by it ."45

Preachers engaged in

rhetoric designed to persuade people to trust in Christ.
Faith thus can mean to be persuaded.

The author of the New

Testament Epistle to the Hebrews associates other rhetorical
terms with maxig.

"Now faith is the evidence of things not

seen, the substance of things hoped for." (Hebrews 11:1,
emphasis mine.)
Through his analysis of pistis, Kinneavy shows that the
Christian faith is already a part of its Greek culture and

112
Greek rhetoric.

Of course, there are other significant

rhetorical terms with New Testament parallels (not discussed
by Kinneavy): Xoyog,
opportune time).
niaxLg.

E k k X t|oicx,

and

K aipog

(Gorgias and the

For example, the A.oyo5 is the means of the

The two concepts clearly belong together as

interacting signs in the emergence of Christian thought.
Augustine's Relation to Rhetoric and Homiletics
Augustine stands in a dialectical relation to the
rhetorical tradition of which he was part.

In his

background lie rhetorical studies and experience as a
teacher of sophistic rhetoric.

After his conversion to

Christianity, Augustine sought to reconcile rhetoric and
homiletics.

The fourth book in the essay De Doctrina

Christiana, considered in the history of preaching as the
first homiletical text, is the classic work on the relation
between rhetoric and preaching.

While the first book

articulates the relation between thing and sign, and the
second and third books contain a summary of the principles
of biblical interpretation, the fourth develops rules for
the use of eloquence in preaching.
For Augustine there are reasons to incorporate rhetoric
into preaching.

The seemingly contradictory remarks about

rhetoric which appear in De Doctrina can be attributed to
Augustine's uneasiness about Christian spokespersons who
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viewed rhetoric as a pagan art.

Still Augustine states

clearly his belief in the usefulness of rhetoric.
example, in Book 2.40.60,

For

(one of the two texts inspiring

the present study) Augustine advises Christians to "despoil
pagan thought of the gold of wisdom and the silver of
eloquence, as by God's command the Hebrews despoiled the
Egyptians."46

Augustine takes his own advice by despoiling

the rhetoric of Cicero, particularly Orator, from which he
borrows extensively.

While Cicero is never mentioned by

name, Augustine refers to him as "the master of Roman
eloquence," (4.3.4);
rhetoric" (4.5.7):

"those who thought to teach the art of

"a certain author," (4.10.24);

"a certain

eloquent man," (4.11.26); and "the author of Roman
eloquence." (4.17.34).

Some scholars have concluded from

their reading of De Doctrina that Augustine opposed the
study of rhetoric by the Christian preacher, but the
consensus, with a few notable exceptions,

is that Augustine

produced a synthesis of rhetoric and preaching.47
Several scholars have defended the position that, for
Augustine, rhetoric was a positive force in Christian
preaching.

For example, Floyd Anderson observes that

Augustine "joins eloquence to wisdom, proclaims the value of
secular and profane learning, and seeks to embrace both
sacred truths and secular knowledge within the unified grasp
of wisdom."48

Keith V. Erickson affirms this judgment by
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classifying De Doctrina as "a homiletic rhetoric" and "a
neoclassical rhetoric designed to serve the Christian
Paideria."49

Thus, Augustine argues that rhetoric is not

secular paganism but a legitimate means by which the Gospel
could be preached.

In short, Augustine re-established

Ciceronian rhetorical concepts, and should be viewed as the
last of the classical rhetoricians.

The argument is that

while Augustine's Ciceronian rhetoric is well known by
rhetorical scholars, homileticians have long since restored
the separation between rhetoric and homiletics.

The

significance of De Doctrina for the present study lies, not
in a summary of its well-known rhetorical rules, but in its
ability to serve as a positive model for a new marriage of
rhetoric and homiletics.

As John H. Patton concludes,

"In

the final analysis, it is surely Augustine's lasting
contribution that his treatment of exegesis and rhetoric
supplies a valuable means of uniting content with form."50
Conclusions and Assessments
I have examined the complex relationship between
rhetoric and homiletics, giving special attention to
representative preachers who have condemned rhetoric as a
pagan art.

There is evidence that this condemnation, dubbed

the "Platonic Rhetorical heresy," has suffered from
imprecise definitions of rhetoric.

What seems condemned in
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homiletics is not so much rhetoric but sophistic rhetoric.
Though homiletical textbooks are saturated with rhetorical
principles and techniques, we have seen a long history of
warnings against the use of rhetoric.

The result has been a

negative assessment of rhetoric, leading to a divorce
between rhetoric and homiletics that still exists.
In an attempt to reclaim a positive role for rhetoric
in homiletics, a return to two primary classical sources was
undertaken.

Since I believe the refusal of homiletics to

come to grips with its basic rhetorical nature is deeply
rooted in history, a new reading of Plato's Phaedrus was
suggested.

The result of this evaluation of the Phaedrus

was the conclusion that while Plato did condemn sophistic
rhetoric, he created a noble or philosophical rhetoric.
This philosophical rhetoric was shown to be a positive and
ethical theory of speaking which can be applied to
homiletics.

The second classical source, Augustine's De

Doctrina Christiana, took the argument one step further by
suggesting, not only a positive value for rhetoric, but the
union of rhetoric and homiletics.
The major conclusion of this historical prelude to a
rhetorical homiletics is that preaching is rhetoric.

This

modest claim opens the door to a homiletics based on
rhetorical principles.

The way is now clear to utilize
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rhetoric and metaphor as the bridge in a positive interface
of rhetoric and preaching.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A RHETORIC OF HOMILETICS OR
THE RHETORIC OF "FOLLY"
Based on the preceding application of Foucault's
discursive formation in Chapter Two, and a positive
attribution of the rhetoric/homiletic mix, I am now prepared
to suggest a new rhetorical model for homiletics.

The first

step in the proposed process is the substitution of the
philosophical starting point of the classical homiletics
with a different starting point.

Therefore,

I have

jettisoned Descartes and the rational certainty starting
point for what I call "Christian humanism."

My "Christian

humanism" combines the humanistic studies of Ernesto Grassi
with the Christian philosophy of proclamation exemplified in
the writings of St. Paul.

In both of these thinkers the

notion of "folly" can be interpreted as the way of seeing
the world that allows us to move beyond the rational
paradigm.
In addition, A. Cheree Carlson suggests a "comic frame"
as an option to the tragic interpretation of movements.
argues that the comic frame enables persons to transcend
themselves by noting their own foibles.

"The end of a

movement from this perspective is to free society by
creating a consciousness of the system as a system,
121
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revealing its inherent weaknesses, and preparing an aware
populace to deal with them."1

Elements of the comic frame

will be incorporated into my understanding of folly.

I

shall argue that 1 ) a comic movement requires a "spiritual
element in its rhetoric, one emphasizing identification with
humanity through some unifying force; and 2 ) a comic
movement must assume that the individuals in the social
order are inherently moral beings.2
There is ample precedent in the history of the Church
for a rhetoric of folly.

In the ritual irony of the

medieval church, celebrations such as the Feast of Fools,
Easter Humor, or the Feast of the Ass during which a carved
donkey was carried in procession, indicate that church
leaders recognized the need for the comic, i.e., the ability
to laugh at themselves.3

M. M. Bakhtin notes that

"Carnival celebrated temporary liberation from the
prevailing truth and from the established order; it marked
the suspension of all hierarchial rank, privileges, norms,
and prohibitions.

Carnival was the true feast of time, the

feast of becoming, change, and renewal."4

What the Church

considered "folly"--a pretension, a comedy to release
tension once a year will now be interpreted in my evaluation
of St. Paul and Grassi as the norm all the time.

The

function of folly in the medieval church, especially the
ability to make the church laugh at its own foibles and
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uncertainties, and the inversion of class structure,

is now

the function of a rhetoric of folly.
Grassi's thesis is that rhetoric is at the basis
of philosophy.
Verene,

"Rhetoric is identified, notes Donald

"with the power" of language and human speech to

generate a basis for human thought."5

This view of

rhetoric contradicts Cartesian philosophy.

Grassi counters

the rational paradigm with a recovery of senses of language
and thought. As Verene claims,

"Grassi sees the humanist

tradition and the ancient notions of metaphor, imagination,
memory, and ingenuity as culminating in the thought of
Giambattista Vico."6
Much of Grassi's thesis can be grasped by a cursory
examination of Vico's central ideas.

According to Vico

certainty has nothing to do with politics, military science,
medicine, jurisprudence, history, and religion.

The formal

logic approach of Descartes runs counter to nature in two
ways: First, it deemphasizes the faculty of memory, and
second, it ignores imagination.
of our genius for invention.

The result is a reduction

In addition, Descartes rejects

rhetoric as being beneath the level of philosophy, placing
undue stress on pathos, and not possessing epistemic value.
Vico disagrees with all of these criticisms and counters by
insisting that rhetoric is rooted in a probability-based
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reality.

Through rhetoric knowledge is created and we can

communicate our ideas and impressions to others.7
Grassi's thesis asks us to choose Vico over Descartes
as our philosophical starting point.

From such a

perspective we may be able to recover the power of the word
as connected to and based in the creative imagination.
"Creative imagination means the prophetic power of the word
to ground thought in the real order."8
power of the word is the metaphor.

The fundamental

The ability of metaphor

to make a beginning point for thought is thus deemed more
fundamental than the logical power of the word.
The significance of Grassi's move to choose the
humanities over science, the imagination over the rational
paradigm, can be supported by numerous contemporary
conceptions of rhetoric.9

For example, Henry Johnstone

considers rhetoric the art of evocation.
argument," according to Johnstone,

"A successful

"is intended to evoke,

and does evoke, a response of a certain kind in the man to
whom it is addressed."10

Michael Hyde and Craig Smith

suggest that the primary function of rhetoric is ". . . t o
'make-known' meaning both in oneself and to others.

Meaning

is derived by a human being in and through the interpretive
understanding of reality.1111

Robert Scott asks us to see

rhetoric "more broadly as a human potentiality to understand
the human condition.1,12

Walter R. Fisher offers his
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"narrative paradigm as an alternative to the rational world
paradigm. ”13
The common thread in these conceptions of rhetoric is a
shift from a Cartesian-based epistemology to a broader
rhetorical space of probabilities and beliefs.

I am not

suggesting, however, that Christian belief should be
disregarded.

On the contrary, I ask that beliefs be

rhetorically constructed and compete for their place in the
"ongoing conversation" among all other beliefs, practices,
and knowledge systems as part of the adventure of being-in-the-world.
The Christian aspect of my "Christian humanism" can be
represented in the word of St. Paul:
foolish the wisdom of the world?

"Has not God made

For since, in the wisdom

of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, it
pleased God through the folly of what we preach to save
those who believe."14

To connect the power of God with the

weakness of a cross equates weakness as power and folly as
wisdom.

God, according to St. Paul, has made the wisdom of

the world a folly.

He means that Christianity involves a

contradiction, what J. Kellenberger calls the "absolute
paradox."

The cross is a supreme paradox, an objective

uncertainty of the greatest magnitude that is an absurdity
to reason.15
wisdom.

As a result, the world is perishing with its
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Folly, not the rational world paradigm, is the
appropriate stance for the human world according to Grassi
and St. Paul.

As Grassi says,

"To live in folly is the

profound reason for existence.1,16

Thus the weight shifts

from an epistemological notion of rationality to a broadened
concept of praxis that encompasses not only the redirection
of the course of modern times but a potential for our very
survival.
Part of the stated purpose of my study concerns the
rhetorician's and the preacher's goal of human survival.
While such a construct sounds somewhat naive, I am more
convinced than ever of the need for the effort.
however,

feel obligated to insert a caveat.

I do,

Any mention of

humanism in a Christian context should not be equated with
the social gospel of nineteenth century American Christian
liberalism.

Evil was considered, not a matter for individ

uals, but a non-transcendental matter of institutions. Good
(God) was constructed through social consensus.

The social

gospel became a liberal version of the simple gospel of the
fundamentalists.
preacher,

According to Carlyle Marney, noted Baptist

"The error of our nineteenth century liberalism

was its use of human powers, human obligations, human
concepts, and human work to produce an 'arrived-at' kingdom
of G o d ."17
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Notice,

for example, the naive view of human nature:

"If the people were free, they would stop exploitation,"
says Walter Rauschenbusch.18

In the sermon,

"The Social

Problem, Our Problem," Rauschenbusch claims that his
generation is solving the problem of poverty. 1,19 Does not
this view of human nature require the illusion that humans
could build a new society through education and moral
persuasion?

Are not nineteenth century liberals

participants in a middle-class, American-dream optimism?
Perhaps the most damaging blow to nineteenth century
liberalism was the loss of the doctrine of Go d .20
were the footsteps of God heard.

Nowhere

The nineteenth century

liberals were unable to come to grips with God as creator;
even the possibility of a transcendental being faded before
the new physics, the new universe, the new glorification of
man.

The loss of the divine awaited a correction and a

chastened humanism.

By humanism I mean the willful turning

away from preoccupation with knowledge we are not equipped
to expand and the devoted acceptance of our place where we
are, as we are, with the strength that is already in our
hands, to be committed to the social, personal, and
redemptive tasks that confront u s .21
I suggest that the road to a chastened humanism that
maintains connections to Christian theology is a "rhetoric
of folly."

I wish to juxtapose the views of Grassi and St.
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Paul concerning folly as a base for a rhetorical homiletics.
The fact of their widely disparate ontological positions
serves only to enhance the widespread acceptance of the
common goal of survival among atheists and Christians.
The Concept of Folly According to St. Paul
A review of the original meaning of folly will
establish its significance in the writings of St. Paul.

The

Greek word pcopia and cognates denote a physical or
intellectual deficiency of persons in their conduct and
actions.

The word refers to dullness, stupidity, and sloth,

but its main reference is to the intellectual life.
asserts,

Grassi

"The word is usually used psychologically and

mentally in a deprecatory manner.

It refers to a general

inferiority in thinking and behaving.

By pwpia, man falls

under a ruling power which confuses his mind and induces him
to 'crazy' or 'insane' actions."22
Bertram,

According to Georg

"The word implies censure on man himself; his acts,

his thoughts, counsels, and words are not as they should
b e ."23

Examples of folly in classical Greek imply a kind

of madness as well as an external control by a power which
confuses individuals.
In the Greek Old Testament and the corresponding Hebrew
originals, pcopia is used almost exclusively for the fool.
However, in Deuteronomy 32:6 and Jeremiah 5:21, pwpia means
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not possessing a true knowledge

of God.

The folly of

man is

seen as apostasy from God.
Philo uses the term as a criticism of all worldly
wisdom.

Man is ensnared in folly.

means of his own reason.

He cannot escape by

There is here an echo of the

pessimism of Greek philosophy.24

Philoaddresses as a fool

the person who has no understanding of the world.25
In the writings of St. Paul, pcopia acquires a
theological meaning.

The theological background revolves

around the death of Christ.

Paul uses the term

"crucifixion" most often in connection with pcopia.

"To

crucify" is a pregnant metaphor for the birth, life, death,
and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

"The preaching of Christ

crucified cannot be done with the instruments of human
wisdom because the X0705 rot axatpou (I Cor. 1:18) is
regarded neither by the world nor by Christian believers as
ao(j)ia

tod

K oapoo"26

In his own work Paul came under the judgment of folly.
According to Luke, the philosophers at Athens mocked him
(Acts 17:18); Gallio regarded the dispute between Paul and
the Jews as foolishness (Acts 18:25); Festus declared Paul
to be out of his mind (Acts 26:24).

The dispute could be

interpreted as an example of the conflict between
philosophical rationalism and religious irrationalism.
Numerous texts, however, demonstrate that the Greek search
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for wisdom often resulted in theological conclusions.

In

the thought world of the first and second centuries A.D., in
which an academic-peripatetic mixture formed the basis of
general education, the interest in the afterlife is worth
noting.

Perhaps the polarities between Greek philosophical

rationalism and supposed Christian irrationalism are not as
severe as scholarly cliches indicate.
Paul gives pcopia a metaphorical and met amorphic
function.

The metaphorical character results from the

transferring of the usual negative meaning of folly to a
positive meaning.

In I Corinthians 4:10, for example, Paul

is proud to be "a fool for Christ's sake."

The metamorphic

transformation takes place with Paul's assigning to folly
the meaning of true, original knowledge.

"What is rejected

as pcopia in the opinion of the Greek scholars is raised by
Paul to the sign of true knowledge.1127

"The transvaluation

of values in the Gospel is the basis of the use of the word
group by Paul."28

An example of this transformation and

transvaluation occurs in I Corinthians 1:11--"For the word
of the cross is folly to those who are perishing, but to us
who are being saved it is the power of God.

..."

Preaching is depicted as foolishness, a certain kind of
folly.

As noted previously, homiletical methods have

attempted to be the opposite of such folly.

The perennial

attempt to eliminate the folly of the cross from Christian
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faith appears in the very method used for the proclamation
of the cross.

In what sense, however, does preaching the

word of the cross constitute folly?

According to St. Paul,

the word of the cross is diametrically opposed to human
wisdom--the latter being condemned by that word of the
cross.

The issue for Paul is that the Jews demand a sign

from above and the Greeks expect wisdom.

What Paul offers

each is the same: the word of the cross.

Thus, the Jewish

expectations of signs is met by

the kerygma of the cross.

The Jews get their sign, but where they demanded power, God
has answered in weakness, and therefore, the word of the
cross is a csKav&aXov .

God with the cross is both folly and

scandal.
The word of the cross to the Greeks is analogous to the
word Paul offered the Jews.

Since the Greeks search for

wisdom, the Christian offers them wisdom--Christ and him
crucified (I Cor. 1:23,24), but this wisdom is a reversal of
what the Greeks expected.

This is not wisdom;

God is thus a fool in human eyes (I Cor. 1:25).

it is folly.
The Greeks

get wisdom, but their expectation of wisdom is met in a way
that paradoxically falls short of that expectation.

Where

worldly wisdom was expected, the foolish word of the cross
is offered.

The Greek search for wisdom has no categories

for salvation effected by means of a despised cross.
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Folly, according to Paul, is a complete reversal of
human standards, expectations, and conventional wisdom.
There is, to use Paul Tournier's term, a "great
reversal."29

The world's values are turned upside down

since power now resides in weakness, and wisdom comes from
folly.

God's power is not demonstrated with forceful signs

from above; it shows its strength in the word of a weak
cross.

God's wisdom is not displayed with scientific

certainty or absolute dogmas; it shows its knowledge in the
word of a foolish cross.

Reversal of human values, of human

ways of being-in-the-world, therefore constitutes the folly
of Christianity.
In summary, the word about the cross as the power and
wisdom of God is fundamentally critical for human knowledge
and expectations; in this word an alternative rhetoric is
offered as hope for survival. The rhetoric about God cannot
be absolute.

Any theological language faces a crisis by its

own subject for discussion--God.

Thus the preacher is shown

to be what all claimers of knowledge turn out to be-rhetoricians.

What Herb Simons says of science is just as

valid for homiletics:

"Like rhetoric,

[science]

[or

homiletics] is rooted in unprovable belief and value
premises;

'undetermined' rules; shackled by the constraints

of language; inspired by personal passions and ambitions;
made credible by stylistic devices; and strongly influenced
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by political, cultural, and marketplace factors."30
later article, Simons asserts,

In a

"Scientific theories are

rhetorical constructions and their key terms are
ineliminably metaphorical . . . scientists [and preachers]
appear to be stuck with metaphor."31
The preacher possesses no absolute dogmas or certain
proofs but tenuous metaphors suggestive of a whole new way
of living.

For him, truth is not a static point revealed

through scriptural reading but an emerging interpretation.
The preacher stands ready for constant revision of her
images, aware that she may have to start from scratch time
and again and that no amount of dogmatism permits her to get
beyond probabilities and beliefs, i.e., rhetoric.

When one

preaches God, the message is always rhetorical in nature and
content.

Of such is the folly of the kingdom of God.

After all, what recourse is there for the preacher who
knows himself/herself to be made of ambiguities and
probabilities, who sees himself/herself as a collective
consensus of reality, and yet who dares to speak for the
love and the despair of the Christian folly?
choices are three.

I think the

She may confine her voice to the

monotone of the nineteenth century rational methods, and so
alienate herself from the world.

Or she may choose what

George Steiner called "the suicidal rhetoric of silence," in
the tradition of Dietrich Bonhoeffer.32

As a Nazi prisoner
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during World War II, he preached to his fellow prisoners,
but on the morning of his execution, said his prayers and
went silently to his death.33
of St. Paul and the title,

Or she may choose the folly

"fool for Christ's sake."

In

what respect, however, can St. Paul's concept of folly have
commonalities with Ernesto Grassi's concept of folly?

To

attempt an answer, I will survey Grassi's theory of folly.
The Concept of Folly According to
Ernesto Grassi
In Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric, Karen A. Foss
describes Grassi's understanding of folly as "the basic
process of inqenium, which allows the human world to emerge
. . . Only in the framework of folly--and not in rational
thought--do the meanings of history reveal themselves."34
There is, however, more to Grassi's concern for the "problem
of folly" than this summary view.

This section illustrates

how a fuller understanding of the role of folly helps
explain Grassi's concerns about the dominance of the
scientific-rational paradigm in Western culture.

The

explication of Grassi's views will focus on a brief review
of Grassi's concepts of rhetoric, ingenium, and metaphor,
before turning to a more detailed discussion of his concept
of folly.
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Rhetoric
Simply put, Grassi argues that rhetorical speech is the
primary and original form of speech.

Rhetoric, in Grassi's

view, is tied to the act wherein the premises of thought are
created.

"It is this original, prophetic sense of the word,

the word that connects the world to a transcendent order of
reality that is at the basis of rhetoric . . ."35

Rhetoric

is not a mere act of persuasion, a language of the emotions,
or a way of communicating truth established by logical
thought.

Rhetoric connects with imaginative speech and

ingenuity to disclose the reality signified in terms of
constantly new situations.
Rhetoric is essential to philosophy.

For one thing,

rhetoric is the first step in the process of philosophical
thought.

Or to put it another way,

"Rhetoric is the first

and primordial form of thought from which philosophy
flows."36

Rhetoric involves dialogue, metaphor,

imagination, and ingenium.
In "Why Rhetoric Is Philosophy," Grassi insists that
philosophizing can only be rhetorical.

Using the metaphor

of the "game" Grassi builds on the ideas that language is a
game, that language does not occur for the determination of
beings, and that authentic language is pure word-play.

The

games we play with language have three essential
characteristics: 1 ) subjectivity, 2 ) possibility of winning
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or losing, and 3) matches reveal the possibilities of the
players as well as their personality and passions.37
Why do we play the game?
is our world."30

"The stake we are playing for

We play as actors and spectators in an

uninterrupted game which reveals the metaphorical nature of
reality.

Grassi's metaphor of the game is relevant to the

concern for survival.

"Having identified rational language

as the preeminent language--as happens in the Western world-and having played our era by means of it, we have lost and
we are still losing the 'match' of the Western world.

Our

hope for winning (i.e., surviving) is in the 'vulgar'
language of rhetoric . . . because it is by means of it that
we 'uncover' the various worlds . . ."39

At stake is our

own kosmos.
Grassi's concept of rhetoric has its detractors.

One

more or less representative attack of Grassi's rhetoric
helps illustrate the tenuous nature of rhetoric's invitation
to the academic party.

The case in point is Thomas B.

Farrell's "Rhetorical Resemblance: Paradoxes of a Practical
Art."40

Farrell argues that Grassi attempts to do away

with rational speech.

"Where rational speech has failed

. . . we must now have recourse to a privileged speech of
the muses, a mythic speech of pure emotion, a speech that
points us toward primordial truth itself."41

Rhetoric is

reduced to a privileged language of inspired passion.
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While Farrell admits there is some merit in Grassi's
rendering, he insists that Grassi's expressivist, mythical
speech cannot be the foundation of society.

As Farrell

counters:
But what cannot be countenanced is the subordination
of all these issues to a privileged aesthetic of
expression--a vision that runs counter to the very
thinkers it invokes as authorities, a vision that
entices us to abandon reflection itself.
The impulse,
such as it is, should be resisted.42
I believe Farrell overstates Grassi's attack on the
impotence of rational language.

It would be inappropriate

to associate the visionary language of the muses with
irrationality or mysticism.

Grassi's interpretations

indicate that the origins of rational speech lie in semantic
speech, that rational knowledge results from insight into
the non-rational character of archaic principles, not that
rational speech should be excluded from culture.

What is

offered is a correction to overdependence on the rational
paradigm and the unceremonious ouster of rhetoric from the
house of respectable disciplines.

Rhetoric, as queen of the

sciences, simply wants to reclaim her place at the table in
the kingdom.

Rhetoric has not, as Farrell suggests, gone

begging, like ancient King Saul of Israel, to the cave of
Endor's witch, desperately searching for a mystical speech
as key to finding again the tree of knowledge.
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In short, Farrell's argument rests upon a restatement
of Cartesian dualism, as if one must choose rhetoric over
reason or vice versa.

Grassi reminds us that St. Augustine,

in De Trinitate for example, draws attention to the
limitations of reason:
It is impossible for human beings either to search for
what he knows because that he knows already and no
further search is necessary; nor can he search for what
he does not know because he does not know what to
search for (80e 2).
Grassi is not opposing the realms of cognition and pathos
but is attempting to show their unity.

He speaks for a

sense of historical order: first comes rhetorical speech,
then rational speech.

In either event, both modes of

speaking are experienced as the content of a faith (pistis).
Ingenium
Along with the rest of the Humanistic tradition,
ingenium has been rejected in scientific and philosophical
disciplines.

Usually ingenium is interpreted solely as an

artistic and literary faculty or as a "psychological
concept."43

For Grassi, however, ingenium plays a central

role as the inventive power in the creative shaping of the
world.

"Ingenium, in other words, refers to a basic

capacity to grasp what is common or similar in things--to
see relationships or make connections."44

Common synonyms

for ingenium are ingenuity, mental cleverness, wit, or
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insight.

Yet it is much more than a mere mental feat; it is

a way of knowing that Grassi describes as a "grasping.1145
Foss summarizes ingenium as the key term embodying the
"process by which humans move from the natural realm to the
human one . . . Ingenium allows humans to deal with the
changing situations of nature and thus make the transference
from the world of senses to the world of intellect and
interpretation."46

In short, ingenium's task is to

decipher the world in order to discover reality.

In the

discovery of reality, ingenium becomes, for Grassi, the
origin of community.
I believe there is a strong link between ingenium and
Peter Berger's concept of ecstasy (EKcruaaig ).47

The

experience of ecstasy involves the risk of stepping outside
the taken-for-granted rules.

There is an element of risk in

the attempt to grasp, to find, to know, to get outside the
status quo.

Perhaps Berger is on target:

"Acting out the

social drama we keep pretending that these precarious
conventions are eternal verities."48

Ingenium and ecstasy

can act in concert to help the preacher gain a perspective
on his/her perspective.
Grassi, working from his profession of atheism,
describes Being as the original force in nature, or that
which makes the demands to which humans must respond.
through language and the process of ingenium can humans

Only
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confront Being.
of faith:
. . ."49

I, in contrast, operate from a confession

"In beginning was the Word and the Word was God
Being, for me, is the God of the Jewish-Christian

scriptures.

Since Jesus was/is the Word, the Christian

responds to Him.

Jesus, as metaphor of God, is open to

numerous imaginative interpretations.

No one or all of

these interpretations constitute the only way of being in
relationship with Being.

Through ingenium the preacher

constantly creates new images of Being.

For example, Jesus

as liberator or friend may be more understandable than
traditional images like Redeemer or Savior.
Metaphor
Metaphor, in Grassi's view, provides for the operation
of ingenium and allows for the transfer of meaning and for
connection between the world of nature and the human realm.
"Thus metaphor, as a process of transfer, has the ability to
transform things--to create new relationships."50

In other

words, metaphor is the most important figure of speech.
Throughout Rhetoric As Philosophy. Grassi insists upon
the significance of metaphor.

A review of Grassi's basic

ideas concerning metaphor seems necessary before moving on.
The metaphor is the original form of the interpretative act
itself.

The metaphor lies at the root of our human world.

"The metaphorical, pictorial nature of every original
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insight links insight with pathos, content with the form of
the speech."51

Metaphor makes philosophy possible because

the archaic assertions on which rational proofs depend have
a metaphorical character.

Metaphor is more than a figure of

speech because it embodies the basic process by which humans
come to know.
Grassi's concept of metaphor supports the theory that
language is the medium of hermeneutic experience.

But more

than this, since metaphor produces light, i.e., knowledge,
then we are released from the illusion that rational truth
is the only truth.

The preacher then can be concerned not

so much with describing facts as with creating images.
Jacob Bronowski says,

"...

As

all our ways of picturing the

invisible are metaphors, likenesses that we snatch from the
larger world of eye and ear and touch."52
Folly
However, Western culture has been dominated by reliance
on science.

Choosing rhetoric over the scientific paradigm

would be considered folly.

Grassi reverses this under

standing:
The reasonable world into which the analytic philosophy
puts us today turns out to be a purely "formal" one,
and only as such is it "sound," "unbroken," "formal"
and "firmly" within the frame of quite special limits.
In this case . . . must we not argue that purely formal
activity without "an ultimate reason," i.e., "formal
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thinking" of the analytic philosophy, is itself nothing
but a "folly"?53
Folly, for Grassi, requires an act of ingenium, or
seeing beyond things as they are to the meaning of Being.
Under this definition of folly contemporary society is seen
as laboring under the illusion that rational knowledge is
true knowledge.

In such a system, man is dehumanized and

perhaps ends up committing technological suicide.

For

example, even if science were to solve all problems, answer
all questions, and verify every hypothesis, there is still
no guarantee that humanity could survive.

Rudolph Carnap

warns that "the mastery of life requires an effort of all
our various powers; we should be wary of the shortsighted
belief that the demands of life can all be met with the
power of conceptual thinking alone."54
Grassi develops his concept more fully in Folly and
Insanity in Renaissance Literature.

Written with Maristella

Lorch, this book deals extensively with the theme of folly.
Of special significance is the critique of Erasmus's Praise
of Folly, where Grassi's understanding of folly can be
grasped more completely.
For Erasmus, as for St. Paul, the term "folly" acquires
new meaning.

Grassi explains this change:

Moria for Erasmus has a fundamental meaning which holds
not only for the range of the human world, as it would
if we understood pcopia only as a human condition . . .
He affirms that moria is the deeper root of the
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unveiling of all beings and, by its undeductibility and
nonrationality, an abysmal folly which has nothing to
do with a subjective insanity.
Through its power the
world appears.55
Moria, as separate entity, is divine.

In fact, Moria

claims divinity for herself:
Now, lest my claim to divinity should seem unsub
stantiated, listen carefully and I will show you how
many benefits I bestow on gods and men alike and how
widely my divine power extends . . . The essence of
divinity is to give aid to mortals.56
The power of Moria opens up the immense stage of the world
with the unfolding of its paradoxical play of comedy/
tragedy.

The principal actors are humans; folly is the

divine director; and the outcome of the play depends upon
the actors' willingness to embrace the claim of folly.
Two kinds of folly present themselves to the actors:
one is the folly of insanity, the other folly is viewed as a
god.

Insanity results when man loses his sense of the value

of life.

The theme of the play concerns man's attempt to

cope with his environment.

As long as he remains under the

spell of divine folly, he survives.

In fact, Grassi claims

divinity for the power of the word, a metaphorical and
metamorphic power.

"Only in the word can I find myself

again in that I recover my world from nature."57

The word

possesses a prophetic power to ground thought in the real
world.

The fundamental power of the word is the metaphor,
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especially its ability to create a beginning point for
thought.
The power of the word grants new insights and the hope
of eternity to the actors.
comes into play.

However, the tragic element now

As Grassi notes,

"We are actors in an

uninterrupted game which bears witness to the metaphorical
nature of reality.

Not only the different eras but also the

different languages are born, exist, and perish."58
However, the illusion is maintained by the spell of folly.
In other terms, a deep spiritual identification with the
common community of humanity casts its spell of survival
over the actors.

Only in this way can humans avoid

insanity.
Folly from Grassi's perspective is a necessary
illusion.

Folly enables man to survive, to change, to cope,

and to realize his existence, because it produces a mirror
which enables people to be observers of themselves as
actors.

Folly produces a consciousness of human frailty

which allows people to transcend themselves.
By this I do not mean that humans are led to despair or
to a feeling of being "nobody" in the larger scheme of life.
In contrast, folly allows an opposite interpretation,

i.e.,

an act of ingenium, an act in which one sees the ironic
dimension of life.

No longer do we have to labor under the

illusion that rational knowledge is all there is because
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folly reveals the significance of humans in the world.
Folly enables us to see beyond the restricted boundaries of
rationality to the opposite truth.
In order to explain what Grassi means,

Erasmus's three

negative judgments about the claim of folly are summarized:
1) Life is a ludicrous comedy because the actors do not
realize that they have submitted to the spell of Moria. 2)
Since life is an empty masquerade, history becomes the
highest tragedy. 3) Unmasking the actors would prove to be
insanity.
folly.

Man's only hope is to remain under the spell of

Any attempt to arrive at the truth will lead to

insanity.

This awareness of the tragic interpre- tation of

life and human history is the basic theme of Erasmus.
Grassi adopts Erasmus's view and sees folly as man's only
hope for coping with the threat of the scientific-rational
paradigm.

The argument against the scientific-rational

paradigm is not an attempt to dismiss the legitimate
advances made by science.

The threat lies in an over

dependence on the rational paradigm, a convenient forgetting
that science is itself metaphorical.

The threat is

manifested in an attitude of superiority and arrogance on
the part of those who believe in the primacy of rationality
and technology to solve all problems.
The correlation between St. Paul and Grassi lies in
their paradoxical definitions of pcopia and their common

concerns for the salvation of society.

Both concepts of

folly are important for contemporary rhetorical theory
because they demonstrate that rhetoric has the power to
effect transformation through its metaphorical and metamorphic powers, and the alliance of rhetoric with homiletics
will benefit preaching.

Both St. Paul and Grassi offer a

consistent guide for action, action that gives humans
choices about the claims being made on i t .

People have

ultimate significance within the world and can rhetorically
structure that world.

Both St. Paul and Grassi offer an

alternative to the rational paradigm for contemporary
society.

Those who choose "folly" can discover values that

can unify their lives, values that are fundamental to human
existence.

Both St. Paul and Grassi are evangelists in the

sense that their language is indicative, declarative,
inventive, imaginative, and pathetic in character.
The Bankrupt Cartesian-Rational World Paradigm
The threat of an attitude of superiority on the part of
those who believe in the scientific-rational paradigm is a
common concern for all rhetors, Christian and secular.
Grassi suggests some of the consequences for a society which
over-values the rational paradigm: First, he argues that the
premise of rationality allows humans to abuse the environ
ment by upsetting the delicate balance of the ecological
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system.

He also notes that the premise of rationality

produces a lust for power and control without concern for
the implications for the common good of our world.

Third,

the premise of rationality, suggests Grassi, puts roadblocks
in front of building a global community.

The dominance of

the rational paradigm also results in the excessive
consumption ethic of our culture.

Finally, for Grassi, the

attitude of the primacy of technology raises the prospect of
the destruction of the planet.59
In a quite different context, the ancient church
fathers of Christianity demonstrated similar concerns.
Their labels, gathered around the central concept of
"cardinal sins," listed greed, pride, envy, acedia, and lust
as our greatest problems.

While nineteenth century American

liberalism played a major role in a reductionistic theology
of sin, changes in meta-vocabularies from religious terms to
market-place terms aided the decline of the church.
Conscience was replaced by interests and the cure of souls
became a technique of psychological science.

"Likewise, the

seven deadly sins became lively capitalist virtues:

avarice

became acumen; sloth,leisure; and pride, ambition . . .

A

religious vocabulary of passions had been replaced by a
commercial vocabulary of interests."60
I am more interested in making like an Old Testament
prophet than a nineteenth century liberal.

In the folly of
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prophetic reproach there may be a viable hope for our
future.

The task, against an entrenched refusal even to

speak of sin, will be extremely hazardous.

Recognition of

the difficulty led to Karl Menninger to write Whatever
Became of Sin?

Menninger does not fear being prophetic.

He

preaches with more fervor than most liberals and with more
intelligence than most fundamentalists.

He exhorts

preachers to get on with the task of helping our world be
more humane by insisting that we have far more intelligence
and power than we need already at hand.61
The Rhetoric of Folly
Thus far I have emphasized the primacy of rhetoric for
preaching and suggested that the method of folly is our
opportunity for redirecting and recreating our world.

And

in accepting these premises, I want to outline the
characteristics of a rhetoric of folly.

My vehicle for this

is the previous discussion of Grassi and Paul.

But it also

draws from other sources--for example, Carlyle Marney's
fundaments of a competent ministry,62 and Richard Harvey
Brown's concept of emancipatory rhetoric.63

All of these

theorists have concerns for the moral evolution and well
being of humans.

By uniting the various concepts of these

scholars we can achieve a rhetoric in which ethical

149
responsibility for the global community is accepted and
embraced.
What then do I mean by a rhetoric of folly?

Such a

rhetoric entails that strange dialectic of power through
weakness, strength through vulnerability; it embodies
discontinuity from the criteria of our culture.

The

rhetoric of folly goes against the status quo of the culture
without surrendering the meaning of the central Christian
event of Jesus Christ.

"I will," claims Paul,

"all the more

gladly boast of my weakness that the power of Christ may
rest upon me."64

Having defined a rhetoric of folly, I

will now discuss its major characteristics.
Identification
The first characteristic of a rhetoric of folly is
identification.

Two biblical examples— one from the Old

Testament and one from the New Testament--can serve as
models for the concept of identification.
Ezekiel, in captivity with his fellow Jews,
sat for seven days and wept."65

The prophet
"sat where they

Jesus' entire ministry is

a metaphor of identification: a baptism with sinners, meals
and weddings with tax collectors and prostitutes, and death
on a cross are but a few of the possible examples.
Our identification with those we address puts us
beneath the shadow of a cross.

We take up the cross— a
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metaphor for the dehumanization of human life--and we work
to make and keep humanity human.

Such an incarnational

identification is derived from the Christ--the true, best of
the breed, human.

As Marney puts it, "Here emerges the

Christian advantage--ours is a genuinely nameable and
recognizable identity . . . Our "I" as Christian is derived
from . . . Jesus the Christ."66
Personal identity presupposes moral agency, and moral
agency is the capacity to create culture.

"Indeed, to be a

person as opposed to an object means to be able to
symbolically construct reality."67

Identification,

however, means that society is the proper field for the
realization of individuality.

The self can be best served

in community as the Christian ideal of community has
demonstrated.

We are asked to create through ingenium and

metaphor public community, not an ideology that legitimates
privatization and lack of community.
Only in community, a nourishing communion and communi
cation, can social isolation, psychological narcissism, lack
of commitment to others, and a mindless conformism be
avoided.

True identification is within a community that

redeems society from atomization: By identifying ourselves
fully with the human race, we may be able to create a
morally deeper conception of ourselves and a safer world.
Such identification will always involve risk.68
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Direct Semantic Speech
A second characteristic of a rhetoric of folly is what
Grassi calls rhetorical, vulgar language or direct, semantic
speech.

Grassi distinguishes between three kinds of speech:

external rhetorical speech, rational speech, and true
rhetorical speech.
false speech.

External rhetoric is purely emotive,

Metaphor has, in this form of rhetoric, only

a decorative purpose, and is considered capable of affecting
only the passions.

Rational speech arises exclusively from

the formulation of first principles.

Rational language is

dialectical, mediating, demonstrative, apodictic, and
without pathetic character.

True rhetorical speech,

however, springs from the archai, the nondeducible and
indicative.69

Rather than the rational language of dogma

and concepts, the preacher, as rhetor, is asked to embrace
the language of conversation.

The Greek New Testament was

first written in the common street language of the first
century--koine Greek.

The lively, conversational metaphors

have been taken literally and have crystallized into narrow
ways of viewing the Christian experience.
metaphor,

For example,

the

"born again," has in its literal interpretation

produced a cult of "born-again Christians."

Since born

again is a metaphor for Christian, the born-again Christian
is a redundancy.
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Direct, semantic speech has its roots in the prophets
and poets and muses.

Primary orality and dialogical

communication combine in such spokespersons in a formidable
partnership.

Here the preacher's task is not to lecture,

but to rhetorically create possible new ways of being-inthe-world.

The main source of creating new worlds of

meaning and being is metaphor.

"Through metaphor, we come

to see the similarity that exists between being and Being.
. ."70

For the Christian this means apprehending God.

.

For

the secularist this means discovering the ultimate
worthwhileness of human existence.
Trembling and fear would be the correct attitude of
direct, semantic speech.

The preacher does not possess

absolute, certain truths, but stands, hat in hand, ready for
constant revision and discussion.

The Christian rhetor is

aware that even twenty centuries of gospel preaching do not
permit one to know anything definitive.

The tree of

knowledge remains hidden. As we never find our way again to
the Garden of Eden, so speech about God cannot be absolute.
Empathic Communication
The third characteristic of a rhetoric of folly is
emphatic communication.

By emphatic I mean the ability to

understand and integrate our basic nature as humans.
insists that our lives are divorced from our social,

Grassi
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corporate selves:

"Contemporary men feel the need for values

that can unify their lives.

But the source of this need

lies in man's original nature as a human being and not in
his momentary situation."71

Richard Harvey Brown

interprets the need for emphatic discourse as a result of
the bifurcation of the private sphere of the individual and
the public sphere of society.

He laments thelack of

bridges between groups and thelack of communication.

Brown

also argues that we have systematically "failed to discover
the kinds of role relations necessary for communicating with
adults or children who realize different orders of
meaning.1,72
In order for our communication to be emphatic, we must
set outside the sociological tent poles of sex, family,
race, region, religion, class,

and economics.If the Gospel

is to offer compassion, it will put every one of these
values under judgment and "bless or damn each, on the basis
of what its faithful service does to persons."73

In terms

of these considerations, the questions, What is our
culture?, and What is the relationship of our preaching to
our culture?, become crucial.

Are our concepts of

Christianity grounded in a religious imperialism?

Have we

regarded middle-class moralism as the criteria for being
accepted as a Christian?

Have we immersed ourselves so
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deeply in our culture as to be unable to discover a proper
mixture of Christ and culture?74
Emphatic communication is dialogical in nature (Grassi,
Brown, and Marney).

For the Christian rhetor, however, no

dialogical being-in-the-world is possible without knowing
the words of consolation.

The name comes from Martin

Luther's Fourteen on Consolation.75

Without a proper

empathy, the consolations cannot console.

The words of

consolation may be summarized:
1.

No rhetor may give a word of consolation he/she has
not yet heard. We represent our truths as fellow
strugglers and listeners.

2.

There is no consolation unless the words spoken are
received (dialogical nature).
Perhaps this is the
meaning of Jesus' "shake the dust" metaphor in St.
Luke 10. The disciple took back the offered
blessing not received--the implication being that
the blesser may need the word before the journey is
done. Also, the metaphor encourages the
preacher/rhetor that while responsible for how
he/she tells the truth, he/she is not responsible
for the results.

3.

There is no consolation for any rhetor who cannot
bless his/her own origins.
The word is always
personal, spoken by one who has come to terms with
one's history and tradition.

4.

The speaker of the word is always caught in the
dis-ease and problem-situation and contradiction of
the hearer.
This insight lies behind the
magnificent poem of the servant in Isaiah 53:
"Surely he has borne our griefs and carried our
sorrows.
Yet we esteemed him stricken, smitten by
God, and afflicted.
But he was wounded for our
transgressions . . . and with his stripes we are
healed." C. C. Jung says, "The doctor is effective
only when he himself is affected." Only the wounded
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can heal.76 (This is the insight behind the
healing rhetoric of Alcoholics Anonymous. )
5.

The word of consolation cannot rest on certainty
for faith never knows--it just bets its life.
This
means that the preacher of folly risks everything
when she speaks. What she has at her disposal is
the experience of a common humanity, a cross of
Christ, and a rhetoric of folly:
pathetic,
indirect, metaphorical, and always and everywhere
intimate, loving, trusting, and personal.
Dialectical Irony

The fourth characteristic of a rhetoric of folly is
dialectical irony.

Richard Brown argues that we may turn to

the rhetorical trope and the logical method of dialectical
irony as a potential discourse for humanizing political
practice.

He defines irony as " . . .

a metaphor of

opposites, a point of view that distances and derealizes
what is taken as real in order to permit the realization of
new meanings and forms"77

I believe such irony has

potential for the preacher as an act of subversion against
religious regimes "that presume they have an absolute right
to define reality. "78
Dialectical irony requires the ability to imagine
things as other than they are.

Brown observes,

"To summon

forth the contrary of that which is through the power of
dialectical irony is the basis of moral freedom and
imagination",79 and "Dialectical irony lifts us above the
view we are given of what the world is or must be."80
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Brown contrasts the ritual ironist to the free ironist.
According to Brown,

"Whereas ritual irony shakes us out of

conventional rules and assumptions only to allow us to wryly
rejoin them, a mastered dialectical irony shows that any
role or assumption is reversible."81

Whereas Brown insists

that the preacher is a ritual ironist who uses irony to
serve his notion of morality, I argue that the preacher may
use "irony in order to liberate us from moralism of any
stripe."82

The preacher as free ironist offers his/her

congregation the opportunity to experience and resolve
ambiguity and contradictions.
How, then, might dialectical irony help the preacher
and his/her congregation realign humane values and
contemporary Christian practice?

Ironic awareness can

safeguard religious authority against arrogant presumption
of certainty,

infallibility, and dogmatism.

The preacher

does not, as an ironist, set himself up as the authority who
dispenses the simple gospel to a willing group of followers.
The audience must participate in his ironic speech acts or
performances in order for him to succeed.

Rather than

passive adherence to a simple gospel, the congregation
becomes an active audience struggling with the ambiguity and
complexity of life.
Brown's dialectical irony appears to parallel Farrell's
comic discourse.

Farrell, for example, argues that "Comic
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discourse is immersed in the crowd, with persons not much
better, and perhaps a bit worse, than ourselves."83

In

addition, comedic discourse is concerned with contingency
and possibility.

As such, the rhetoric of comedy is limited

and perishable discourse.

There remains, however, the comic

hope of a happy ending, the hope of renewal and survival as
well as the recurrent hope that everything will turn out all
right after all.
Ironic awareness also reveals all modes of Christian
theology/proclamation to be processes of symbolic
construction, all to be historical, and none to be superior
to others.

Brown suggests that "irony teaches that nothing

is known absolutely, and that everything is reversed when
overextended.

An awareness of this would encourage humility

in those wishing to shape human affairs."84
reminds us that rhetoric is tenuous:

Farrell also

"This is because

rhetoric is the only art responsible for the imitation and
expression of human thought.
than that."85

And nothing is more tenuous

Such attitudes would reduce the dogmatic

certainty of socially-constructed religious movements like
the negative, hopeless vision of the modern apocalypticists,
the romantic version of reality in fundamentalists such as
Jerry Falwell, and the emotional, subjective reality of the
Charismatics.

Perhaps more importantly, the attitude of

humility would ally Christian preaching with humanism, not
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only in their common goal of survival, but also in their
acknowledgement of human freedom and frailty as well as
their recognition of moral responsibility and tolerance.
Conclusion
As I attempt to develop a theory of communication with
the goal

of survival, the preacher should realize thathe is

involved

in a "folly" likely to be rejected by those who see

this as just one more warmed over by-product of the social
gospel and nineteenth century liberalism.

Those who preach

are also

likely to be ostracized by the conservative

bastions

of resurgent frontier pietism with its

individualistic salvation.

And in accepting this we must

recognize that the rhetoric of folly can be useful only if
we become in a radical sense participants in the ongoing
communication process.

We must establish a communication

process that is conversational. We must be ready to take
risks (what else does cross-bearing mean for the
Christian?).

We have to present our truths as witnesses and

fellow-strugglers.

To meet these requirements would be to

make our sermons acts of political and moral courage.

It

would liberate us from unreflective pietism and put us to
the work of freeing persons to be fully human.86
I have examined the concept of folly and proposed a
"rhetoric of folly" for those who engage in a particular
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kind of rhetorical practice--preaching.

I suggested that

the concerns for the survival of humanity are rhetoricallybased concerns.

I have proposed to define rhetoric as an

event of folly through which people are confronted with
ethical choices.

I contend that a "rhetoric of folly"

solves or avoids the problems not resolved by previous
homiletical methodology.
1.

In general, a rhetoric of folly:

Accommodates not only the preacher but the congregation
as well;

2.

Recognizes that rhetoric includes the entire discourse
of the church, verbal as well as nonverbal;

3.

Makes clear that there are alternative methods of truth
telling thus negating the dependence upon the Cartesian
paradigm;

4.

Makes clear that the preacher is ethically responsible
for his/her discourse;

5.

Identifies the preacher, not as the subject, but as a
fellow struggler and witness with the congregation in
the journey toward a Christian way of being in the
world;

6 . Presumes that the use of metaphor offers the most
promising model for producing truth-claims or knowledge
in the Christian community;
7.

Recognizes that the preacher will have to take risks.

8 . Puts a high premium on empathic communication, based on
love and trust;
9.
10.

Insists that the congregation reach its own conclusions
and make its own choices; and/or
Releases the preacher from the role of church
bureaucrat to the role of prophet through the use of
irony.
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CHAPTER FIVE
TOWARD A METAPHORICAL HOMILETICS
In Chapter Four, a nonauthoritarian status for the
preacher was developed.

Without the epistemology of

certainty, the preacher turns to a rhetoric of folly.

The

most significant rhetorical component of the rhetoric of
folly is the metaphor.

The purpose of this chapter is to

show the relevance and applicability of metaphor to a
homiletical model based on the "rhetoric of folly."
Metaphor is the indispensable language of the rhetoric of
folly.

Preaching by its very nature is metaphorical.

I do

not argue, however, that all instances of preaching are
necessarily metaphoric.

I shall provide a summary of the

status of metaphor in philosophy, theology, and homiletics
in order to ground my proposed metaphorical homiletics in
previous scholarship.

I will evaluate problems relating to

metaphor that require some adjudication in terms of
homiletical relevance.

Finally, I will extend the

philosophical and rhetorical studies of metaphor by applying
the thought of I. A. Richards, Max Black, and Paul Ricoeur
to specific homiletical purposes.
Metaphor in Contemporary Philosophy
The last four decades have witnessed an increasing
philosophical interest in metaphor.
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Philosophers have
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explored the nature of metaphor, the definition of metaphor,
the pragmatics of metaphor, and the cognitive status of
metaphor.

The present state of the study of metaphor may be

summarized as follows:
1.

Metaphor is a part of all disciplines in the sense
that thought is metaphoric.

2.

Metaphor is best understood within the parameters
of some kind of tension or interaction theory.

3.

Context is essential to any understanding of
metaphor.

4.

Metaphors are neither necessarily literally false
nor semantically deviant.

5.

A variety of "metaphors" have been proposed as
being descriptive of what happens in the metaphoric
process and its resultant tension:
"clash of
literal meanings,"1 "transgression,"2
"metaphorical twist,"3 "category-mistake,"4
"redescription of reality,"5 "experiential
gestalts, 1,6 "semantically deviant and non-deviant
sentences,"7 and "world-structuring disclosure."8

6.

Metaphor is not reducible to a literal meaning or
paraphrase.9 (Davidson disagrees)

7.

Metaphor has the potential to redescribe our world,
restructure our concepts and categories, and
reshape our experience of reality.10

In short, metaphor is pervasive, indispensable,

irreducible,

creative, and resistant to definition.
The philosophical and rhetorical study of metaphor has
produced at least two problems that impact any metaphorical
homiletics.

Both of these problems are associated with the

language and "metaphors" historically employed to discuss
metaphor.

The first problem relates to the way metaphors
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have been perceived as being violations of normal, literal
language.

Metaphors from theology,

for example, like

"transgression," "violation," and "mistake" have been used
to define what happens in a metaphorical utterance.
"Transgression" belongs to the biblical word-group that
includes "sin," "iniquity," and "trespasses."

The literal

definition of "transgression" is to walk beside or pass by.
It refers to not following the original, true direction as
well as to a violation of the standard or the norm.
transgress is to violate the law.11

To

Applied to language,

metaphor becomes criminalized as a law-breaker.

Arbi

trarily, then, a supposed literal meaning becomes the norm
or standard for all language use.
Contemporary studies of metaphor have basically dropped
this prejudice against metaphor.

When metaphor was shown to

not always involve a transgression of linguistic laws, the
distinction of law-breaker no longer held.
Binkley insists,

As Timothy

"Once we recognize that there is no pure

core of literal meaning, we lose the inclination to set up
the literal as an ideal against which figurative language is
to be measured."12

To accept metaphor in this fashion is a

positive step toward a metaphorical homiletics.

With

Grassi, the preacher can set up the metaphoric as the
creator of the literal.

In this sense, metaphor claims an

ontological status superior to literal language.
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A related metaphor often used to explain what happens
in a metaphorical utterance is "deviance," a sociological
metaphor.

Deviant behaviors were once considered the prime

rhetorical responsibility of preachers.

Almost any person

with a family tree containing eight or more generations of
Protestant preachers can conjure up a caricature of the
minister blasting away at immoral, sinful behavior.

In

American society, however, there has been a transformation
of definitions of deviance from "badness" to "sickness,"
i.e., the "medicalization of deviance."13

This change of

perspectives has met continued resistance from certain
fundamentalist churches.

I can recall, for example, hearing

numerous preachers insist that alcoholism was a sin not a
sickness (my childhood church was in the midst of the Bible
Belt of Baptist North Louisiana).
Applied to metaphor, deviance refers to an explicit
moral judgment that metaphor is a "sin" against literal
language.

In the etymology of sin, such an assumption about

metaphor would mean that metaphor "misses the mark ."14

As

demonstrated in chapter three, the typical charges against
metaphor by homileticians have been its danger and its
seductive power; i.e.,

"deviance."

To explain metaphor as the deviant behavior of language
is a typical positivist approach.

This approach assumes

that there is an "undeviant" use of language--an ideal, pure
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language, and that it exists in an objective and expressible
form.

Deviance, according to the logic of the positivist or

literalist,

is the usage of words not within conformity to

literal language norms.

In other terms, deviant is "bad,"

literal is good.
To approach metaphor as a type of deviance is to take
the traditional philosophical approach to metaphor:

"A

metaphor is an elliptical simile useful for stylistic,
rhetorical, and didactic purposes, but which can be
translated into a literal paraphrase without any loss of
cognitive content."15

Metaphor has for centuries suffered

from one reductionistic attack after another.

A request for

historical witnesses to testify against metaphor would be a
"Broadway cattle call" for a bit part.

Two most often cited

opponents of metaphor, however, are Thomas Hobbes and John
Locke.
Hobbes thought that metaphors impeded thought and
served only to deceive people.
undermines proper reasoning.

Hobbes attacks speech that
Included in his displeasure

are four abuses of speech: "First, when men register their
thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of
their words; by which they register for their conception,
that which they never conceived, and so deceive themselves.
Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in
other senses than that they are ordained for; and thereby
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deceive others . . . And therefore such [inconstant] names
can never be true grounds of any ratiocination.
metaphors, and tropes of speech:

No more can

but these are less

dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the
others do n o t ."16
Mark Johnson, discussing the peculiarities of Hobbes's
linguistic theory, enumerates the characteristics of what he
calls the "literal-truth paradigm":
1.

The human conceptual system is essentially
literal--literal language ("words proper") is the
only adequate vehicle for (a) expressing one's
meaning precisely, and (b) making truth claims,
which together make possible correct reasoning by
the philosopher.

2.

Metaphor is a deviant use of words in other than
their proper senses, which accounts for its
tendency to confuse and to deceive.

3.

The meaning and truth claims of a metaphor (if
there are any) are just those of its literal
paraphrase.17

The literal-truth paradigm goes hand-in-hand with the
homiletical association of metaphor with rhetoric.

This

connection assumes that metaphor, like rhetoric, has a
negative connotation in preaching.

Metaphor, according to

this view, has little value for preaching other than making
"pretty" sermons, and even this is countered by metaphor's
deviance.
Reference to metaphor as "transgression" and "deviance"
raises an interesting religious question.

If metaphor

really is a misuse of language, are those who insist on
using metaphor guilty of sin?

Just such a moral charge is

implied by biblical literalists.

Christians, for example,

who reject the metaphor "inerrancy" as descriptive of the
Bible are labelled by James Draper, former president of the
Southern Baptist Convention, as those who have "started over
the edge.

They have abandoned divine revelation . . .

It is

also extremely likely that those to whom they minister or
those whom they teach will go a lot farther down than they
d o ."18

Again Draper warns:

"Once we depart from divine

revelation, we have at least opened the door to whatever
deviation a person chooses to engage in, 1,19 and
"Ultimately, historic, biblical Christianity will be in
shambles. "20
The question of metaphor in preaching thus becomes a
question of credibility in the rhetorical sense of ethos.

.

Wayne Booth, for example, suggests that "the deliberate use
of a recognizable metaphor . . . inevitably invites
judgments of the speaker's character."21

In the more

generalized discussion of whether or not metaphor should be
used at all Booth's assertion becomes particularly apropos.
A homiletical tradition that reduces metaphor to a deviant
use of language has now been transferred to a mistrust of
persons who use metaphors, especially by literalists.
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A second problem related to the language employed to
discuss metaphor can be interpreted as relevant to
preaching.

I refer particularly to the slow but steady

transformation in the language used to talk about metaphors
as "figures of speech," which are described as a "pretty,"
"fickle," "merely emotional," and generally weaker form of
language.

Such language, I believe, can be traced to what

Jacques Derrida calls the logocentric, phonocentric, and
phallocentric prejudices of our Greek forebears.22

If

Derrida has become the Trojan horse within the walls of the
structuralists, he is a very un-Greek horse.

In any event,

I will argue that the language used to talk about rhetoric
in general, and metaphor in particular, expresses a
masculine prejudice which I shall call the "feminization of
metaphor."

The current transformation of metaphor's status

and language I shall label the "defeminization of metaphor."
This transformation is certainly not complete and has not
been universally accepted.
These changes have not occurred by themselves nor have
they been the result of a "natural" evolution of society.
The roots of these changes lie deep in our social, cultural,
and religious understandings of the role and place of women.
I believe that, aside from its technical and intellectual
aspect, this change parallels the significant gains, made in
our time, for the equality of women.

In short, metaphor has
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gained in status as women have gained in status.

The

suggested parallel is by no means considered causative or
derivative, simply a way of seeing or connecting two
different ideas.
The traditional positivist approach to the study of
metaphor assumes that metaphor is feminine in nature.
me explain what I mean.

Let

This assumption rests on a second

assumption, namely, that metaphor is definable in a
straight-forward manner as language-use not within
permissible conformity to rational thoughts.

Metaphor,

in

other words, if admitted any status at all, must be kept in
its place.

As Paul deMan, in his analysis of Locke's

denunciation of eloquence, points out,
It is clear that rhetoric is something one can
decorously indulge in as long as one knows where it
belongs.
Like a woman, which it resembles ( 'like the
fair sex'), it is a fine thing as long as it is kept in
its own proper place.
Out of place, among the serious
affairs of men, it is a disruptive scandal-like the
appearance of a real woman in a gentleman's club where
it would only be tolerated as a picture, preferably
naked, framed, and hung on the wall."23
As the entire history of Western civilization is a
story of the oppression and subjugation of women, so is the
treatment of metaphor as a mere figure of speech to be kept
in its proper place.

Those religious positivists, usually

Protestants and fundamentalists, who still deny equality to
women with their crude literal interpretations of Saint
Paul, also have a very low regard for metaphor.

Perhaps the
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positivistic literalism of these groups has more than a
casual relationship to their refusal to grant ordination to
women.

According to the assumption of the feminization of

metaphor,

I suggest the following list for comparison,

equating literalism with masculinity and metaphor with
femininity.
MASCULINE

FEMININE

Rational
science
technology
literal
Western
repressive
strength
objective
Protestant reformation
Fundamentalism
superior
proper
Adam

rhetoric
figures of speech
imagination
Myth
Eastern
inferior
weakness
inappropriate
Renaissance
liberal
merely emotional
pleasure
seductive ("Eve")
style and grace
clothing
beautiful
deviant

Following the model projected here, homiletics would
benefit from 1) a defeminization of its traditional treat
ment of metaphor and 2) an acceptance of the powerful
positive feminine qualities suggested here.
As concerns for inclusive language claim an increased
and deserved attention in the various Christian denomina
tions, the defeminization of metaphor becomes a small part
of a far larger crusade.

While my rhetorical concern is

with changing perspectives of metaphor and the consequences
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of these for homiletics, this is also a study of ethics,
especially as related to the treatment of women and other
oppressed, powerless persons.
I have briefly examined philosophical treatment of
metaphor and delineated two problems within the parameters
of such study.
metaphor.

I summarized leading assumptions about

I suggested there has been a general failure of

the traditional homiletical model to participate in the
transformation of thought concerning metaphor.

I have

proposed that metaphor not be considered a deviant use of
some ideal literal language, and that literalist Christian
interpreters have an inherent prejudice against rhetoric and
metaphor.
metaphor,

Based on consideration of contemporary studies in
I suggest that a metaphorical homiletic:

1.

Recognizes that metaphor is not a deviant use of
language, but a different use of language.

2.

Presumes that metaphor requires inventional
activity because to describe metaphor as a mere
device of style is to fall back into our
phallocentric prejudice.

3.

Recognizes the role of metaphor in all human
thought and disciplines.

4.

Makes clear that metaphor involves ethical power in
the sense of ethos as well as logos and pathos.

5.

Assumes that metaphor is indispensable to the
preacher and irreducible to a literal paraphrase.

6 . Insists that we preach by metaphors that create
Christian community as a way of being-in-the-world.
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Each of these assumptions of metaphor's potential value
for preaching could be elaborated in great detail.

In

order, however, to attend to the modest goal of pragmatism,
i.e., the practical rhetorical/metaphorical model of
preaching, it will be necessary to concentrate on particular
aspects of metaphorical theory of representative scholars'
thoughts on metaphor.

This section shall concentrate upon

two representative analysts of metaphor: I. A. Richards, and
Paul Ricoeur.

At the same time these theorists must be

understood in the context of the wider discussion of
language by philosophers and rhetoricians.

Richards and

Ricoeur represent a view of metaphor different from the
received homiletical and philosophical theory of
substitution.
I. A. Richards
I.

A. Richards sets forth his central understanding of

metaphor in his book The Philosophy of Rhetoric.

As the

title indicates, Richards is principally concerned with
rhetoric.

He defines rhetoric as a "study of misunder

standing and its remedies."24

Richards contended that

through examination of language and its use we can
comprehend the nature of communication and improve
communicative enterprises.

He hoped to decrease

misunderstanding by an analysis of meaning and how it
changes as discourse occurs.
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Richards' definition of metaphor has impacted all
succeeding treatments of metaphor:

"In the simplest

formulation, when we use a metaphor, we have two thoughts of
different things active together and supported by a single
word or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their
interaction. "25
One of the ways Richards suggests for communicators to
work at preventing misunderstandings is the use of metaphor.
He sees metaphor as the heart of our language systems.

The

metaphor "is a borrowing between and intercourse of
thoughts, a transaction between contexts.

Thought is

metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of
language derive therefrom."26

Daniel Fogarty summarizes

the importance Richards delegated to metaphor:
Richards' most emphatic contention about metaphor, thus
explained, is that language is naturally metaphoric.
Since metaphor is just abstraction for the purpose of
clearer and more vivid communication, since it seems to
be the nature of our thinking to be perpetually busy
with sorting and classifying references and comparing
contexts and their parts, and since our language
symbolizes this thinking, it seems to Richards that our
language must be highly, habitually, and even naturally
metaphoric.27
The concepts of metaphor worked out by I. A. Richards
continue to influence new explorations of metaphor:
1.

Metaphor is an omnipresent principle of thought.

2.

Metaphor permeates all discourse.

3.

Metaphors work through the tension created by the
tenor and the vehicle.
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4.

Metaphor is cognitively irreducible.

5.

Any account of meaning and truth must give a
central place to metaphor.28

In at least two ways, Richards' study of metaphor can
be extended to the discipline of homiletics.

First, his

insistence that metaphor as the essence of thought
permeates all discourse parallels similar conclusions by
theologians.

The language of the Bible is seen to be as

essentially metaphoric in nature.
McFague,

According to Sallie

"Metaphor is the way we think, and it is the way

the parables--a central form of expression in the New
Testament--work.

These are related assertions,

for the

power of the parables stems, in part, from that basic
movement by indirection from the known to the unknown--the
heart of metaphor."29

Theologians have extended the

linguistic conclusion of Richards to an assertion that
religious reality is metaphoric.

Some theologians agree

with McFague that Jesus is the metaphor of G o d .30

There

fore, metaphors not only move to the center of New Testament
discussion, but become crucial to the preaching of the New
Testament.
While homileticians have, with few exceptions, ignored
contemporary scholarship on metaphor, theologians have
incorporated metaphor into much of their work.

Theologians
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seem to have reached an emergent consensus on the study of
metaphor:
1.

Metaphors in the New Testament disclose a number of
possible Christian modes of being-in-the-world.

2.

Literary genres are seen as productive of meanings.
Metaphor, therefore, is no longer interpreted on
the rhetorical model of decoration.

3.

Original intention and meaning of a biblical writer
(finds meaning of the text behind the text) is
being replaced with a hermeneutics locating meaning
in front of the text.

4.

Interpreters seek to analyze the production of the
sense of the text and the production of the
referent of the text.
That referent is a possible
mode of being-in-the-world.

5.

The major candidate for the central root metaphors
of Christianity is the group of stories known as
the parables of Jesus.31

A second way Richards' study of language and metaphor
impacts homiletics concerns what Richards labels the "Proper
Meaning Superstition."32

The history of homiletics is a

history of the attempt to avoid the excesses of allegorical
and spiritualistic interpretation of the scriptures e.g.,
(Origen).

In the attempt at discovering a realistic,

historical interpretation, preachers and theologians have
searched diligently for the original meaning and the literal
meaning of the biblical text.
As long as biblical texts are considered to have an
original meaning, a literal meaning, and a literal
application, the essential metaphorical nature of the Bible
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remains an unexamined presupposition.

At this point,

I. A.

Richards can shed some light on this particular homiletical
problem.

"A chief cause of misunderstanding . . .

Proper Meaning Superstition.

is the

That is, the common belief--

encouraged officially by what lingers on in the school
manuals as Rhetoric--that a word has a meaning of its own
(ideally, only one) independent of and controlling its use
and the purpose for which it should be uttered."33
The proper meaning view belongs to the school of
literal language interpreters, whether philosophers or
preachers.

The literalist insistence upon univocal meaning

I have labelled the Literal Truth Superstition and the
Original Meaning Fallacy.

These two terms are somewhat

parallel to the proper meaning superstition of Richards:
"It is only a superstition when it forgets (as it commonly
does) that the stability of the meaning of a word comes from
the constancy of the contexts that give it its meanings.34
The problem with the literalist is that only one way of
interpreting words, phrases, and texts is allowed; all
others are heresies.

Stephen Brown claims,

"Literalism is a

view of representation that has forgotten its own dependence
on a sociohistorical, and hence relative, community of
discourse."35
ism.

It eventually collapses into authoritarian

In the light of the worldwide conservative resurgence,

an insistence on the plurality of meanings within religious
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texts is an ethical and religious responsibility.

No

peremptory decrees from the Pope, and no threats from Jerry
Falwell should be allowed to destroy such an insistence.
Developments in the theory of metaphor have shown that
the literalist hope for a language of univocal meaning and
precision was doomed to fail.

We are now, more than ever,

aware that metaphor is indispensable to science, religion,
theology, everyday life, and preaching.36

As Tracy notes:

The central theological concern with metaphor is to
analyze the root metaphors which disclose a
distinctively religious form of life in the major
religions.
In descriptions of God in Judaism and
Christianity, for example, one finds a whole cluster of
metaphors ranging from father, lord, shepherd, and king
to more elusive and subtle choices like light, truth,
love, and wisdom.
If metaphors are purely and simply
defined as decorative substitutions for real, literal,
ideational meanings, then the relative lack of concern
among many theologians with most biblical metaphors for
God is completely justified.
If, however, metaphors
are more properly understood to function by means of
some theory of tension or interaction (on the three
levels of the word, the phrase, and the text), then the
move to replace these decorative images with concepts
seems a precipitate one.37
This view of metaphor,

first illuminated by Richards,

reverses the traditional literalist view that a word or text
has only one meaning.

Metaphor is by nature symbolic,

ambiguous, and polysemous.38

If multiple and excess

meanings for words and texts within multiple contexts is the
correct way of viewing language, if the interpreter is
influenced by the culture of which he/she is a part, if the
interpreter is conscious of his/her responsibility within a
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highly ambiguous history and society, then literalism is but
a superstition.

As David Tracy affirms:

We may continue to try to persuade ourselves of our
autonomy, our innocence, and our idealism.
Our
theories can become exercises in passive contemplation
of mere possibilities, or deceptively hard exercises
excluding anything not fitting an already determined
model.
Our theories and our conversations can become,
however, what they in fact always were: limited,
fragile, necessary exercises in reaching relatively
adequate knowledge of language and history alike.39
Any attempt at an autonomy so pure that it is unaffected by
the plurality of religious meanings in which we stand is the
final form of the general privatization which plagues our
culture.40
Maintaining the literal truth superstition leaves few
alternatives.

We may embrace the increasing privatization

of the autonomous self, loosed on the world, according to
William Muehl, by the forces of the vulgar Reformation.41
We may run for security to the heteronomous privatization in
which once proud traditions harden into ideologies.

(Witness

the ideological turn within the Southern Baptist
Convention).

Or we may risk interpreting our sacred texts

in order to discover new, multiple meanings.
In our pluralistic present, we may risk concentration
on the polysemous nature of biblical texts, symbols,
and metaphors.
Brown,

images,

Tracy, from a theological perspective, and

from a sociological perspective, offer just such a

risk as "one hope for a move forward into publicness."42

In a recent essay, Allen Scult considered the use of an
interpretive approach to elucidate sacred texts which is in
accord with the polysemous nature of religious language.

In

Scult's account, the critic is an interpreter--a surrogate
for the audience--whose recounting of the process of textual
encounter helps others to gain access to textual meaning.
Noting that certain texts have the power to speak beyond
themselves via a medium which he labels "textuality," Scult
describes the process of critical interpretation:

"Texu-

ality draws rhetorician-interpreters to the text as the
source for what might be known or said.

The interpreter's

audience shares in the textuality and helps direct the
inventional process toward the text.

The shared textuality

is what gives the text the force of testimony, to use
Ricoeur's phrase . . . The events and experiences described
in the text might remain within the bounds of a spatialtemporal moment, but their meaning reaches beyond that
moment. "43
In a more obvious rebuttal of original meaning, Scult
observes that "if the interpreter tries to understand the
text in terms of the original rhetorical situation which
gave rise to it, to which it was a fitting response, then
the more adequate the interpretation becomes, the more
circumscribed the epistemological range of the text also
becomes.

If the direction of the interpretation is backward
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in time, toward the original rhetorical situation in which
the text was uttered, its original meaning might become
clear; but its capacity to transcend the original rhetorical
situation and speak to a contemporary audience is muted."44
Scult also argues persuasively against the significance
of original authorial intent when he observes that "in order
for a text to be interpreted in a way that provides a
fitting response to a new rhetorical situation, its
meaningfulness in the original rhetorical situation must
somehow be overcome . . .1145
To summarize, I
attitude on the part
an attitude I trust.

am making an appealfor a pluralistic
of the preacher as rhetorician.

It is

I am not, however, suggesting a limp

pluralism that becomes simply a passive response to more and
more possibilities.
practiced.

Such a liberal pluralism is never

That kind is the perfect ideology for the modern

bourgeois mind.

"Such a pluralism masks a genial confusion

in which one tries to enjoy the pleasures of difference
without ever committing oneself to any particular
vision.

. . ."46

My position is thus a paradox.

The

preacher embraces pluralism, but at the same time, commits
herself to a particular interpretation.
Such a preacher will allow the speaker-immediate
audience relationship to move off center stage.

The new

stage star will be the text, and, in particular, the text
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interpreted not backward but forward.

To understand the

biblical text is to open oneself to a search for original
intent as well as an interpretation different from how the
original authors and their first audiences may have
understood them.

Thus the preacher struggles upstream

against cultural distance and historical alienation (like
the creature in Richard Bach's Illusions of a Reluctant
Messiah).

Instead of a precise, good-for-all-time,

pedestrian meaning, the preacher strives toward
identification, toward Burke's "consubstantiality, 1,47
toward Gadamer's "fusion of horizons,"48 toward Tracy's
"analogical imagination."49
Numerous substantive definitions have been proposed for
religion: Friedrich Schleiermacher's "the feeling of
absolute dependence," Rudolph Otto's "mysterium fascinans et
tremendum." Paul Tillich's "ultimate concern," Bernard
Lonergan's "being-in-love-in-an-unrestricted-fashion," and
David Tracy's "limit-experience."

In my analysis of the

significance of metaphor for preaching, I have adopted
Tracy's definition of a distinguishing characteristic of
religion.

Tracy argues that there is a presence of an

implicit religious dimension in our ordinary experience and
the presence of religious-as-limit use of language in
Christianity.

He then argues for a limit-language in the

form of metaphors,

images, symbols, and myths as adequate
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for interpreting the experiences of life.

At a certain

limit-point or boundary, the language of rationality
falters.

Then the human spirit searches for metaphors

expressive of the positive and negative limit experiences of
life. Examples include death, guilt, and anxiety as well as
creativity, joy, and fundamental trust.50
Limit-situations allow, even demand, reflection upon
the boundaries of our existence.

These are self-

transcending moments, and they are more than "emotional M
and M's" or "warm fuzzies" or pious statements.

We touch

upon a dimension of experience which cannot be stated
adequately in ordinary language.
reality simply given.

We experience,

in short, a

Life is seen as gift-love.

Authentic

love, both erotic and agapic, puts us in touch with a
reality whose power we cannot deny.51

Such experiences

disclose the possible existence of a limit, a religious
dimension or horizon to our lives.

I am arguing that life

has a religious dimension due to limit-situations.

The

preacher can describe the reality of these limit-situations
through metaphor.

In summary, three assertions about the

significance of homiletics of metaphor are made:
1.

All authentic limit-language seems to be initially
and irretrievably a symbolic and a metaphorical
one.

2.

Insofar as the hidden dimension of an ultimate
limit is not merely hidden but not even expressible
in the language of everyday (as no-thing), that

189
language retains the linguistic structure of
metaphor and symbol.
3.

The language of the scriptures is intrinsically
symbolic and metaphorical limit-language.52
Paul Ricoeur

Metaphor rises from a kind of discourse Paul Ricoeur
labels as "ontological" where the task is to reveal a "mode
of being."

Ontological discourse, in opposition to a

univocal language,

"is at best a kind of broken discourse,

full of ambiguity . . .1153

This is significant for our

purpose because metaphor has a privileged position in
ontological discourse.
Two important characteristics of ontological language
are polysemy and ambiguity.
". . . a

Ricoeur defines polysemy as

feature of words, several senses for one name."

Ambiguity, however,

"means that for one string of words we

have more than one way of interpreting it."54
Ricoeur develops his theory of metaphor on three
levels:

the word, the sentence, and the discourse.

He

produces a series of polarities with each pair in tension:
word/sentence, semiotics/semantics,

substitution/tension,

and deviant denomination/impertinent predication.

While

insisting that metaphor's ties to the noun must be cut, and
that the sentence takes priority over the word, Ricoeur does
not dispense with the word.

"The place of metaphor is
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neither the name, nor the sentence, nor even discourse, but
the copula of the verb to be.

The metaphorical 'is' at once

signifies both 'is not' and 'is like'."55
that " . . .

Also, he argues

the function of the word within discourse is to

embody the semantic identity."56
Contrary to the view of literalists, Ricoeur praises
the positive value of polysemy and metaphor.

Ambiguity,

for

example, is the source of the creativity of all language.57
Metaphor has a direct relationship to polysemy's creative
capacity.

Ricoeur asserts,

"I shall treat metaphor as a

creative use of polysemy and in that way as a specific
strategy of language. "58
The creativity of metaphor contradicts the classical
view of metaphor.

In Study One of the Rule of Metaphor

Ricoeur sets his own view of metaphor against the classical
view of Aristotle.

According to Aristotle, metaphor is a

matter of denomination, words, and in particular nouns.
Recall Aristotle's definition of metaphor as ". . . giving
the thing a name that belongs to something else."59
According to Ricoeur, when metaphor is connected to the
noun, its destiny is sealed for centuries to come.

In fact,

as we have seen, the word remained the essential metaphoric
unit until I. A. Richards' argument that metaphor is "the
omnipresent principle of language."60

As Ricoeur notes,
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"It is important for the theory of metaphor that its link to
the noun can be cut . . ."61
Ricoeur characterizes Aristotle's definition of
metaphor as follows:
1.

Metaphor is something that happens to the noun.

2.

Metaphor is defined in terms of movement "from
. . . to",
"For Aristotle the word metaphor
applies to every transposition of terms."62

3.

Metaphor is the transposition of a name that
Aristotle calls "alien" (aXXorpiog) as opposed to
"ordinary"(Kppiov ). Metaphor is thus defined as
deviation.
As Ricoeur warns, "In these
characteristics of opposition or deviation and
kinship are the seeds of important developments
regarding rhetoric and metaphor."63 Ricoeur
offers a summary of Aristotle's idea of aXAoxfLLOS.:
deviation, borrowing, and substitution.
As Ricoeur
correctly points out, "It is the idea of
substitution that appears to bear the greatest
consequences:
for if the metaphorical term is
really a substituted term, it carries no new
information, since the absent term (if one exists)
can be brought back in; and if there is no new
information conveyed, then metaphor has only an
ornamental, decorative value."64

Ricoeur proposes a theory of metaphor that counters the
classical understanding.

His theory begins with the word,

progresses to the sentence, and culminates in metaphor as
discourse.

Ricoeur traces the route of his proposed theory:

"At the same time each forms part of a unique path which
begins with classical rhetoric, passes through semiotics and
semantics, and finally reaches hermeneutics."65
Ricoeur declares as his "most important theme . . .
that metaphor is the rhetorical process by which discourse
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unleashes the power that certain fictions have to redescribe
reality."66

In examining the nature of metaphor Ricoeur

proposes three interpretive hypotheses to counter the
classical tradition of metaphor:
1.

2.

3.

It always takes two ideas to make a metaphor.
If
metaphor always . . . involves taking one thing for
another by a sort of calculated error, then
metaphor is essentially a discursive phenomenon.
To affect just one word, the metaphor has to
disturb a whole network by means of an aberrant
attribution. 67
A second line of reflection seems to be suggested
by the idea of categorical transgression . . .
should we not say that metaphor destroys an order
to invent a new one; and that the category-mistake
is nothing but the complement of a logic of
discovery? . . . One must say that metaphor bears
information because it 'redescribes reality'.68
A third more venturesome hypothesis arises on the
fringe of the second . . . metaphor does not
produce a new order except by creating rifts in an
old order.
Nevertheless, could we not imagine that
the order itself is born in the same way that it
changes? Is there not, in Gadamer's terms, a
'metaphoric' at work at the origin of logical
thought, at the root of all classification? . . .
The idea of an initial metaphorical impulse
destroys these oppositions between proper and
figurative, ordinary and strange, order and
transgression.
It suggests the idea that order
itself proceeds from the metaphorical constitution
of semantic fields, which themselves give rise to
genus and species.69

My thesis, adapted from Ricoeur, is that what we mean
by metaphor is that here we recognize the disclosure of a
reality which we cannot but name truth.

We find here

something valuable, something meaningful, some disclosure of
a reality in a moment that can be called one of recognition
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which surprises, provokes, challenges, shocks, and
potentially transforms us; an experience that upsets
conventional opinions and expands the sense of the possible.
The presence of metaphors in every culture is undeniable.
Their effects in our lives endure and await new
translations, new interpretations, new imagined worlds.
The power of metaphor to produce such changes may be
explained as the tension or interaction aspect of metaphor.
Since Ricoeur adopts the concept of interaction, an
explanation of his method is necessary.
Interaction Theory
Ricoeur's theory of metaphor is centered in the tension
or interaction theory of English-language scholars such as
I. A. Richards, Max Black, Monroe Beardsley, and Philip
Wheelwright. Ricoeur critiques Richard's and Black's
interaction theories of metaphor.

Having already discussed

Richards, I will present a brief summary of Black's
contributions to metaphor theory in general and of Ricoeur's
theory of metaphor in particular.
Black's work advances the theory of metaphor in at
least three ways.

First, metaphor is a matter of the whole

statement, but attention focuses on a particular word.
Black replaces "tenor" and "vehicle" with "focus" and
"frame."

The "focus" is the metaphorical word, while the
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"frame" is the rest of the sentence.
terminology," according to Ricoeur,

"The advantage of this
"is that it directly

expresses the phenomenon of focusing on a word, yet without
returning to the illusion that words have meanings in
themselves,

. . . Black's more precise vocabulary allows us

to get closer to the interaction that takes place between
the undivided meaning of the statement and the focused
meaning of the word."70
Black's second advance is the distinction between the
interaction theory and the substitution and comparison
theories.

In the interaction theory the frame (as the new

context) creates a new meaning, an extended metaphorical
meaning.

The interaction is between systems of associated

commonplaces which characterize each subject.

The nature of

this interaction is that the two parts of the metaphor
combine to organize our view of the subjects of the
metaphor.

Ricoeur observes that the distinction between the

interaction theory and the substitution theory is the same
as the dichotomy between semiology and semantics.71
One of the problems with Black's theory, is the
vagueness and open-endedness of the "associated systems of
commonplaces."

Preachers have used such a method,

in

different guise, to handle metaphorical language in
Scripture.

For example, the metaphor,

"You are the light of

the world," was unpacked by John Claypool as follows:

"Put
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into simple terms, this means that light performs two
important functions: it warms and it illumines.

. . ."72

What criteria are used to select only these two
characteristics of light?

Michael Osborn, in "Archetypal

Metaphor in Rhetoric," suggests three characteristics of
"light":

"Light . . . relates to the fundamental struggle

for survival and development.

Light is a condition for

sight . . . Light also means the warmth and engendering
power of the sun.

. . .1173

The method appears to be

somewhat reductionistic, and, in the case of the preacher,
seems to be an attempt to paraphrase the metaphor by
eliminating the tension.
Ricoeur applies the concept of tension in three ways:
First, the internal tension of the metaphorical term and the
rest of the statement takes place "between tenor and
vehicle, between focus and frame, between principal subject
and secondary subject"; second, external tension occurs
"between a literal interpretation that perishes at the hands
of semantic impertinence and a metaphorical interpretation
whose sense emerges through non-sense"; and third,
relational tension exists "between identity and difference
in the interplay of resemblance."74
In taking into account both the metaphor-maker and the
metaphor-interpreter, Ricoeur's tension theory is superior
to those which fail to account for the structural and the
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phenomenological aspects of metaphor.

Ricoeur wrestles

with both the production of the metaphor and the product of
metaphor.

In this sense his theory is interactional because

an interpreting subject and an interpreting object are
present.

Otherwise a hermeneutics of metaphor would be

impossible.
Imagination
A second major aspect of Ricoeur's theory is his more
fully developed account of the role of imagination in
metaphor.

Ricoeur, by combining a semantic theory of

metaphor with a psychological theory of imagination and
feeling, explains how metaphor works.

He defines a semantic

theory as "an inquiry into the capacity of metaphor

to

provide untranslatable information and, accordingly, into
metaphor's claim to yield some true insight about
reality."75

To this theory Ricoeur adds a concept of

imagination and feeling, arguing that metaphors with truth
value are partly constituted by images and feelings.
Ricoeur explains his purpose:

"I want . . .

to show that the

kind of theory of metaphor initiated by I. A.
Richards . . . Max Black . . . Beardsley, Berggren, and
others cannot achieve

its own goal without including

imagining and feeling

. . .1176

There are three steps in the process of connecting the
iconic moment to the work of resemblance.
Kant's theory of imagination,

Ricoeur draws on

"specifically on Kant's

concept of productive imagination as schematizing a
synthetic operation.1,77

In the first step, imagination is

the "seeing" which effects the shift in logical distance.
The role of imagination is insight into likeness.

"This

insight into likeness is both a thinking and a seeing."
Ricoeur calls this act of thinking/seeing,

"the instan

taneous grasping of the combinatory possibilities.

. . ."78

He calls this productive character of insight "predicative
assimilation."79

Mark Johnson explains the synthesis as

"the imaginative leap in which we see how two previously
unassociated systems of implications fit together to reveal
an underlying unity. "80
The second step is the "pictorial" dimension.

It is

this aspect which is at stake in the figurative character of
metaphor.

Ricoeur argues that the pictorial dimension of

metaphor was intended by I. A. Richards' technical terms,
tenor and vehicle.

He draws a distinction between Richards'

terms and Black's frame and focus:

"Frame and focus

designate only the contextual settings, say, the sentence as
a whole--and the term which is the bearer of the shift of
meaning, whereas tenor and vehicle designate the conceptual
import and its pictorial envelope."81

In short, the first
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function of imagination is an imaginative leap and the
second is a picture of the semantic innovation.

Ricoeur

borrows Paul Henle’s concept of the iconic signification of
metaphor:

"If there is an iconic element in metaphor,

it is

equally clear that the icon is not presented, but merely
described.1182

As Johnson points out,

". . . the claim that

the iconic element provides a rule for reflecting on some
object or situation constitutes a preliminary account of how
imaginative metaphoric insight is possible.1183
To imagine, according to Ricoeur,

"is the concrete

milieu in which and through which we see similarities.

To

imagine, then, is not to have a mental picture of something,
but to display relations in a depicting mode."84

Ricoeur

ties his concept of imagining to the Wittgensteinian concept
of "seeing as," even though Wittgenstein himself did not
extend his analysis beyond the field of perception.

Ricoeur

extends the "seeing-as" notion by reference to Marcus B.
Hester and his The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor.

Hester

attempts to relate the concept of "seeing-as" to the
functioning of poetic images.

He distinguishes between

"wild" poetic images, which divert the reader, and "bound
images," by which he means concrete representations aroused
by the verbal element and controlled by i t .85

Poetic

language, according to Hester, not only merges sense and
sound, but sense and senses, meaning by that the flow of
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bound images displayed by the sense.
argues,

"...

These images, Ricoeur

bring to concrete completion the metaphorical

process . . . The metaphorical sense is generated in the
thickness of the imagining scene displayed by the verbal
structure of the poem.

Such is, to my mind, the functioning

of the intuitive grasp of a predicative connection."86
Moreover, Ricoeur locates the second stage of his theory of
imagination on the borderline between pure semantics and
psychology.

The metaphorical meaning thus compels an

exploration of the borderline between the verbal and the
non-verbal.

"The process of schematization and that of the

bound images aroused and controlled by schematization obtain
precisely on that borderline between a semantics of
metaphorical utterances and a psychology of imagination.1187
The third step in imagination is the moment of
suspension, or "the moment of negativity brought by the
image in the metaphorical process."88
makes possible a remaking of reality.

This crucial step
"A metaphor may be

seen as a model for changing our way of looking at things,
of perceiving the world."89

The contrast between the

everyday, ordinary world and the possibility of a new world
created by metaphor is a crucial development in the present
study.

There is a suspension of the ordinary, and there is

an invasion of the extraordinary.

The ordinary, however,

not destroyed, but is held in tension with the new.

is
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Ricoeur sums up the three-fold movement of imagination:
My contention now is that one of the functions of
imagination is to give a concrete dimension to the
suspension or epoche proper to split reference.
Imagination does not merely schematize the predicative
assimilation between terms by its synthetic insight
into similarities nor does it merely picture the sense
thanks to the display of images aroused and controlled
by the cognitive process.
Rather, it contributes
concretely to the epoche of ordinary reference and to
the projection of new possibilities of redescribing the
w orld.90
Based on Ricoeur's theory of imagination, we can
project the metaphors of the New Testament as disclosers of
possibilities for human existence which seem and are beyond
the limit of what our ordinary language and experience might
imagine.

I do not mean that religious metaphors present a

new, supernatural world wherein we may escape the world in
which we live.

I do mean that metaphor redescribes ordinary

reality in order to disclose a new, an extraordinary
possibility for our lives.

The New Testament contains a

parable of Jesus that suggests an additional "text" for this
entire study.

"Therefore, every scribe who has been trained

for the kingdom of heaven is like a householder who brings
out of his treasure what is new and what is o l d ."91

I will

attempt such a new metaphorical reading of a biblical genre
known as apocalypse.
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A Rhetoric of Apocalyptic Consciousness
I want to show the relationship between Ricoeur's
theory of imagination and metaphor and what I call a
rhetoric of "apocalyptic consciousness."

The connection can

be made because metaphor is such an essential ingredient in
all apocalyptic rhetoric.

Also, Ricoeur's definition of

metaphor as a redescription of reality coincides with a type
of apocalypticism that I consider essential to any proper
Christian preaching.

Apocalyptic texts are frequent in the

Bible, and I will argue for a different reality that is
created by the metaphor of apocalyptic.

What I attempt is a

positive hope rather than the usual negative despair
characteristic of much apocalypticism.
"Apocalypse" is a central New Testament genre.

Whether

apocalyptic demands demythologizing with Bultmann and Dodd,
or compels recognition as "the mother of all Christian
theology" with Kasemann, or the prophetic protest and sense
for the struggle for historical justice sensed in
apocalyptic by the liberation theologians, apocalypse
remains a central New Testament genre.92

I will not

attempt in this discussion to answer historical-critical
questions on the characteristic of New Testament
apocalyptic.

Rather,

I will abstract an "apocalyptic

consciousness" which I consider necessary for metaphorical
preaching.

Note that any association of apocalyptic with
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Ricoeur's definition is itself a metaphorical move, i.e.,
the asserting of similarity in dissimilarity.
In any event, a minimum "apocalyptic consciousness"
rooted in metaphor will include apocalyptic's challenge to
the status quo, explosive intensification, negativity, and
hope for a new "not-yet" future.

The tension of metaphor is

matched with the intensity of apocalyptic to form the
preacher's "apocalyptic consciousness."

Such a

consciousness is a challenge to any purely "individualized"
understanding of the Christian event.

The suggested view of

salvation is far more than "saving your soul" or "getting to
heaven."

The "privatization" of salvation is a leftover

from primitive,

frontier revivalism that, while still

providing impetus for evangelism, allows the preacher to
escape, avoid, or ignore the genuinely public nature of
Christianity as well as the oppressed, poor, suffering
marginalized majority in the world.
To refuse an "apocalyptic consciousness" and to claim
success as "God's chosen people" by baptizing thousands of
converts into a culturally accommodated religion of the
status quo is to evade responsibility as surely as those who
court an end-of-the-world literal apocalypse are attempting
to escape responsibility.

Either move--to save the world

one individual at a time or to devise cataclysmic schemes to
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destroy the world--is to deny the public, corporate,
communal nature of Christianity.
An apocalyptic consciousness serves as one corrective
to any slackening of intensity for publicness,

for the "not-

yet" future, for the power of the negative, and for the
power of the metaphorical "is/is not."

Moreover, the

presence of an "apocalyptic consciousness" negates the
pretense of the arrogant certainty of all claims to total
adequacy.

In short, apocalyptic consciousness challenges

all wisdom and all principles of order as a correlative to a
"rhetoric of folly."
Apocalyptic rhetoric flourishes in times of crisis.
"Terms like 'anomie' and 'aporia' recur in descriptions of
the apocalyptic situation.

Everything is lost.

Not only

answers but questions, meaning, and categories of meaning
are all forfeit."93

In times of crisis, the old ways of

understanding and practice no longer work.
argues that " . . .

David Tracy

the larger crisis is likely to be . . .

in a tradition, a culture, or a language that can no longer
simply move forward by means of its usual ways of
experiencing, understanding, acting, or interpreting."94
Stephen Brown carries Tracy's argument even further:

"Yet

when sufficient anomalies arise, or when competing
perspectives or root metaphors challenge the dominant one,
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both old and new paradigms appear as metaphors until the old
world image is reaffirmed or the new one replaces i t ."95
We live in such a crisis age.

Our culture qualifies as

one in which old and new paradigms struggle to define
reality.

We face something that is systemically awry in our

culture, i.e., systemic distortion.

To try to escape this

reality either by romantic hyperbole or positivist fiat is
to find oneself bound to old metaphors, and "trapped in two
intellectually spent but culturally powerful languages,
romantic expressivism and positivist scientism."96

I

realize that many scholars are not prepared to invite any
kind of Christian preacher to the conversation about our
survival.
theology,

Some do not want to think any longer about
for the religions seem to be spent forces.

Some

may want, like Richard Rorty, simply "to change the
subject."

Others have too many unhappy childhood memories

of a moralistic religion.

Still others are unable to

overlook the appalling history of Christianity, with its
litany of murder, inquisitions, political expediency, holy
wars, obscurantisms, persecutions, and exclusivisms.

While

these ethical charges have to be taken seriously, the
explicitly Christian offer of an authentic existence within
community deserves a hearing.
We simply need to appropriate the warning of David
Tracy:
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Whoever comes to speak in favor of religion and its
possibilities of enlightenment and emancipation does
not come with clean hands nor with a clear conscience.
If interpreters of religion come with any pretense to
purity, they should not be listened to.
If religious
thinkers will not combat the obscurantism,
exclusivisms, and moral fanaticisms within their own
religious tradition, how can the rest of us take them
seriously as providing new strategies for
resistance?97
The proposal of fundamentalist Christianity that the
hope for survival lies in the past and in the old seems to
me false and illusory.

The Garden of Eden cannot be re

entered for we are not innocent.
Heschel insisted:
responsible."98

Rather, as Abraham Joshua

"Not all are guilty, but all are

Responsible in this case means "response-

able. "
Crisis times call for rhetorical homiletics more
radical than the secure and tamed rhetoric of the
fundamentalists.

In light of the failure of the reduction

of religion to the revelational positivism called
fundamentalism, which proclaims intellectually untenable
tenets,

I ask for a different strategy.

In particular I

argue for a Christian proclamation that has the potential to
create a new world, i.e., a rhetoric of apocalyptic
consciousness.
While rejecting fundamentalism with its traditional
apocalyptic mindset, there is a sense in which any relevant
preaching will have an apocalyptic consciousness.

Such a

consciousness, as described within the parameters of a
rhetoric of folly, does not share all the characteristics of
biblical or secular apocalypticism.

Much of the excess

baggage of the apocalypticism of intertestamental Judaism is
thrown out.

For example, the element of determinism is not

included in the apocalyptic consciousness.

Mixon and

Hopkins define biblical apocalyptic as "a narrative text
reporting a vision of the end of things - all things - and
the vision of a new world to come.

The texts, appearing in

times of crisis for the writers' people and containing
allegorical symbols meaningful to the people but not to
their oppressors, offer hope to the intended readers.

Their

message is that doom is certain for the existing system.
God will effect the change; the oppressed need only await
God's replacement of the present world."99
The proposed apocalyptic consciousness considers the
preaching of Jesus as an appropriate model.

Jesus was not a

thoroughgoing apocalypticist, but he did display some
features of apocalyptic thought: Notably, his idea of a new
age about to break into the old reality.
reminds us,

As Barry Brummett

"Apocalyptic predicts an impending change (the

arrival of the Jewish Messiah or the return of Christ,
nuclear war, ecological catastrophe, or civil
disintegration)

. . ."10°

In addition, apocalyptic

presages the reversal of the values of the status quo.

(For
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a clear example of the rhetoric of reversal, see the
Beatitudes in Matthew 5).

Finally, apocalyptic demonstrates

that the the old age is passing away.
words,

In David Buttrick's

"The new eon of the Spirit will inevitably displace

institutional securities of the present ag e ."101
In summary, apocalyptic consciousness proclaims that a
new social reality is being created.

There are no cosmic

favorites, no atonement of violence, no Satan, no end-ofthe-world doom and gloom.

These traditional elements of

apocalypticism are discarded.
there is a radical hope.

In place of apocalyptic gloom

There is a rhetoric of reversal,

resistance, and radicalism.

The sacred cows are all swept

away: national identity, religious affiliation,

sexual

pride, and racial make-up.
To proclaim a new social order means to abandon
ecclesiastical accommodation in favor of a more radical
ekklesia, a new-order, being-saved community in the world.
Such a community is by no means an easy one to form.

As

Richard R. Niebuhr observes, we are all "radial" people; we
internalize the slogans, images, attitudes, advertisements
around us, and build a social world in which to live."102
Apocalyptic consciousness and Gospel metaphors are both
in tension with this present age: "Repent for the Kingdom of
God is at hand."

The message of Christ is not the promotion

of death, destruction, violence, and hatred, but an explicit
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faith, a complete trust, and an unrestricted love.
future is still hope.

The future is still open.

The
There is

much we can do.
Apocalyptic consciousness thrives on the old age/new
age paradox.

The open, uncertain future, known only by the

Abba, sets persons free to engage in whatever conversation
is taking place, and to propose a new social order or
reality in place of the old one.

The old order will not

expire or be destroyed in apocalyptic splendor, but the
audacity of the proclamation puts the "powers that be" on
notice.

We preach a gospel of new reality.

Apocalyptic consciousness, without blinking in the face
of corporate evil, accepts a bold, fearless responsibility
for the world.

Such a proclamation counters the gnostic

escapism of much biblical/secular apocalypticism, as well as
the feeling of powerlessness that such apocalypticism
promotes.

Walker Percy's Lancelot and The Second Coming.

for example, depict an out of control society in which
nothing can be done.103

In contrast, the preacher of folly

and apocalyptic consciousness is not caught in the illusion
of power and success, nor deluded by the myths of the super
hero so prevalent in American society104, nor deluded by
our frontier metaphors and myths, secular as well as
religious.105
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Finally, apocalyptic consciousness projects a theme of
reversal.

In the words of Jesus: "Some are last who will be

first, and some are first who will be last."106

The

radical inversion of values and understanding and status is
perhaps the most prominent feature of the New Testament.
Jesus made as much clear in the paradigmatic text of his
ministry:

"For the Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he

has anointed me to preach good news to the poor.

He has

sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovering
of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are
oppressed . . ."107

Paul echoes the same reversal:

"For

consider your call, brethren; not many of you were wise
according to worldly standards, not many were powerful, not
many were of noble birth; but God chose what is foolish in
the world to shame the wise, God chose what is weak in the
world to shame the strong, God chose what is low and
despised in the world, even things that are not, to bring to
nothing things that a re ."108
Foucault's concept of power and knowledge seems to
indicate that the discourse of others, such as the poor and
the oppressed, has been systematically excluded.

And yet we

live in an age when the voices of the others multiply: the
hysterics and mystics speaking through Lacan; the mad and
the criminals allowed to speak by Foucault; the primal
peoples defended and interpreted by Eliade;109 the dead
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whose story the victors still presume to tell; the repressed
suffering of peoples cheated of their own experience by
modern mass media; the poor, the oppressed, and the
marginalized--all those considered "nonpersons" by the
powerful but declared by a great reversal to be G o d 's own
special children.
At the very least, the rhetoric of apocalyptic
consciousness involves all persons in the struggle for
individual, social, political, and religious liberation.
Flannery O'Connor’s short stories illustrate the apocalyptic
consciousness of reversal.

For example, both "Everything

That Rises Must Converge" and "Revelation" reverse and
transgress our ordinary world of values.110

The

vulnerability of O'Connor offers a stark contrast to the
secular apocalypticism of Walker Percy; an atonement of love
not of violence.

It is an apocalyptic consciousness of this

kind that I advocate in a rhetorical homiletics of folly.
Metaphorical Sermons
The combining of Paul Ricoeur's definition of rhetoric
as the redescription of reality with a stripped-down
apocalyptic consciousness suggests a rhetorical/metaphorical
model for preaching.

For example, the history of Western

Christianity requires an acceptance of responsibility for
the subjugation of women.

The patriarchal metaphors of the
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Bible and the Church indicate the depth of the oppression.
The preacher can suggest an entirely different way of
perceiving the world, and a whole new world, a world where
women are equal, by changing the dominant metaphor for God
from father to mother.
From this perspective I develop a metaphorical sermon
combining the metaphor of Jesus as a mother hen with
apocalyptic consciousness.

For example, in Luke 13:31-35,

Jesus refers to himself as a mother hen, but he calls Herod
an "old fox."

I have juxtaposed antithetical metaphors to

set up a contrast between powerlessness and power:
Oh, how easy it is to pin all our hopes on the power we
can see.
Maybe that's the attraction of television
preachers.
The rich, powerful, charismatic preacher
exudes power to people without power.
Or, perhaps,
that's why we donate so much money to political
candidates because we believe POLITICS IS POWER.
Even
in church we buy the illusions that MONEY IS POWER or
POLITICS IS POWER or STATUS IS POWER.
Even in the
church we choose the FOX over the HEN. Move over old
fox:
There's some more folks wanting in the hen house.
And with all the power-grabbing and oppression going
on, we fail to see a different-order reality; a reality
of Jesus that claims Herod power is not power at
a l l .111
The sermon evokes metaphors that structure our everyday
concepts as well as metaphors that violate our status quo.
For example, MONEY IS POWER is a metaphorical concept
structuring the consumption ethic of our culture.
The metaphorical concept, MONEY IS POWER, is expressed
in such everyday sayings as "money talks" and "he who has
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the gold makes the rules."

Brown maintains,

"The decline of

the Church relative to the marketplace involved a decline of
religious vocabularies in favor of commercial ones."112
Likewise, greed has become, not a deadly sin, but a
capitalist virtue, so much so that the antagonist in the
movie Wall Street tells a meeting of his corporation's
stockholders,

"Greed is good."

Another example of a metaphor capable of structuring
everyday concepts is the metaphorical concept POLITICS IS
POWER.

One common expression indicative of the POLITICS IS

POWER metaphor:

"It's not what you know but who you know."

A more involved acting out of the POLITICS IS POWER metaphor
is the Church's frequent forays into the political arena,
liberals and fundamentalists alike.

Current political

debates enlivened by religious political involvements
include abortion, school prayer, creationism, nuclear
disarmament, and pornography.
sample,

As I suggest in my sermon

"Even in the Church we choose the FOX over the HEN."

The metaphor which violates the status quo and offers a
new description of the reality is the JESUS IS A MOTHER HEN
metaphorical concept.

The preacher offers a metaphor of

folly, the powerlessness of a hen overcoming the power of
Herod.

The preacher offers hope through the vision of a

different-order world.
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A variation on the power vs. powerlessness model is the
contrast between the Pharaoh of Egypt and two unknown, lowstatus Hebrew midwives (Exodus 1:6-19 and 1:22-2:10).

When

the opportunity came to disclose opposition to the oppres
sive power of Pharaoh, the no-status, no-power women step
forward.

A sample paragraph from one of my sermons suggests

the metaphorical treatment of the text:
Of all things, the Hebrew nannies stood up to the
oppressor.
Not the Hebrew army.
Not some biblical
Rambo or Terminator.
Not even Dick Tracy or Superman.
But two slave women refused to bow down and cave in to
Pharaoh.
Face it, somebody has to stand up.
Funny
thing about power-brokers. Sometimes it doesn't take
much to back them down. And there have always been
those brave souls from the past who have stood tall.
There's Shiprah and Puah, our Hebrew nannies; and
Gideon, the poor man who thought he was the least
person in the least tribe of all Israel; and Rahab, the
whore of Jericho who helped the spies.
And there are
others.
Dietrich Bonnheoffer praying before his
execution by the Gestapo, and Gandhi in India, and Rosa
Parks in Birmingham (Actually she sat down but her act
caused a whole people to stand tall).113
The deliberate choice of the contemporary metaphor,
"nannies," to describe the Hebrew midwives, accentuates the
awful gap between the powers that be in our own racist
society and the treatment that blacks receive.

Perhaps

remembering that to be a white American is also to belong to
a history that nearly destroyed one people (the North
American Indians), and enslaved and discriminated against
another people (the blacks) will be a disturbing metaphor
that remakes a whole new world, i.e., a world free of racial
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prejudice.

This is not, however, a denial of the "is" and

"is not" tension of the metaphor, or the harshness of the
status quo.
Conclusion
I have identified the principal language of a "rhetoric
of folly" as metaphor.

I have also applied selected

theories and sub-theories of metaphor to the preaching
event.

I have argued that the distinction of literal

language or truth is an illusion, and that metaphor is not
reducible to some literal paraphrase.

I have accepted the

concept of "limit", and in particular the limit-language of
metaphor as a way of redescribing reality.

In the sense of

disclosing new worlds and new meanings, we consider metaphor
to have epistemic value.

Using these premises, we can now

demonstrate how metaphor conceptualizes the Christian view
of the world, and how the preacher proclaims his/her message
metaphorically.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE CREATIVE POWER OF METAPHOR IN HOMILETICS
Thus far I have argued that a rhetoric for homiletics
should be a "rhetoric of folly."

Also, I have insisted that

metaphor, as a redescription of reality, is one possible
language for a "rhetoric of folly."

There remains one step

in the movement toward a rhetorical/metaphorical model for
homiletics: a discussion of the possible epistemic value of
metaphor.

Therefore, in Chapter Six I shall examine recent

philosophical and rhetorical discussions concerning the
cognitive force of metaphor.

The basis of my work is a

chastened homiletic realism that combines aspects of Richard
Rorty's pragmatism with James W. Hikins and Kenneth
Zagacki's "minimal objectivism."

I then make three basic

claims: 1) Metaphor creates character and authority,

2)

Metaphor creates community, and 3) Metaphor creates concepts
by which we live.

The work of George Lakoff and Mark

Johnson will be extended to the discipline of homiletics in
the discussion of claim number three.
The philosophical and rhetorical research on metaphor
has asserted that there is a certain tension involved in
metaphor, that metaphor is indispensable to all disciplines,
that metaphor occurs in the relation of the utterance to the
total speech situation in which it occurs, that metaphor
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"permeates all discourse," that metaphor is a fundamental
principle of thought and action, and that metaphor is
irreducible to any supposed literal meaning.

I will argue

that these assertions concerning metaphor have particular
practical value for the preacher as rhetorician.
A number of scholars have insisted on the positive,
creative value of metaphor.

Binkley maintains that there is

no pure core of literal meaning, and, therefore, there is no
reason to treat the literal as an ideal against which the
metaphor is to be measured.1
knowledge is metaphorical.2

R. H. Brown insists that all
Gerald W. Casenave claims that

metaphor is fundamentally a world-structuring discourse.3
Ted Cohen points to the aesthetic, cognitive, ethical, and
intimate values of metaphor.

He maintains that community is

a necessary precondition for metaphor.4

I believe the

converse also to be true: metaphor is a necessary condition
for community.

Loewenberg asserts that metaphor can be

creative in changing our world.5

Also, metaphor enables us

to see old concepts in terms of new insights.

Such a

concept of metaphor could be valuable for the preacher
attempting to resurrect "dead" metaphors in biblical texts.
S. I. Hayakawa suggests that language changes and grows
through metaphor.6

Paul deMan asserts that metaphor can be
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seen as operating in the shaping and extending of our
understanding.7

Earl R. MacCormac, in Metaphor and Myth in

Science and Religion, argues that both science and religion
are erected upon hypothetical root metaphors about the
nature of the world and human experience.8

Also, both use

metaphors to convey ideas about the known, thus science and
religion both have metaphorical bases.
In a similar argument, Casenave suggests that the
fundamental nature of language is discourse:

"The cognitive

significance of metaphor is grounded in the cognitive nature
of language.

In radical metaphor the very fabric of the

world order, the rules of comparison and collection,

is

being reworked . . . Metaphor is a response to an opening of
a new vista of what is.

It is the holding open of a

different perspective which has

been discovered."9

A

similar view of metaphor as perspective or point-of-view has
been argued by R. H. Brown, in his A Poetics for
Sociology.10
C. 0. Hartman, in "Cognitive Metaphor," poses the
question,

"How does the bric-a-brac of things we call ’the

world' become a world, a cosmos, a system?"; and suggests
the answer,

"that our minds, our senses, and our language

create that system by a process one ought to call
metaphorical."11

Hartman bases his conclusion on Kant's

Critique of Pure Reason and the work of gestalt psychol-
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ogists:

"Cognitive metaphor is analogical . . . Metaphor not

only lets us know, it helps us know what we know: to
understand. "12
The epistemological issue of metaphor is due partly to
the enduring influence of Max Black's "Metaphor."

Black

argued that there were insights expressible metaphorically
but not literally, and that interaction metaphors are not
reducible to literal language without loss of cognitive
content.

He also claimed that "It would be more

illuminating in some of these cases to say that the metaphor
creates the similarity rather than to say that it formulates
some similarity antecedently existing."13
Given this account of metaphor, scholars have
attributed creative power to metaphor as it appears in
science, philosophy, religion, sociology, or other forms of
discourse.

Black's claim that metaphor is not reducible to

literal speech means there must be a distinctive cognitive
function for metaphor beyond mere representation.

In this

sense metaphor allows us to see what previously was not
seen, and to say what previously could not be said.
Metaphor's "is/is not" quality shows remarkable affinity to
the rhetorical qualities of secrecy/disclosure.14

Metaphor

creates a new organization among our concepts by bringing
together what has not previously been associated.

"Speech

is creative in its metaphorical aspect, by virtue of
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metaphor's power to restructure our conceptual
framework."15
Take an example.

Suppose I am asked to describe

preaching in words drawn as much as possible from the
vocabulary of agriculture.

These latter terms determine a

system of implications which will proceed to control my
description of preaching the gospel.

To paraphrase Black,

the agriculture vocabulary filters and transforms: it not
only selects, it brings forward aspects of preaching that
might not be seen at all through another medium.16

To

describe preaching as if it were the planting of a crop is
to exclude, by the choice of metaphor, all the more negative
understandings of preaching as "harangue" or "manipulation"
or "emotionalism."
In sum, every version of the irreducibility and
creative, cognitive value of metaphor claims that metaphor
performs a unique function, and, therefore, cannot be
replaced by a paraphrase, literal language or conceptual
language without losing the distinctive cognitive content.
There is, however, a problem rooted in the epistemology and
ontology of language.

The background for this problem, at

least in rhetoric, has been the debates revolving around the
claim,

"rhetoric is epistemic."

Neither the objectivists

nor the relativists have made much genuine progress in this
inconclusive debate.

In reviewing the literature that has
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made up the debate about the nature of knowledge, reality,
and truth, I believe the opposite sides are closer than they
may appear.

I detect a movement toward a middle ground.

Indeed, a number of scholars, among them Richard Crable,
Richard J. Bernstein, Stanley Deetz, Mark Johnson, Keith
Erickson, and Walter Fisher, have proposed alternatives to
the current deadlock within the system of Cartesian
dualism.17

While some have attempted to solve the problem

by not dealing with epistemology at all, others have tried
to move beyond objectivism and subjectivism, and Rorty has
put forth an anti-epistemology.

I will argue, however,

for

a third view which incorporates objectivism and relativism.
I attempt to combine the insights of both while avoiding the
common error of each.
There is something beyond the subject to which language
must conform (this is the truth of objectivism).

This

something is not the objects, because they are within the
sway of the subject (the truth of intellectualism).

With

Johnson and Erickson I argue that metaphors are not merely
the product of the ego's power of imagination, but are
generated by beings outside the subject.18
The attempt to incorporate portions of objectivism with
portions of relativism I have labelled as a "chastened
homiletical realism."

Chasten is a theological word meaning

punishment for wrong doing.

I use the term as a metaphor
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for the need of homiletics to move away from a belief in
possession of certain truth to a less authoritarian
position.
A Chastened Homiletic Realism
Earlier, I employed arguments from the "rhetoric of
inquiry" to critique the Cartesian starting point of
traditional homiletics.

I did not, however, accept the

ontological claims made by, among others, Rorty and Schrag.
While I do reject the literalist, positivist Christian
fundamentalism,
foundationalism.

I support what I label as a "husk theory" of
In short, in agreement with James W.

Hikins and Kenneth S. Zagacki, I propose "rhetorical
realism" as the philosophical base of my homiletical model.
As already stressed, I am not authorizing rhetoric with the
power of certainty.

As Hikins and Zagacki assert:

"We

. . . contend that aspects of the world exist independent of
human knowers and can, at least potentially, be discovered,
described accurately, and known through communication."19
Hikins and Zagacki affirm some aspects of the rhetoric
of inquiry movement: specifically,

"...

Nelson and

Megill's proclivity to see 'every enterprise of research as
a rhetorical project,' and, importantly, Schrag's concern
that the new view be sensitive to communicative praxis, to
pedestrian affairs as well as specialized concerns, and that
it accommodate 'the contingency of social practices and the
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conversational voice of mankind.'"20

In an extension of

the acceptance of these three claims, I want to demonstrate
how the rhetorical principles of Richard Rorty, as an
example of the rhetoric of inquiry, applies to homiletical
realism.
Rorty's attempt to undermine traditional philosophical
assumptions has already been employed in this work as part
of the attack on rationalist, Cartesian certainty.

Now,

I

want to turn to a more explicit critique of Rorty's antiepistemological stance.

Janet Horne has offered the

following summary of Rorty's position:
1.

Knowledge is discursive, not absolute.

2.

What constitutes knowledge is determined by o n e 's
community, rather than by correspondence to truth.

3.

Since knowledge is discursive and ethnocentric, it
is enhanced by diversity of participation in the
conversation.

4.

Competing views of knowledge emerge in the form of
competing, or alternative vocabularies which gain
acceptance in a variety of ways--ways primarily
related to their discursive nature.21

Knowledge is not absolute.

Any revisionist homiletical

model will of necessity accept this proposition.

Dogmatism,

intolerance, claims of certainty, even for objectivists like
Hikins and Zagacki, are simply unacceptable.
embraced as the only way to move forward.

Pluralism is

Rorty's " . . .

somebody may come up with a better idea,"22 is matched with
Dorothy Van Ghent's "something else might be the case."23

233
Hikins and Zagacki, for example, repeatedly deny that their
epistemology is positivist in nature: " . . .

we are not

suggesting that one correct perspective can ultimately be
determined . . .

1,24

We do not " . . .

authorize rhetoric

with the power to determine ultimate, objective truth."25
Again,

"...

arguers are often guilty of entering debate

with the assumption that since they possess objective truth,
all disputants should, therefore, defer to their authority.
But advocating rhetorical realism does not necessarily
commit one to this sort of dogmatism."26

"While making

claims to know objectively at least some things [rhetorical
realists] recognize that any given item of knowledge may be
cast aside tomorrow as better theories and methods for
approximating reality develop."27
Hikins and Zagacki compare favorably in these examples
to Rorty's pragmatist position:
From a pragmatist point of view . . . there is always
room for improved belief, since new evidence, or new
hypotheses, or a whole new vocabulary, may come
along.28
To suggest that knowledge is not absolute, however,
does not of necessity commit one to a rejection of all
objective reality.

As David Tracy asserts,

"Only the

mindless would want to rid our culture of the emancipatory
discoveries of Western reason.1,29

In accord with Hikins

and Zagacki, I claim at least a minimal objectivism and
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foundationalism even for the rhetorical preacher.

To be

clear, such a claim is not synonymous with the naive realism
of fundamentalists or the positivism of biblical
literalists.

For example, to continue to hold a literal

interpretation of the Genesis account of creation is
impossible for anyone who accepts the findings of modern
science.

By the same token, a literalist theory of

scriptural interpretation seems no longer a viable option in
light of the results of modern historical study of the
scriptures.30
Thus, while granting Rorty's insistence that knowledge
is never absolute, I maintain a basic rhetorical realism.

I

contend that while all knowledge is partial and inadequate,
the rhetor discovers as well as creates.

Even though all

Christian truth-claims, beliefs, attitudes, values, and
symbols are indirect and hence relative, reality does exist
in objective ways and "is such as to bear description in
some ways and not others."31
On this view, an ultimate reality exists independent of
human belief or unbelief.

Among the various names ascribed

to the Christian reality, I choose to use the most common-God.

Accordingly I am expressing my belief (not ultimate,

dogmatic, certain, or objective truth) that God exists now,
existed before there were any humans to debate his/her
existence, and will exist long after humans are extinct.
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While the rhetoric employed to describe or disclose or
mediate God cannot ever be proven to be accurate,

"rhetoric

is not herein defined by the accuracy of the claims about
reality.1,32

I am asserting claims about reality from a

Christian perspective: a pre-existent Being that has not
been, and perhaps cannot be adequately explained, accounted
for, described, or disclosed by any of the traditional
Christian rhetoric.

The pre-existent Logos is above and

beyond all human words.
I am not, however, suggesting that my beliefs serve as
warrants for my arguments.

What I am presenting has much in

common with the critical rationalism of C. Jack Orr.

An

important contention of Orr is that knowledge claims are
"criticized in the name of absolute truth."33

What Orr

offers is the possibility of an objective reality that can
be and should be pursued but cannot be comprehended.
"Objective reality, then, is beyond human apprehension, but
exists in an independent and objective manner and is useful
for the critique of socially constructed symbolic
universes."34

The paradox of an epistemology based upon

contingent knowledge and an ontology predicated on objective
truth raises issues that are difficult, but not
insurmountable.
To claim that Orr's objective reality is a delusion is
of little value when the same criticism can be made of all
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knowledge-claims.

Besides, Orr also denies the existence of

any certain knowledge.

To live with doubt does not in and

of itself predict or produce chaos.

What is at stake here

is a Christian limit-experience and limit-language that
posits a mode of being-in-the-world with explicit faith in,
complete trust in, and unrestricted commitment to the
ultimate worthwhileness of human existence.

An explicit and

full recognition of this faith, trust, and commitment as the
common property shared by secularists and modern Christians
is perhaps the key to this discussion.

In making the

connection between secular and Christian faith as the belief
in ultimate significance of our lives in this world,

I am

not attempting to constitute traditional Christian cognitive
beliefs as evidence to be endorsed by everyone.

Rather, my

fundamental attitude toward reality is the same attitude
shared implicitly or explicitly by secular contemporaries.
No more than they am I insisting on pie-in-the-sky super
naturalism or positivist Christian fundamentalism.

I am,

however, suggesting that the Christian thinker holds that a
proper understanding of the explicitly Christian faith can
render intellectually coherent and symbolically powerful
that common secular faith in worthwileness that we share.35
Therefore,

I uphold a minimal objectivism based upon

the independent reality manifested in the Logos mysticism of
St. John.

Furthermore,

I believe that the Christian
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preacher can proclaim a message to Christians and nonChristians that gives credibility to the meaning and truth
of the central Christian metaphors.

In the words of Tracy:

Neither supernaturalism nor pure secularism, neither
classical theism nor atheism, neither an exclusivist
christology nor the rejection of Jesus the Christ can
allow us to reflect appropriately or to represent
adequately our fundamental faith in the ultimate
worthwhileness of our present action.36
More specifically,

I wish to deny the secular negation of

any real ground of meaning outside ourselves which assures
that faith is not mere illusion.

To deny the truth of

Christianity is not to prove it false.
believe," admits Barry Brummett,

"I have come to

"that philosophies are not

directly arguable, that they are matters of faith, grounded
in basic premises and belief systems."37

On this reading

Christian preaching has the same invitation to the conver
sation as all other truth-claims.
To summarize this section, I contend that while all
knowledge is partial and inadequate, the rhetor discovers as
well as creates.

Metaphor is the principal component in

this creative, inventive process.

We are now aware that

metaphors and other tropes are "necessary and not just
nice," since they are indispensable to constituting the
basic subject matter of preaching and to forming theories
about it.

Metaphor is our fundamental way of noting

similarity and difference, of illuminating the unknown by
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the known.38
metaphor,

As a minimal objectivist who utilizes

I claim that while all beliefs, attitudes, values

and symbolic interactions are indirect and thus relative,
reality does exist in objective ways and can be partially
described and structured through metaphor.

Now, we can

examine specific ways in which metaphor is creative.
Metaphor Creates Character
Character as used in this discussion is an extension of
the rhetorical concept of ethos, to include the notion of
character as well as the concept of character in metaphor.
Cal Logue expresses credibility as "speaker status."39
Andrew King explains,

As

"Speakers exhibit visual and verbal

signs that prompt their listeners to make judgments about
their right to communicate.1,40

Speaker credibility,

I will

argue, depends partially upon whether or not the speaker's
metaphors are accepted.

While members of a congregation

tend to share root metaphors as well as common attitudes,
beliefs, or expectations, their homogeneity cannot be taken
for granted.

The preacher still has an ethical responsi

bility to choose her metaphors with care.

Wayne Booth

cautions that "to understand a metaphor is by its very
nature to decide whether to join the metaphorist or reject
him, and that is simultaneously to decide either to be
shaped in the shape his metaphor requires or to resist."41
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A preacher, in the sense of one who tells the story of
the gospel through the use of selected metaphors, derives
authority in ways different from other kinds of speakers.
For example, a preacher who depends for authority upon the
"inerrant" Bible is asking his/her congregation to accept
his/her proposition or theory that the Bible is inerrant and
authoritative.42

The metaphorist, on the other hand, does

not ask for any external authority to provide a prop for
his/her proclamation.

He/She offers metaphors for the

consideration of the audience and wins or loses assent
accordingly.
The preacher, on this reading, is not demanding
allegiance to a certain proposition, i.e., an inerrant
Bible, but inviting participation in a certain vision of
life, a metaphor for reality.

As Booth maintains:

All the great poets seem to be saying something like
this: my vision of what stands for human happiness is
itself the activity of sharing pictures of what human
life is or can be. Metaphor in this view is not a
means to other ends, but one of the main ends of life;
sharing metaphors becomes one of the experiences we
live for.43
Booth recognized that the existence of a small group of
great religions can be traced to the clash of hundreds of
metaphors for the relationship of humans to God.44

Most of

these metaphors "have been tested in the great philosophical--that is, critical--wars and found wanting."45
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The preacher, therefore, faces the choice of
accepting traditional Christian metaphors or the risk of
presenting, without any credibility, alternative metaphors.
Perhaps I should make a distinction here between initial
credibility and derived credibility.

Obviously, a preacher

has a substantial amount of initial credibility within
his/her own denominational structure.

This initial

credibility is wrapped in twenty centuries of Christianity,
the accepted authority of God, the Bible, and the Church.

A

preacher may decide to always proclaim a message consistent
with this tradition.

For example, take Kathleen Hall

Jamieson's evaluation of the metaphors of Pope Paul VI:

"By

employing the metaphors in which Christ, the apostles, and
nineteen centuries of popes have expressed Catholicism, Paul
VI implies that he has preserved the tradition of the Church
and, hence, is a legitimate heir of Peter . . . Paul's
metaphors endorse ancestral doctrine."46
In the example of Pope Paul, we observe a preacher
embracing both an established rhetorical repertoire and a
pre-existent initial authority.

Of course, one could argue

that the Pope's credibility is of such a status as to
trivialize my distinctions.

Place the Pope, however,

in the

pulpit of a country Baptist church in the deep South, and
initial credibility is lost, and only that which he can
derive will count.
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My major concern in this section is to illustrate that
the preacher may derive credibility from his/her choice of
metaphors.

Even Pope Paul receives additional derived

authority by the traditional metaphors he employs.
result, it is unlikely," argues Jamieson,

"As a

"that Paul's

metaphors will tantalize with their freshness, but likely
that the audience will assign intended referents."47

For

example, Paul's metaphor of the Church as a body will be
naturally accepted by a Catholic audience with extended
meanings: Christ is the head of the body.

The Pope is

Christ's vicar; the faithful are members of the body, the
faithful, by sinning, can sever themselves from the body.
The metaphor,

"the church is the body of Christ "

sustains a traditional ethos for the preacher, building and
sustaining his character as someone to be trusted.

There

is, however, a more risky and perhaps potentially more
rewarding channel for the preacher: The quest of metaphors
that would improve our culture, even at the expense of
denominational loyalties.

From my perspective the various

denominations have each gathered around a favored cluster of
metaphors and worship these idols (symbols) as the whole
truth.

To transcend these metaphorical wars in pursuit of a

true ecumenicity and the end of all denominationalism would
be a noble goal for any creator of metaphors (as well as a
personal risk).

The point is, to paraphrase Booth, that the
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quality of Christianity will in part be measured both by the
quality of the metaphors it induces or allows and the
quality of the judges of metaphor that it educates and
rewards.48
In Susan Lanser's discussion of the status of a
narrator, she suggests that narrators may have both diegetic
and mimetic authority.49

Diegetic authority is related to

initial credibility in that it refers to the narrator's
personality and reputation.

Mimetic authority refers to the

speaker's ability to tell a story.

In other words, the

narrator has a derived credibility which rises from the text
or speech itself.

All preachers "are subject to judgments

about their mimetic authority, how well they tell the
story."50

I would extend mimetic authority beyond how well

the preacher tells the story to how well he/she chooses and
employs metaphors.

The preacher who does not make the

arrogant assumption that everyone accepts the authority of
the Church or the Bible, will, of necessity, attend to
establishing the right to speak as well as the right to
claim our attention.
Richard Sennett outlines two major schools of thought
on the nature of authority.51

Max Weber views authority as

based on how a person is perceived by subordinates.
person is perceived as having legitimacy, that person
possesses authority.

There are three categories of

If a
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authority according to Weber: traditional authority, legalrational authority, and charismatic authority.52
The second school, based on the thought of Sigmund Freud,
emphasizes believability.

In other words, people have a

need to believe that someone has credibility.

Sennett

criticizes this approach as making authority static.
Gerard A. Hauser notes,

As

"Rather than thinking of authority

as a thing, Sennett suggests it is a social construct.

It

exists as an event in social time and space, the product of
an interaction.1153
The preacher may profit from Sennett1s observation
concerning ethos.

As a social construct, ethos does not

depend on an audience believing that the speaker
legitimately possesses certain attributes of character, nor
does it rest on the needs of the audience.

Ethos is a

result of a dialogical partnership formed between the
speaker and the audience.

"Ethos is not a thing or a

quality but an interpretation that is the by-product of
speaker-audience interaction.1,54
Hauser suggests that ethos has several significant
features: 1) It is developed in the message " . . .

and is

the resulting product of choices about what to express and
to omit . .

2) It is dynamic in that ethos changes by

the moment, and 3) It is a caused response.

In other words,
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we can guide interpretations of our credibility by the ways
we argue, and this includes the metaphors we use.55
The implications of ethos as a social construct are
significant.

The preacher is free to create authority

within the text of the sermon rather than having total
dependence upon an external authority.

Also, the preacher

has the opportunity to develop trust of his/her vision of
reality through the metaphoric worlds he/she creates.
Aristotle's advice still rings true at this point:
a rule we trust men of probity more,

". . . a s

. . . and . . .

on

points outside the realm of exact knowledge, where opinion
is divided, we trust them absolutely.

This trust, however,

should be created by the speech itself, and not left to
depend upon an antecedent impression that the speaker is
this or that kind of man. "56
As I argued in Chapter One, the preacher is not engaged
in the stating of propositions of certainty, but in claims
that are probable, i.e., outside the realm of exact
knowledge.

Therefore, the preacher's task is to win

allegiance to his metaphoric vision.

Unless the audience

grants the metaphor, there is no credibility or authority.
In this interaction between preacher and congregation, there
seems to be an epistemic authority which the audience can
grant or refuse.

Despite all claims of external authority,

charismatic appeal, and the power of tradition, and
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position,

"the audience may refuse to mobilize its power, to

withhold its power, or to extend its mandate to a
spokesman.1157
I have already noted that the preacher has traditional
authority by virtue of a connection with twenty centuries of
Christian tradition.

Since legal-rational authority is

often that of position, the example of the Pope illustrates
that the preacher enjoys legal-rational authority.
the charisma of the preacher is an important factor.
F. Hopkins notes,
charming.

Also,
Mary

"We are inclined to heed people we find

A narrator who seduces us by the force of his or

her personality is likely to win our credence, a narrator we
can admire--for honesty, for cheerfulness in adversity,
generous attitudes toward others, for example.

for

Narrators

who demonstrate characteristics to which most of us aspire
will also succeed in getting us to accept their stories."58
The preacher may also establish credibility with a
demonstration of metaphoric competence.

When a preacher

offers a metaphor, the congregation must judge on the basis
of metaphoric authority.

No physical

evidence is relevant.

Metaphorical proclamation offers a new vision, a different
reality.

There is no certainty based on an examination of

the evidence.

The audience can only decide whether or not

to accept the vision, perspective, or reality of the
metaphor, that is, the context that allows the metaphor to
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exist.

As Booth insists, metaphor can be judged with

reference to a context.

And as he argues,

"The metaphors we

care for most are always embedded in metaphorical structures
that finally both depend on and constitute selves and
societies.

. . ."59

The context of the metaphor is the status quo or
essential agreement on what constitutes the existing state
of affairs or reality and the introduction of the counter
status-quo metaphor.

Take, for example, one of the parables

of Jesus, i.e., the parable of the workers in the field.
utilizing the example of a parable,

In

I am accepting the

prevailing view of New Testament scholars that the parables
of Jesus are metaphors.60

The parable opens with the world

as we know it: workers, wages, jobs, and economics.

The

foreman agrees to pay the workers a denarius a day.

Then

other workers are hired to work for nine, six, three, and
one hour.

When the foreman pays the workers, everyone

receives the same pay.

The all-day workers received one

denarius, and one-hour workers received a denarius.
different kind of world is introduced.

Now a

No longer are we

asked to deal in fairness, in a day's work for a day's pay.
The new world introduced by Jesus is a free grace world
where God is good rather than fair.
In somewhat less religious terms the audience is asked
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to choose a

world where time is not structured as money but

as the generosity of the employer.
occurs is a
status quo.

In any event, what

reversal of values, a counter-offer to the
A literary development of the story can be seen

in C. S. Lewis' The Great Divorce.
is on an excursion to heaven.

A large ghost from hell

He is appalled upon meeting a

solid person in heaven who had been a murderer on earth.
demands his rights.

He

The solid person tries to explain that

it is all a matter of mercy, but the ghost cannot
comprehend.
In summary, character and culture are both products of
metaphor.

The preacher is granted authority by virtue of

tradition, position, and charisma.

Derived credibility,

however, is at least partially determined by the metaphors
the preacher employs.

The metaphors are context-dependent

and the audience must decide whether or not to grant
legitimacy and authority to the reality offered by the
metaphor.

The preacher may choose, like other rhetors, to

rely upon traditional and positional authority.

She may, on

the other hand, risk offering new ways of viewing the world.
As I will explore in the next section, the shared risk in
offering the metaphor for the audience's unpacking, creates
the potential of intimacy and community.
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Metaphor Creates Community
Ted Cohen, in "Metaphor and the Cultivation of
Intimacy," insists that the proper concern with metaphor has
to do with meaning.61

He agrees with Ricoeur that metaphor

has a meaning in addition to the literal meaning.

Cohen,

however, goes beyond Ricoeur to define metaphor as
"peculiarly crystallized works of art."62

For Cohen the

issue is not so much cognitivity but community.

He drops

the question of metaphor’s cognitivity, and introduces what
he calls "the achievement of intimacy."63

There are ways

in which a metaphor-maker and a metaphor-appreciator, Cohen
claims, are drawn closer to one another:

"The speaker issues

a kind of concealed invitation; the hearer expends a special
effort to accept the invitation; and this transaction
constitutes the acknowledgement of a community.1,64
Cohen illustrates his point with an example,
chairman is a bolshevik."

"the

He suggests that the listener, in

this case the chairman, has to realize that the statement is
a metaphor, and then he has to unpack the figure.

"In doing

this he moves through a network of assumptions, hypotheses,
and inferences, at the core of which is the literal sense of
the expression and some part of which overlaps the complex
gone through earlier in achieving his realization that the
utterance was a metaphor."65

The rule, according to Cohen,
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is that the metaphor-maker and the chairman "become an
intimate pair."66

"The sense of close community results

not only from the shared awareness that a special invitation
has been given and accepted, but also from the awareness
that not everyone could make that offer or take it up."67
In the dual process of identification and interpre
tation, the chairman makes assumptions about what the
speaker believes and about what the speaker believes about
what the listener believes.

As Cohen points out,

"A

figurative use can be inaccessible to all but those who
share information about one another's knowledge, beliefs,
intentions, and attitudes."68

According to this under

standing, metaphor functions as a boundary which defines the
community.
Cohen also argues that metaphors are much like jokes.
The property that jokes share in common with metaphors is
the capacity to form or acknowledge community and establish
intimacy between the teller and the hearer.

The identifi

cation and interpretation of a joke is much like the same
process in metaphor.

"This must be related to the fact that

often a paraphrase fails to do the job of its metaphor in
much the same way that an explanation fails to replace a
joke.1,69
While Cohen is right to call our attention to the
metaphor-joke parallels, I do not believe he is suggesting
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that all metaphors are comic in nature.

In fact,

communication research suggests that on certain occasions
the use of humor reduces the credibility or status of a
speaker.70
conclusion:

Cohen does insert a disclaimer in his
"Do not, therefore, suppose that jokes are

always for shared amusement, or metaphors always for
communal insight."71

Despite the modest disclaimer, Cohen

comes out in favor of the idea of intimacy by insisting that
metaphor creates community.
On the basis of Cohen's concept of metaphorical
intimacy, I want to claim that the preacher as metaphormaker is a primary player in the game which creates a
particular church community.

The metaphors of the preacher

are an invitation for a congregation to enter into com
munity.

To demonstrate how completely given churches may

embrace offered metaphors, consider applying Erving
Goffman's definition of a total institution.

Total

institutions are those in which "all aspects of life are
conducted in the same place and under the same single
authority.

They are places in which one's activities are

always in the company of large batches of similar others,
where time is tightly scheduled, where there are explicit
rules and a body of officials, all according to a single
overall plan. "72

A church, with an authority centered in the pastor,
meets at least some of the criteria of a total
institution.73

For example, the autocratic preacher serves

as the basic authority, and like the Puritans of old, often
tries to enforce rigid rules upon the church members that
cover every aspect of life.

While church members are free

to come and go, there are explicit rules and a body of
officials.

It is a narrow and constricted world in which

the members of the congregation are uniform.

At least part

of the reason for such uniformity lies in the mutual
acceptance of the preacher's ruling metaphors.

Metaphors

are central to the preacher's ability to shape and control
the reality of his congregation.

For example, a charismatic

preacher insisting on the metaphor, THE HOLY SPIRIT IS A
TONGUE OF FIRE, creates a situation in which the faithful
can be validated only by speaking in tongues.

The

literalizing of the metaphor becomes the sign that a person
is a genuine believer.
create community.

The point is that metaphor helps to

Once accepted by the congregation, the

metaphors become the reality of the particular community.
Metaphors allow us to know and experience reality by
constructing a particular reality for us.

Thus metaphors

affect our thought and experience of reality.
prescribe how we are to act.
perform our metaphors.

Metaphors

In other words, we act out or

For example, a Christian who has
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accepted the metaphoric concept, THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A
W A R , will perform differently from the Christian who
perceives the Christian LIFE AS A WEDDING.
Thus, metaphor is a way of knowing.

The preacher can

use metaphor to construct a different reality for his
audience.

But the focus is on the invitation to partici

pate: An invitation to intimacy, a shared view of reality,
the making of a community.

Metaphor possesses the power to

form community and intimacy between the preacher and the
congregation.

A preacher becomes responsible for the

metaphors he/she uses, and is given or refused authority on
the basis of the audience's response to those metaphors.
Metaphor Creates Concepts
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson claim that metaphor is
"pervasive in everyday life . . . thought and action."74
Also, they claim,

"Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms

of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphori
cal in nature."75

In homiletical tradition, a preacher

always needs a text.

Therefore, my text76 for the last

section of Chapter Six is the claim of Lakoff and Johnson:
our conceptual system is largely metaphorical.

Lakoff and

Johnson insist with Ricoeur and Richards and others that all
language is essentially metaphoric.

It puts into tensional
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relationships words and the objects to which those words
refer, thereby structuring our world.
Our conceptual system, however, is not usually a part
of everyday awareness.

In order to create awareness, Lakoff

and Johnson offer a series of examples to give some idea of
what it means for a concept to be metaphorical.

One example

is the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR:
Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.77
Lakoff and Johnson are not implying that
arguments and wars are the same.

"The essence of metaphor

is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms
of another."78

Therefore, argument is partially struc

tured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of
war.

Lakoff and Johnson make an important connection about

arguments and war at this point: We talk about arguments as
wars "because we conceive of them that way--and we act
according to the way we conceive of things."79
we perform our metaphors.

In short,

We are actors and our metaphors

are our lines, but as such, our metaphors also structure our
performance.
Combining Lakoff and Johnson's claim that human thought
processes are largely metaphorical with the consensus that
Christianity consists of root and archetypal metaphors, we

254
arrive at the contention that Christian preaching by its
very nature is metaphorical and not literal.
As David Tracy asserts,

"That all major religions are

grounded in certain root metaphors has become a commonplace
in modern religious studies."80

Despite the emphasis on

metaphor in theology, however, homiletics has virtually
ignored metaphor.

This work is a partial beginning toward

correcting the oversight in homiletics of the significance
of metaphor.
To get an idea of how metaphoric concepts are crucial
to preaching, let us consider the metaphorical concept THE
CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A W A R .81

I have chosen the WAR metaphor

because violence is so much a part of the everyday life of
our planet, and because the metaphor of war is prevalent in
the Bible and Christian preaching in general.

The metaphor

allows us to conceptualize the Christian life in terms of
something that we understand more readily, namely, physical
conflict.
First, in a general sense fighting and war are
commonplace on our planet.

Our prospects of survival are

partially related to our concepts of fighting and conflict.
In a more specific sense, those of us who live in the South
are the by-products of a violent spirit.

The violent spirit

of the South mixed with the military images of the Bible
makes for a volatile religious experience.

255
According to historian Thomas L. Connelly,

"Violence

appears intrinsic to the Southern soul and the sheer mention
of it can produce a host of images."82

Violence as used in

this discussion is passion, strong feeling, the worship of
physical force.

"All of this is central to the Southern

soul--and its religion."83

Dixie idolizes force and power

in many forms: the football mythological hero, Paul "Bear"
Bryant; NASCAR race-car drivers; the adoration for a high
school football coach in a small Southern town; the
proverbial Good Ole Boy with his pick-up truck, 30.06 rifle,
NRA membership card, and bumper sticker,
Dixie or get your ass out."

"Get your heart in

In Connelly's words,

"It is an

idolatry of bigness, strength, force, extremism, and a mild
disrespect for authority."84
The shaping of the Southern self-image, still trapped
in the enigma

of losing the Civil War, gravitated toward

power, bigness, and showy excess.

As Connelly insists,

"There is too much bravado in Dixie and its music, too much
bluster and reinforcement of the male ego.
exercise of power."85

Violence is an

For our purposes, the point of this

excursion into the soul of the South is that the religion of
the South has imbibed at this same cup of violence.
Churches compete with one another to be the biggest as they
count their members in the thousands and spend millions of
dollars on huge worship centers.
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The battle metaphor, then, has deep affinities for
Southern Christians rooted as it is in Bible, Gospel music,
church, and culture.

The performance of this metaphor has

far-reaching implications: antagonism toward other Christian
groups, dogmatic extremism, combative anti-ecumenical
stances, and so forth.
In the second place, the Bible and the language of
Christianity are replete with battle metaphors.

The

Christian experience is conceptualized with words like
"war," "fight," "battle," "powers and principalities,"
"weapons," and "sword."

The most obvious New Testament

example of a battle metaphor is Ephesians 6:10-17,

"Put on

the whole armor of God, that you may be able to stand
against the wiles of the devil.

For we are not contending

against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against
the powers, against the world rulers of this present
darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the
heavenly places.

Therefore, take the whole armor of

God . . .”86
In addition to the language of the Bible, Christian
hymns contain numerous WAR metaphors.

Examples could be

cited in the hundreds, but a few of the more prominent
metaphors should suffice:
A mighty fortress is our God.
Though hosts encamp around me,
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firm in the fight I stand.
Am I a soldier of the cross?
Stand up, stand up for Jesus,
ye soldiers of the cross.
The Son of God goes forth to war.
Mine eyes have seen the coming of
the Lord.87 (You can sing this song
in Atlanta, but don't try to take an offering).
The most prominent and controversial of the battle
hymns is "Onward Christian Soldiers."

When the United

Methodist hymnal committee voted to exclude the song from
the proposed new hymnal, a holy war was declared.

After

months of strident rhetoric and threats, the war hymn was
restored.

"Onward Christian Soldiers" can be found on page

305 of the new United Methodist Hymnal, prominent evidence
of the power of the WAR metaphor in Protestant Christianity.
The CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A WAR metaphor crosses
theological spectrums.

Sermons by mainline Protestant

preachers are as likely to employ a cluster of war metaphors
as the harangues of a fundamentalist Bible thumper.

For

example, Bruce W. Thielmann, senior minister of the First
Presbyterian Church in Pittsburgh, concludes his sermon,
"Christus Imperator," with apocalyptic imagery from the
Bible and an extended WAR metaphor:
How do you see Jesus? I see him as the Book of
Revelation sees him, riding on a white horse.
His
vesture is dipped in blood, and on that vesture . . .
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is a name so holy that none of us can know it. And
behind him are riding the legions of heaven . . .
They come regiment by regiment and army by army and
legion by legion--all behind this One who wears crowns
and crowns and whose Word is of such power that it is
like a two-edged sword from his mouth.88
Christians who accept the war metaphor as their
dominant concept do not just talk about Christian living in
terms of war.

They see certain forces as their enemies,

especially Satan.
One.

Battles are won or lost against the Evil

The enemy's positions are attacked while Christian

positions are defended.

Many of the actions these

Christians take are partially structured by the concept of
war.

Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal

and spiritual battle, and the structure of war reflects this
reality.
In this sense the CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A WAR metaphor is
one that many Christians live by in this culture; it
structures the actions they perform in daily life.

It also
*«r

structures their perception of the world as an evil place
dominated by Satan.

The rhetoric of Christian apocalyp-

ticists can offer an example of how the war metaphor
structures reality.
Planet Earth, claims,

Hal Lindsey, in The Liberation of
"Satan calls the shots over this

present world system.1189

Lindsey produces a scenario based

on the CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A WAR METAPHOR.
literal enemy, while God is the liberator.

Satan is the real,
Lindsey asserts:

259
"With Satan as the legal ruler of this planet, it became one
great big slave market and everyone born into it of Adam's
seed is born a slave of Satan.

This was clearly taught by

Jesus and his disciples."90
Another example of the war metaphor is a denominational
quarrel.

Both sides are trying to get what each of them

wants, such as getting the other to accept a certain
viewpoint on the Bible.

Each sees itself as having

something to win or lose, territory to establish and
territory to defend.

Both sides use whatever verbal means

at their disposal-~intimidation, threat, invoking authority,
insult, belittling, challenging authority, evading issues,
and even "rational reasons."

But all these tactics are

presented as reasons; for example:
Because the Bible says so (authority)
Because if you don't I'll fire you (threat)
Fundamentalist Southern Baptists have won a twelve year
"holy war" for control of the denomination through the
creation of a powerful symbol that does not even exist.
Using biblical metaphors of THE BIBLE IS A SWORD type, the
fundamentalists have forged a weapon that has proven
unassailable: the inerrant Bible.
debate,

In the course of the

fundamentalists have changed their weapon to an

invisible one: only the original autographs are inerrant.
According to theologian Martin Marty,

"Biblical inerrancy is
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not a doctrine, it's a weapon."91

Since there are no

extant originals, the document is a prime example of
socially created reality.

For moderates who inject

inerancy, the only recourse appears as a frontal assault on
the authority of the Bible, and such an attack is likely to
be misunderstood or turned against the moderates.
Conservative Baptists have staked their claim to the
high and holy ground.

In addition, they have surrounded

their invisible weapon--the inerrant Bible--with literalized
biblical metaphors like substitutionary atonement and
creationism.

The point here is that not only the conception

of the Christian life but also the way certain Christians
carry it out is grounded in knowledge and experience of
physical combat.

In short, when a preacher conceives of,

carries out, and describes the Christian life as a battle,
his experience is grounded in the CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A WAR
metaphor.
In general, then, the metaphor THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A
WAR is prevalent in the Bible, Christian hymnody, sermons,
and culture.

The concept of life as a war structures

everyday activity and understanding for those Christians who
accept the metaphor.

"The concept is metaphorically

structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and,
consequently, the language is metaphorically structured. 1192

By no means is THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A WAR the only
metaphorical concept available for the preacher.

Use of

such a metaphor may be less ethical than imagining a church
where Christian living is not viewed in terms of war, where
there is no great enemy, where no one wins or loses, where
there is no call to battle.

Imagine alternative

metaphorical concepts: THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A PARTY, THE
CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A MARATHON RACE, or the CHRISTIAN LIFE IS
A JOURNEY.

As with the WAR metaphor there is ample support

for each of these metaphorical concepts in Scripture,
Christian history, and culture.

In each of the metaphors

suggested, the Christians would view life differently,
experience it differently, and perform it differently.

For

example, to perform the PARTY metaphor would be far less a
paranoid style than the WAR metaphor which perceives of the
world under the control of dark and sinister forces.

In

short, the Christian life becomes a different (and perhaps
more expansive and spiritually meaningful) reality in each
metaphorical concept.

Herein lies at least part of the

potential of metaphorical preaching.

Also it is possible to

imagine contexts in which the WAR metaphor would be as
appropriate as it appears to have been for St. Paul.
The preacher as rhetor attempts to structure a
particular reality, i.e., a reality considered as "folly" in
the real world, a reversal of the status quo.

We have

262
demonstrated that particular metaphors can dramatically
change our thought and experience of reality.

Now, I would

like to consider how the preacher can offer a metaphor that
radically alters a given status-quo metaphorical concept.
Let us consider the metaphorical concept TIME IS MONEY as it
is part of our everyday status-quo.
This metaphor, reflected in our culture by such
expressions as, "You're wasting my time," "You're running
out of time," and "He's living on borrowed time," has led us
to experience the reality of time as MONEY, as a LIMITED
RESOURCE, and as a VALUABLE COMMODITY.

To perceive of time

as something that can be spent, budgeted, wasted, and saved,
is the normal status-quo way of conceptualizing time in our
culture.
Lakoff and Johnson almost as an aside indicate that
"this isn't a necessary way for human beings to concep
tualize time; it is tied to our culture.
where time is none of these things."93

There are cultures

The preacher, as

the maker of a reality counter to the status-quo, has an
opening here.
other ways.

In other words, time can be conceptualized in
To consider another alternative, what if the

proper Christian understanding of time is the metaphor TIME
IS ETERNAL or TIME IS PLAY?

Either of these metaphors would

create a reality radically different from the usual
Christian understanding of time.

As a matter of fact, a

popular Christian concept of time is the same as the concept
of time in the TIME IS MONEY metaphor.

For example, a major

appeal of evangelists who employ conversion rhetoric is
"You're running out of time."

The preacher, playing on the

supposed fear of the congregation, suggests that there is
only a limited period of time available for the persons to
"be saved" or "accept Jesus Christ."

I have often heard

revival preachers implore their congregations to make a
decision.

"This may be your last chance.

Do it now."

are going to sing one last verse of 'Just As I Am'
typical hymn of invitation].
the invitation.

"We

[a

If no one comes you will close

Someone coming forward may extend the time

that some poor lost sinner has to accept Christ."

The

urgency and the creation of a reality based on the metaphor
TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE, supplied for centuries a
reliable technique for conversions.

An example of a

Christian use of the TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE is the
gospel hymn,

"0 Why Not To-Night?":

0 do not let the Word depart, And close thine eyes
against the light; Poor sinner, harden not your heart,
Be saved, 0 to-night.
Tomorrow's sun may never rise To bless thy long deluded
sight; This is the time, 0 then be wise, Be saved, 0
to-night.94
Other frequently used invitational hymns of the same genre
include "Jesus Is Calling," "Let Him In," "Only Trust Him,"
"Pass Me Not," and "Whosoever Will."95
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TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE is a metaphorical concept.
It is metaphorical because the preacher uses everyday
experiences with limited resources to conceptualize time.
Those who act on the basis of the TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE
metaphor conceive of time that way.

Since those persons

"walking the aisle" understand and experience time as the
kind of thing that can be wasted or lost, they perform the
metaphorical concept.

In other words, these converts no

longer delay their decision.

They come forward to receive

the offered salvation because "tomorrow's sun may never
rise."

The disappearance of this particular evangelistic

appeal may be, in part, the result of the gradual
realization of church-goers, that no matter how often the
preacher warned of their last chance, the sun did come up
again the next morning.

Thus, the preacher's created

metaphorical reality no longer cohered with the experience
of the audience.
bility.

As a result, the preacher lost credi

When no one in the audience performs the metaphor,

the metaphor fails, and the preacher, as metaphor-maker, is
not given status or authority.

As with most metaphors, the

negative extension of the limited time metaphor could be
expressed in a positive light.
The preacher can, however, offer different concepts of
time.

For example, the preacher can turn to the New

Testament for a concept of time as Kaipog, i.e.,

"the
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opportune time" or the right time.96

Now, time is no

longer perceived of as a limited resource.

The urgency, the

sense of time running out is replaced by a more relaxed
concept.

Time is ongoing and the emphasis changes from a

negative threat to a positive opportunity.

Time no longer

acts as a potential adversary on the verge of snatching away
the life of the unbeliever, but now acts as a potential
ally.

By changing the metaphor from the normal way we

conceptualize time, the preacher creates a new reality.

The

audience is invited to understand and experience time as
something other than TIME IS MONEY, TIME IS A LIMITED
RESOURCE, or TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY.
An even more radical departure from the usual metaphor
TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE would be to conceive of time as
eternal.

In the TIME IS AN UNLIMITED RESOURCE metaphor, the

usual Christian understanding of salvation is completely
changed.

Death does not mean the end of time or of

opportunities to be "saved."

Death is, on the new reading,

a passage to life on a different level.
the person can and will be "saved."
no place of eternal punishment.

In this new world,

There is thus no hell,

There is no such thing as a

person's last chance to relate to God.

Life does not end

but continues on in new and unexpected ways.

The theolog

ical concept that attempts to explain the metaphor TIME IS
AN UNLIMITED RESOURCE is called "universalism."

The point I
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am attempting to make is that the preacher can radically
alter the concept of time by using different metaphors.

The

choice of metaphor is a significant part of the preacher's
rhetorical task.

What I have offered are examples of the

way in which metaphors can be used to conceptualize our
everyday experience like TIME.

Conclusion
I have identified metaphor as a creative power for the
preacher.

I have also illustrated three ways in which

metaphor is creative and thus has epistemic power in a given
Christian community: 1) Metaphor creates character; 2)
Metaphor creates community; and 3) Metaphor creates concepts
by which we live.

I have argued that the preacher can offer

alternative worlds, i.e., ways of being-in-the-world through
the use of different metaphors.

Thus, the preacher as

rhetorician becomes a metaphor for Christian communication
far different from other metaphors such as the preacher as
herald or the preacher as prince of the pulpit.

Although

the preacher as rhetorician forfeits the security of status
quo authority, the irony is that by so risking herself, the
preacher may gain an enhanced, derived authority as the
maker of a new world.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
After the seas are all cross'd,
(as they seem already cross'd)
After the great captains and engineers have
accomplish'd their work,
After the noble inventors, after the scientists,
the chemist, the geologist, the enthnologist,
Finally shall come the poet worthy that name,
The true son of God shall come singing his songs.
-Walt Whitman
The rhetorical/metaphorical homiletics presented in
this study, I am assuming, is a model which outlines the
changes which take place in our concept of reality by means
of metaphor.

These changes, when embraced by a particular

community of believers, become the new reality of the
community.

In the creation of this new reality, one may

give meaning to the assertion,

"Metaphor is epistemic."

The

metaphors, offered up by the preacher-rhetorician, may
present a better understanding of experience than the status
quo metaphoric concepts, and if accepted by the community,
be granted epistemic authority.
Throughout this work I have endorsed the view of
Richards and others that all language is essentially
metaphoric.

The preacher, by utilizing rhetoric, may depict

a new world for her congregation.

In other words, the

metaphors of the preacher as rhetorician cross the boundary
of the old world and offer a new world.
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Such an adventure

276
moves the proclamation of the Christian message beyond
rigidism, reductionism, and rationalism.
In arriving at a rhetorical/metaphorical grounding for
homiletics,

I developed a series of moves.

First, I moved

rhetoric from its traditional position of exile back into
the heart of the homiletical experience.

Such a move was a

necessary prerequisite to granting epistemic authority to
metaphor.

By combining the insights of rhetorical theory

with the discipline of homiletics, I have attempted to
restore the synthesis of Augustine.

Without this prelim

inary move, rhetoric and philosophy would have remained
subordinate to theology.

Rhetoric would have been merely

the art of presenting truths and values already established.
Whenever truth is an already established certainty, all
disputed alternative methods are attacked as "mere"
rhetoric, i.e., mere opinions based on prejudices, passions,
and ornamental language.

As long as the rhetoric of

homiletics was that of sophistic handbooks, it was deni
grated as a devil term.

The only acceptable task of such a

rhetoric was as a technique for presenting ideas and putting
them in the proper form.

The preacher as rhetorician served

only a reductionistic method.

He/She presented the truth,

organized the truth in three or more propositions, and
decorated the truth with appropriate ornaments.

Second, I deconstructed the traditional homiletic
method as a copy machine version of Cartesian certainty
without the benefit of scientific, empirical verification.
The method of homiletics was shown to be antithetical to the
metaphoric language of the Bible, the metaphoric nature of
everyday language, and the metaphoric nature of the
homiletic experience.

By taking rhetoric seriously as a

context-giving tradition for homiletics, I could no longer
embrace certainty or literal truth for the preacher as
rhetorician.

The move from a supposed certainty to the

ambiguity and probabilities of rhetoric made me aware that
there are alternative ways of truth telling.

No longer

hemmed in by the paranoia about certainty, the preacher as
rhetorician is free to respond to the Cartesian question,
"How can I be certain," with a definite rhetorical response,
"You can't."

Contrary to the insistence of some Christian

thinkers, such a move from certainty to probability does not
eliminate Christianity from serious consideration or from
the ongoing conversation of humanity.

On the contrary, such

a move enables the Christian spokesperson to come to the
party without the baggage of dogmatism that frequently
causes Christianity embarrassment.

The preacher as rhetori

cian thus endorses a pluralistic method.
My third move involved the presentation, of an
alternative method of homiletics.

I labelled this method

•the rhetoric of folly.

The defining characteristics of the

rhetoric of folly are identification, direct semantic
speech, empathic communication, dialectical irony, and
metaphor.

I do not pretend that all public problems will be

solved through reliance on the rhetoric of folly and its
creative metaphorical power, but I do hope I have demon
strated that such discourse deserves a new hearing in a
world where technology and rationality have not produced
adequate answers to our problems.

I contend further, and

perhaps this reveals my hidden agenda, that by accepting the
rhetorical/metaphorical nature of Christian preaching,

the

preacher has a word which offers positive hope for a new
humanity and for our survival.

The elements of what may be

a naive construct are the rhetoric of folly, the creative
power of metaphor, a chastened homiletic realism, and an
apocalyptic consciousness.
Preaching, by its very nature, is rhetorical.

Through

out this work I have tried to present the significance of
rhetoric and metaphor to homiletics.

Future research could

expand the preliminary model of a rhetoric of homiletics.
Rhetorical critics could produce a rhetorical history of
preaching that concentrates on the dominant metaphors of
preachers, churches, and religious movements.

Metaphoric

criticism could offer insight into the great periods of
religious awakening in our world.

For example, the
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metaphors of Jonathan Edwards and the Puritans may hold
clues to a better understanding of the continued influence
of these early American Christians upon the American psyche.
In addition, a pragmatic model of homiletics could be
developed from this study.

Utilizing the model of

conversation, imagination, and metaphor, the preacher could
create an alternative method for preaching.

The potential

value of rhetoric for homiletics perhaps awaits the coming
of the poet worthy of the name.
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